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The migration phenomenon can be said to be as old as humanity, but it has never 
received so much attention as in recent years. More than ever before, migration encompasses 
nearly all countries in the world and touches on a variety of economic, social and security 
aspects affecting people’s daily lives. Now that we are living in the era of globalization, modern 
transportations has made it easier, faster and cheaper for people to move around an increasingly 
interconnected world in search for better jobs, education, and living conditions. As a matter of 
fact, the number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in recent 
years, reaching 258 million in 2017, up from 220 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000 (U.N., 
2017b). At the same time, conflicts, poverty, inequality and lack of sustainable livelihoods force 
many people to move and seek a better future for themselves and their families far from their 
homelands. In fact, in 2016, the total number of refugees and asylum seekers in the world was 
estimated at 25.9 million (U.N., 2017b). 
In the last decades, given the exponential growth of immigrant population in developed 
countries, migration is increasingly seen as a crucial policy issue by many governments, 
politicians and the broader public all over the world. Perhaps, the importance of migration as a 
public policy issue and newsworthy topic has never been more pronounced; just think that, 
according to the European Commission, EU citizens perceive immigration as one of the most 
important issues facing the European Union, second only to terrorism. 
Moreover, immigration has progressively arouse the interest of many scholars, who 
attempted to explain its determinants and to investigate its effects on a diversity of outcomes. 
Therefore, in the last three decades, we have witnessed to a huge proliferation of academic 
papers and empirical studies aimed at giving economic and social explanations for immigration 
dynamics that took place in major destination countries. 
Most of this literature focuses on the United States, a country with a long history of 
immigration, whereas studies that aim attention at Europe are still less numerous, giving that 
European countries began to transform from emigration to immigration areas far more recently. 
Anyway, in the last years most Western-European countries, including Italy, have experimented 
huge inflows of foreigners coming from developing countries with a strong impact on many 
different national aspects – like aging, labor market, industrial specialization, innovative 
capacity, economic welfare, education, pension system, and so on. 
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 The present paper is related to the large body of literature that tries to measure the 
effects of immigration on domestic dynamics. In particular, it focuses on the impact of low-
skilled immigration on Italian manufacturing firms, with an emphasis on its implications for 
productivity, efficiency, and innovation. By conducting two different types of analyses, this 
work represents an attempt to enhance the quite limited existing literature on the subject. The 
main analysis is aimed at examining whether low-skilled immigration, measured as the local 
share of low-skilled immigrants out of the total population, exerted a causal influence on Italian 
manufacturing firms’ profitability and efficiency in the period between 2008 and 2017. This 
main investigation is carried out on a big panel dataset that combines firm-level and local-level 
data. The second, additional analysis is intended to take the empirical research a little step 
further by exploring whether low-skilled immigration had also an impact on Italian innovation, 
measured as the number of patent applications presented by Italian residents between 2004 and 
2016. This additional investigation is performed on a smaller panel dataset that incorporates 
local-level dimensions. 
This study consist of three chapters. The first one is a sort of contextualizing chapter 
designed to theoretically define the migration phenomena. After a brief presentation of the 
different categories of migration, it is mainly devoted to an overview of the leading theories 
expressed by various scholars with the purpose of providing an explanation for the initiation 
and persistence of international migration. At the end, the chapter presents also some interesting 
insights about the challenges that migration theorists should deal with in the near future. 
The second chapter offers a quite comprehensive literature review. It firstly focuses on 
the major academic papers that attempted to investigate the impact of immigration on domestic 
economies and native population, in particular on the economic prosperity, the population 
growth and mainly the labor market opportunities in the destination countries. Subsequently, 
the chapter illustrates the main empirical studies on the effects of immigration on domestic 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and firm performance. This last group of papers are of particular 
interest because the empirical analyses on which the present work is focused can be said to 
belong precisely to it. 
The third and final chapter indeed illustrates in detail how the abovementioned statistical 
investigations have been set up and carried out. The core of the chapter is the search of a causal 
effect of low-skilled immigration on manufacturing firms’ performance. In particular, EBITA 
margin and asset turnover ratio has been identified as indicators of operating profitability and 
efficiency, respectively. Afterwards an additional analysis has been conducted in order to assess 
whether low-skilled immigration also exerts an influence on Italian innovation capability. For 
both analyses, the chapter details i) how data have been collected and combined to construct 
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the datasets, ii) which indicators have been used to conduct the empirical investigations, iii) 
which methodologies have been adopted, and iv) the results obtained from the regressions 
estimates. Moreover, some robustness checks and heterogeneous effects analysis are also 
illustrated. 
Finally, in the conclusions of the paper, empirical findings are resumed, interpreted, and 
compared to those obtained in the extant literature on the subject; moreover, the main 









MIGRATION: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
The concept of migration has always been inherent in human nature. As a matter of fact, 
the migratory movement is a habit that accompanies human beings through their entire history 
as a species. Over the centuries, they have always moved around the world, driven by many 
different causes that may vary according to the specific historical period. 
It is not difficult to believe that, without mobility, humanity would probably have faced 
nothing but extinction. And sure enough, population movements have allowed the spread of 
innovation and development from one region of the world to another, and have contributed 
therefore to the diffusion of technology and to the prosperity of mankind as a whole. In this 
perspective, it is clear that migration assumes a particular importance because of the way it 
continuously shapes – and re-shapes – societies, making them more and more diverse and 
complex over time. In fact, it is precisely because of its heterogeneity and complexity that the 
migratory phenomenon can be said to be one of the most discussed and studied by scholars of 
multiple disciplines – primarily economics, sociology, and geography. 
This first, contextualizing chapter is aimed at giving a general historical and theoretical 
overview of the multi-dimensional and multifaceted phenomenon of human migration. It is 
structured in two paragraphs: the first one classifies migration movements in four main 
categories, based on the definition of human communities according to language boundaries; 
the second one provides an overview of the most important and significant theories formulated 
by the various scholars over the years in an attempt to study and explain the reasons why 
migration flows generate and persist over time. 
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1.1. Categories of human migration 
Migration, whether of long or short distance or duration, is one of those characteristic 
human behaviors that have always occurred in human experience, from the appearance of the 
first hominid communities to the present. Over the centuries and millennia, there have been a 
series of periodic migratory waves, driven by different historical causes and characterized by 
peculiar features. But these “large-scale movements […] consisted in practice of an 
accumulation of smaller movements that fit into larger pattern with time” (Manning, 2013, p. 
2). In this perspective, migration can be seen not only as a collective phenomenon but also as 
an individual experience, linked to many deeper issues and choices, which intervene in the life 
of a single person or household. Therefore, it is clear that, having human migration a myriad of 
different facets and being it able to be analyzed at different levels, it emerges the need to define 
the phenomenon in the simplest possible way. Hereafter it will be presented a classification of 
human migration in four main categories, built on the definition of human communities on the 
basis of linguistic boundaries1. 
In any event, first of all, it might useful to specify why the concept of human community 
is so important for the definition of the migratory phenomenon. By its nature, migration 
generates connections, at least because every migration connects a point of origin to a point of 
destination. But more than links between two geographic areas, migrations consist of links 
between a community of origin and one of destination. From this point of view, it becomes 
fundamental to define what is meant by a human community and what are its boundaries. 
Like most other animal species, human beings also organize their existence in defined 
communities. However, what characterizes and distinguishes human communities is language2. 
Indeed, human beings organize their own communities on the basis of a shared language, and 
not just of geographic proximity. Only the members of the same community are able to 
communicate profoundly with each other, while communication with members of other human 
communities is possible, but it can occur in the best way only if one learns the other’s language. 
Therefore, a human community can be defined as the speakers of a given language, so the 
                                                          
1 However, it is worth specifying that, given the complexity of the migratory phenomenon, this classification 
should not be understood as exhaustive. The intention here is simply that of trying to frame a problematic 
phenomenon, so diverse by its very nature, within more or less defined categories. In the existing literature about 
migration, there can be found many other classifications, more or less sophisticated and complex, based on 
different criteria – sociological, geographical, economic, and so on (for a different perspective see, for instance, 
King, 2012). But since none of them is able to cover in full all the possible manifestations of the migration 
phenomenon, each of them must be taken for what it is – a simple, unpretentious attempt to describe an extremely 
multifaceted human habit. 
2 Oral communication surely exists among other animal species, as birds, dolphins and monkeys, and it existed 
also among the first hominids who appeared on Earth. However, what is meant here by language is a fully inflected 
language, with its distinctive grammar and vocabulary. Such a language eventually appeared and developed with 
our own species, Homo sapiens, approximately 300,000 years ago. 
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boundaries3 of human communities are not based on geography or ethnicity but rather on 
speech. 
Notwithstanding the usual thinking according to which communities are usually defined 
as ethnic groups or nations, the identification of communities based on linguistic boundaries 
adopted here turns out to be the most appropriate and useful for the purpose of framing 
migratory phenomena, at least for two main reasons. First of all, this definition allows a simple 
classification of social and cultural differences among communities. Indeed, members of the 
same community, tied together by language, also share a set of customs and traditions. People 
that move from one community to another, must learn not only a new language but also a 
connected set of customs if they strive for full assimilation. Second, language communities 
have long-term stability and steady patterns of transformation, while the ethnic identities and 
nations have been, and still are, considerably much more changeable over time. 
At this point, given the previous definition of human language communities, it is 
possible to classify migration – within and among different communities – in four main 
categories: home-community migration, colonization, whole-community migration and cross-
community migration. Table 1.1 briefly summarizes these four categories of migration, their 
main function and their typical demographic profile among humans. Three of these categories 
roughly corresponds to patterns of migration that can also be identified in other animal species, 
but the fourth one is peculiar of human beings, and has even been of key importance in 
determining the most part of human history and in fostering the development of mankind; 
though it represents only one of four categories, cross-community migration conditions every 
aspect of human migration because it has also an influence on all the other three categories. The 
following subparagraphs will deal with these four categories one by one and will briefly present 
their main distinctive features. 
  
                                                          
3 These boundaries among language communities are not necessary sharp – closely related languages and dialects 
may be easily understood by members of similar communities. In this sense, emblematic is the case of Italy in 
which dialects and linguistic inflections vary, in a more or less marked way, not only from region to region but 
often also from city to city. However, this does not completely prevent the understanding of the various dialects 
and inflections, especially if spoken in neighboring areas. But “beyond a certain level of difference, languages 
become mutually unintelligible, and can only be understood after a period of study and practice” (Manning, 2013, 
p. 3). 
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Table 1.1: The four categories of migration. 
Home-community migration 
Function: broaden gene pool or allow the division of labor by moving within community 
Species following this pattern: all species 
Human demographic profile: mostly young male and female migrant 
Colonization 
Function: extend geographic range of species 
Species following this pattern: all species 
Human demographic profile: mostly male migrant, primarily young adults 
Whole-community migration 
Function: alternate among ecological settings 
Species following this pattern: some species 
Human demographic profile: overall demographic profile of the entire community 
Cross-community migration 
Function: share community experience and spread technology 
Species following this pattern: Homo sapiens only 
Human demographic profile: mostly young migrant, primarily single male 
Source: own elaboration, based on Manning (2013). 
1.1.1. Home-community migration 
Home-community migration implies the movement of individuals from one region to 
another within their home community. That is, people that decide to change place where to live 
but without leaving the community they belong to. 
This type of migration mainly concerns offspring abandoning the family of origin in 
search of a life mate. So, “home-community migration is necessary for reproduction of the 
species, in order to maintain a sufficiently wide genetic pool” (Manning, 2013, p. 5). For 
humans in particular, these movements imply young men and women moving from one family 
to another in marriage. 
Moreover, home-community migration can also be linked to a sort of division of labor. 
An example of that is what happened in Italy in the 1950’s and 1960’s, when the profound 
process of restructuring that involved the manufacturing industry led to the intensification of 
the phenomenon of the so-called internal migration. In those years, the strengthening of the 
mass-consumption industry required the large-scale employment of workers, even without 
qualified industrial experience; therefore, young males left their farming families en masse and 
moved from Southern Italy either to the industrial cities of the North-West or to other important 
cities – primarily Rome –, where they were employed as workers in factories or in construction. 
This caused on the one hand, a general reduction of agricultural workers, and on the other hand, 
a sudden feminization and ageing of the agricultural sector (Pugliese, 2015). Hence, in this 
context, home-community migration ended up enabling the division of the labor force between 
agriculture and industry. 
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All things considered, it can be said that almost all human beings experience home-
community migration in their life, at least as soon as they decide to build a new family on their 
own or to move in search for a better working position within their country, even if they tend 
not to consider these localized movements as “migration”. 
1.1.2. Colonization 
Colonization consists in the departure of a narrow group of individuals from their own 
community with the purpose of establishing a new community elsewhere. Usually, the aim of 
colonization is that of replicating the home community in the new area by seizing unoccupied 
territory or either expelling previous occupants, even using force if necessary. 
This type of migration can be considered one of the primary means by which a species 
expands its geographic range. Usually the colonists settle in an environment that is similar to 
that of the community of origin, in order to maintain as much as possible the lifestyle to which 
they are accustomed. Colonists are more often male than female, and are primarily young 
adults. 
In human history, colonization occurred occasionally, but it turned out to be crucial in 
shaping the world as we know it today. Just think about how post-Columbian colonization in 
the Americas, Australasia and New Zealand is linked to the spread of tens of millions of people 
from Western European states all over the world. Former Western European colonists 
established their settled colonies in territories until then unexplored, forming larger or smaller 
groups, that were often dominant in their places of settlement. As it is well known, this 
European domination has lasted more or less over time, however influencing the customs and 
habits – including the language – of the colonized countries up to the present day. However, 
the most tragic consequence of colonization, especially the Anglo-Saxon one, was the 
extermination of a large part of the native population and the relegation of the few survivors in 
the so-called “indigenous reserves”; colonialism caused indigenous people to count nowadays 
around 370 million people – some 5 per cent of the world's total population (U.N., 2010). 
1.1.3. Whole-community migration 
Whole-community migration involves the relocation of all the members of a community. 
Some animal species migrate periodically, usually cyclically on an annual basis, and all the 
members of the community – except for some laggards – take part to the movement. These 
animal migrations occur between alternating environments, and this enables the community to 
accomplish its life cycle.  
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Humans rarely undertake this type of migration. However, some communities – the so-
called “nomadic people” – do move habitually; these communities do not settle permanently in 
a fixed location, rather they regularly move to and from the same areas, usually because of their 
form of economy or for reasons of historical and cultural tradition. This pattern – referred to as 
“nomadism”4 – “may have been fairly common for early human communities in the days before 
settled life began” (Manning, 2013, pp. 5-6). And sure enough, many cultures have traditionally 
been nomadic, but nomadic behavior is increasingly rare in modern, industrialized countries. 
Indeed, nomads are estimated to be around 30-40 million people in the world – definitely less 
than 0.05 per cent of the total population.   
Apart from economic or traditional reasons, it may also happen that a whole community 
is forced to migrate and abandon its homeland because of a natural or human disaster – such 
as, for example, in case of famine or expulsion by invaders. 
1.1.4. Cross-community migration 
Cross-community migration occurs when single individuals or groups leave their home 
community and move to join another community. This pattern of migration is almost 
exclusively followed by humans, while it is extremely rarely observed in other animal species; 
“language communication among humans provides the basic reason for this distinct pattern of 
migration” (Manning, 2013, p. 6). 
All human communities universally experience both out-migration and in-migration. 
Out-migration concerns members of a community who emigrate towards other communities 
because of various reasons; on the contrary, in-migration regards individuals who come from 
other communities and find a local role to play in a new community, for either a long or short 
time. 
Unlike other categories of migration, which present a main reason for their occurrence, 
cross-community migration may be triggered by multiple causes. The first reason for 
individuals to leave their home community is the need – or even the chance – to improve their 
                                                          
4 Nomadism is a form of mobility that is typical of three categories of communities: hunter-gatherers, pastoralists 
and “peripatetic nomads”.  
The nomadism of hunter-gatherers is usually linked to directly providing for their primary needs in the context of 
an economy of mere subsistence, and it appears as a cyclical phenomenon within the territory. 
The nomadism of pastoralists rest on the satisfaction of the needs of the livestock, and can be itinerant or seasonal. 
If pastoralists also practice some form of agriculture, their nomadism assumes the connotations of transhumance. 
“Peripatetic nomads” refer to various itinerant populations who move about in densely populated areas living not 
on natural resources but by offering services –  based on their skills in crafting or trading – to the settled populations 
among whom they travel. Undoubtedly, they are the most common remaining nomadic people in industrialized 
countries. 
Nomadism is also a lifestyle adapted to infertile regions – such as steppe, tundra, or ice and sand deserts –, where 
periodic mobility is the most efficient strategy for exploiting scarce resources. 
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own social or economic condition. A second reason for people to migrate is the hope to bring 
benefit to their family, or more generally to their home community; the migrants may be going 
to look for needed resources and learn new skills with the purpose of bringing back help to their 
households. A third, less common, reason for migration is the will to provide additional 
resources – or other type of benefits – to the receiving community; this motivation can be 
attributed to humanitarian volunteers and religious missionaries who reach destitute 
communities in poor countries. A fourth reason for migrating may be considered also the simple 
pleasure of voyaging, exploring new places, meeting new people, and discover different 
cultures around the world5. 
The decision to migrate, however, is not always taken in total freedom or autonomy; it 
can also assume the connotation of voluntary or forced migration. Some individuals may be 
compelled to abandon or escape their home community by external causes – not dependent on 
their will. Just to mention a few examples, this is the case of the various ethnic, religious, 
political, and social persecutions that have taken place over the centuries and that still occur 
today in many parts of the world; or even of the “Atlantic slave trade” from Africa to the 
Americas and the Caribbean which started after the discovery of the New World6; or, more 
simply, one can think of all the wives and children forced to accept the decision to migrate 
taken by the breadwinners. 
Clearly, as for other human migration categories, also cross-community migrants 
display a predominant demographic profile; they are usually young adults, and most of them 
are single males. Despite cross-community migration includes a variety of patterns which 
render it complex to be described, it can be framed in four generally recognized subcategories: 
settlers, sojourners, itinerant, and invaders. Settlers – sometimes referred to as “permanent 
migrants” – migrate to join an existing community that is different from their home one and of 
which they accept the prevailing rules and customs, with the intent of set up a new home at 
destination. Sojourners – also known as “temporary migrants” – move to a new community, 
with the intention of coming back to their original community after a period of time spent far 
                                                          
5 Although migration often generates hope and benefit to the migrants, it always brings also costs and dangers. 
The main risk linked to migration – especially for people emigrating from poor countries or escaping from conflicts 
and persecutions – is the mortality risk brought by the displacement; hunger, thirst, diseases, storm, injuries, 
disputes, and accidents in the course of travel, all raise the risk of dying for people that travel away from their 
home community, and the probability of these circumstances to occur increases the longer is the distance to cover 
to reach the destination community. The costs of migration include both monetary costs – the expenses incurred 
by migrants to move – and non-monetary costs. The latter concerns also the effort of learning a new language and 
new customs, and finding a new job in the new community. Moreover, the migrants “must go through the effort 
of social initiation, joining and finding an adequate place in a new community or household. This process […] is 
an essential step in the successful completion of any act of migration” (Manning, 2013, p. 8). For a well detailed 
analysis of costs and returns of migration, see Sjaastad (1962). 
6 Between 1492 and 1880 about 11 million black slaves were taken into captivity by slave traders and transported 
to the Americas, “under horrendous conditions and with very high mortality rates” (Ferrie and Hatton, 2013, p. 2).  
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from home, usually for a precise purpose. Itinerants – also called “onward migrants” – 
habitually move from community to community; unlike sojourners, they have no single home 
to which they plan to return. Invaders decide to relocate as a group in an existing community, 
with the objective of setting the rules and force natives to abide and adapt to them. 
As mentioned before, cross-community migration of humans assumes a particular 
character because of the existence of language and its peculiarities among different 
communities. Unlike animal species, human beings who migrate to new communities usually 
need to learn new languages and customs, while often introducing new language and customs 
to their host communities. This type of migration covers therefore a fundamental role both in 
spreading innovation from community to community7 and in sharing diverging community 
experiences, thereby bringing new resources and generating new ideas into the receiving 
community, which in turn stimulate further innovation in a sort of virtuous circle. 
In this respect, it can be said that migration not only brings benefits to individual 
migrants and their families or communities but also on a broader aggregated level; “the 
exchange of language, customs, and technology leads to innovations, as different ideas are 
brought into contact with each other” (Manning, 2013, p. 11). Nonetheless, there are also 
aggregated costs of migration; it always spreads diseases, sometimes causing massive 
contagion and bringing waves of death to all connected communities. 
To conclude, it is worth emphasizing that the typologies of migration presented above 
do not manifest themselves as independent phenomena. On the contrary, these categories – 
primarily colonization, whole-community migration, and cross-community migration –
combine with each other to provide one of the major forces for positive and negative historical 
change and the engine for the continuous transformation of human way of living. 
1.2. Attempts to explain the migration phenomenon: an overview of the leading 
theories 
Even though, as already said, “for thousands of years humans have moved around the 
globe in search for food, in flight from enemies, or in pursuit of riches, spreading their cultures, 
languages, diseases and genes” (Ferrie and Hatton, 2013, p. 2), it is only over the past decades, 
that migration has gained increasing cultural, social, and political significance. 
                                                          
7 Language is important in spreading innovations within human communities, thereby differentiating communities 
one from the other, and in turn cross-community migration is important in spreading these innovations from 
community to community. 
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It is well known that with the beginning of European expansion from the sixteenth 
century, and the Industrial Revolution from the nineteenth century – which set in motion a 
massive transfer of population from rural to urban areas within and across borders –, long-
distance migration assumed a new character, drastically different from that of the most ancient 
migrations. But it was in the second half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the last 
quarter, that “rapid and sustained economic growth, the increasing internationalization of 
economic activity, decolonization, and emergent processes of economic development in the 
Third World, all brought about the intensification of migration, both internal and international”8 
(Arango, 2000, p. 284). This change and exacerbation of migration flows has led some to state 
that we live in the “Age of Migration”9, a period in which international migration is becoming 
more and more “accelerated, globalised, feminised, diversified and […] politicised” (King, 
2012, p. 4).  
In addition to what has been said so far, in recent years population movements are 
gaining even more importance because of the diminishing impact of natural change on 
population dynamics. Immigration is becoming fundamental especially in the developed 
countries10, which are facing almost zero – or even negative – natural population growth. But 
the effects of migration are not limited to demography; it also affects many other aspects of 
social life – including economy, labor relations, politics, and culture. Hence, the phenomenon 
of human migration is a matter of common interest for many social-science disciplines11. 
From the twentieth century onwards, many scholars have attempted to provide general 
explanations for migratory phenomena and to assign them a defined theoretical framework. The 
final result of such efforts has been a series of theoretical models, conceptual approaches, 
notions, analytical frameworks, and empirical generalizations that do not constitute a coherent 
and general theory of migration; rather than developing a cumulative sequence of contributions, 
the relative short history of theorizing about migration consists of various attempts, often rigid 
                                                          
8 In theory, “there is a clear distinction between internal and international migration”, but in recent times 
globalization processes exacerbated the complexity of migratory phenomena, increasingly blurring the diversity 
between the mechanisms that characterize internal and international migration (Bijak, 2006, p. 4). Nowadays, both 
types of population flows are becoming more and more substitutes. Just think of contemporary Europe, in which 
the process of European integration with respect to the free circulation of persons and labor force, and the 
consequent partial dissolution of institutional barriers, both allow prospective migrants to rationally select their 
destinations; they can freely choose whether to migrate internally or externally, making their decisions on the basis 
of a cost-benefit analysis, and therefore revealing their true migration preferences.  
9 See Castles et al. (2014). 
10 According to the United Nations Population Division, between 2000 and 2015, positive net migration 
contributed to 42 per cent of the population growth registered in North America and 31 per cent in Oceania (U.N., 
2017b). These figures prove how immigration is essential for most of the world’s developed countries, the majority 
of which, as a consequence, “have become diverse, multiethnic societies, and those that have not [yet] reached this 
state are moving decisively in that direction” (Massey et al., 1993, p. 431). 
11 Mainly economics, sociology, and human geography but also social psychology, anthropology, demography, 
history, political science, law, and – moving towards the humanities – literary, media and cultural studies. 
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and largely developed in isolation from one another, sometimes even segmented by disciplinary 
boundaries (Massey et al., 1993; Arango, 2000).  In any case, more recent efforts – combining 
deductive and inductive reasoning – have led to a variety of middle-range theorizations, which 
seem to fit more closely with the patterns of migration today. 
Nonetheless, the migration phenomenon seems to be too multifaceted to be explained 
by a single theory12. Some scholars think that “the increasing diversification of migration types 
and processes, and also their increasing spontaneity of occurrence in the globalized, ever-more 
interconnected world of today, makes it difficult if not well-nigh impossible to envision a single, 
overarching theory of migration” (King, 2012, p. 7); some others believe that “a full 
understanding of contemporary migratory process will not be achieved by relying on the tools 
of one discipline alone, or by focusing on a single level of analysis”, rather they think that the 
complexity of current patterns and trends in migration can only be explained through “a 
sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels, and assumptions” 
(Massey et al., 1993, p. 432). But evidently such a comprehensive and multidimensional theory 
is still far from being formulated and developed. 
In the light of the above, the following subparagraphs will present in broad terms the 
leading contemporary theories of international migration. The first one focuses on Ravenstein’s 
“laws of migration” as they can be said to be the first attempt to synthetize knowledge on spatial 
population movements in the form of a coherent theory; the second subparagraph examines 
models that describe how international movements begin, while the third one considers theories 
that account for why transnational flows persist across time and space. Clearly, it would not 
have been possible to illustrate hereinafter all the various theorizations on migration developed 
over the years, therefore only the most significant will be presented. Table 1.2 summarizes these 
selected theories, specifying their subject and level of analysis, and their perspective in terms 
of disciplines of science. Finally, the last subparagraph will exhibit a brief overview of the 
future challenges that scholars should tackle to make significant additional contributions to 
migration theorizing. 
  
                                                          
12 In the past, studies of migration focused mainly on temporary labor migrants, settler-migrants, and refugees. But 
in the “Age of Migration” arose a variety of new types of population movements which are acquiring more and 
more importance in international mobility. These new patterns include, but are not limited to, globe-spanning 
migrations, local-scale cross-border shuttle migration, “residential tourism”, business visits and work contract 
migration, retirement migration, high-skilled migration and brain drain (King, 2012, p. 9). 
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1.2.1. The laws of migration of Ravenstein 
Theory building in relation to the explanation of migration phenomena is basically a 
matter of the second half of the twentieth century – especially of the last third. “Most 
contributions prior to the 1960s are nowadays of only historical interest, except for a number 
of contributions to the vocabulary of migration and the epoch-making significance of few 
outstanding forerunners” (Arango, 2000, p. 283). These undoubtedly include the seven “laws 
of migration” of Ernest-George Ravenstein, who is considered the uncontested founding father 
of the modern thinking about migration. Rather than real laws, his are empirical generalizations 
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based on observations and calculations about internal migration in Great Britain. Ravenstein 
(1885-1889, as cited in Bijak, 2006, p. 6) pointed out that the intensity of the migratory process 
is influenced by several factors – including distance, population size of the origin and 
destination regions, absorption capacities of the latter, and sex of migrants. Although he found 
the rural-urban flows to be dominant, he also acknowledged the existence of the return 
migration phenomenon. Ravenstein’s laws – as reported by King (2012, pp. 12-13) – are 
summarized here below: 
1) Migrants move mainly over short distances; those going longer distances head for 
the great centers of industry and commerce; 
2) Most migration is from agricultural to industrial areas; 
3) Large towns grow more by migration than by natural increase; 
4) Migration increases along with the development of industry, commerce and 
transport; 
5) Each migration stream produces a counterstream; 
6) Females are more migratory than males, at least over shorter distances, while males 
are a majority in international migration; 
7) The major causes of migration are economic. 
These seven simple laws have represented a real pioneering approach for that period 
since they were able to capture many aspects of the migratory dynamics that are still valid 
nowadays, even anticipating – by nearby a hundred years – some issues that would have been 
concern of successive theories. Boyle et al. wrote that Ravenstein’s laws “provided the 
hypotheses upon which much future migration research and theorization was built” (1998, p. 
59, as cited in King, 2012, p. 12).  More specifically, law 1) foreshadowed the gravity theory 
of migration (see subparagraph 1.2.2.); laws 2) and 3) concerned rural-urban migration and 
urbanization, which are historically the main mechanisms that still determine population change 
in most countries all over the world; law 4) linked development to migration and prefigured the 
hypothesis of mobility transition (see subparagraph 1.2.2.); law 5) opened up the study of two-
way migration dynamics, net migration, and return migration13; law 6) was even more 
pioneering and anticipated the matter of migration gendering; finally, law 7) can be thought as 
the most obvious since it stated a fundamental truism of most types of migration.  
It is generally recognized that Ravenstein’s laws implicitly constituted the first, leading-
edge endeavor to combine the individual rational-choice framework with macro phenomena, 
like rural-urban and developmental inequalities (King, 2012, p. 13). 
                                                          
13 “Return migration was only picked up for detailed study in the 1970s and 1980s and remains an under-researched 
component of migration” (King, 2012, p. 13). 
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1.2.2. Theories explaining the initiation of international migration flows 
There exist a variety of models that attempt to explain why and how international 
migration originates, and albeit they seek to examine the same thing, they do so by 
concentrating on different levels of analysis and by resorting to different assumptions, concepts, 
and frames of reference. Some of them – the most significant and influential – will be briefly 
illustrated below. 
Neoclassical economics: macro and micro theory 
Probably the oldest and best-known real theory of migration was developed by Lewis 
in 1954 in his “Model of Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”. Then 
his approach laid the foundations for the neoclassical macroeconomic theory, which is based 
on factor mobility and wage differentials between geographic areas. According to this theory – 
firstly developed by Ranis and Fei (1961, as cited in Massey et al., 1993, p. 433 and Arango, 
2000, p. 285) – and its following extensions14, both internal and international migration is 
caused by geographic differences in the supply of and demand for labor and other factors of 
production, above all capital, between two regions. Indeed, given wage differentials between 
two countries or regions15, – one characterized by a surplus of labor (unemployment) and the 
other by a surplus of capital – migration and capital movements occur between them. The flows 
of both production factors in opposite directions contribute to their even redistribution, and the 
related convergence of wage levels progressively brings back to the economic equilibrium, 
where the newly-stabilized wage differentials reflect only the costs of undertaking migration. 
Therefore, in the neoclassical view, the origin of international migration can be traced 
in disparities in wage rates between countries – which in turn mirror income and welfare 
disparities – and in the subsequent spatial redistribution of factors of production; “migration is 
a disequilibrium phenomenon, which ceases as soon as the equilibrium is reached” (Bijak, 2006, 
p. 9). 
One of the main advantages of the neoclassical economic theory of migration is the fact 
that it combines the macro perspective of structural determinants with the micro counterpart of 
individual decision-making mechanisms. Sjaastad (1962) firstly articulated the neoclassical 
microeconomic theory – that explains the reason why individuals respond to structural 
differences between countries or regions and engage in migration. It is founded on the concepts 
of rational choice, utility maximization, and expected net returns. 
                                                          
14 As cited in Massey et al. (1993, p. 433), see Harris and Todaro (1970) – who based their model on expected 
wages – and Todaro (1976). 
15 Lewis estimated that a differential of about 30 per cent would be sufficient for the exceeding labor force to 
migrate (Arango, 2000, p. 284). 
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Following this model and its subsequent specifications16, migration constitutes a form 
of investment in human capital, and the individual decision to migrate results from a rational 
cost-benefit analysis. Hence, prospective migrants – who seek to improve their well-being by 
moving to new places – weight up the pros and cons of moving relative to staying and choose 
the destinations that allow them to maximize the net present value of their expected future 
income, considering direct and indirect, tangible and intangible, costs of moving. Migration is 
therefore an individual, spontaneous, and voluntary act which is based on the comparison 
between the present situation of the rational actor and the expected net gain of moving. 
A subsequent generalization of the microeconomic theory is the value-expectancy 
concept of De Jong and Fawcett (1981, as cited in Bijak, 2006, pp. 11-12), which specifies the 
personally valued goals that might be met by moving. The assessment of the perceived linkage 
between migration behavior and the attainment of goals in alternative locations determines the 
individual motivation to migrate. This model may be adapted to many facets of human decisions 
in the migration context – not only limited to economic ones but including also social and 
psychological ones. The main problem behind this model is that many dimensions of migration 
decisions may prove to be hardly measurable. 
Despite its simplicity and its reconciliation between macro and micro perspectives, the 
neoclassical approach to migration presents some intrinsic shortcomings, which remarkably 
emerged after the mid 1970’s, when the dynamics of international migration changed 
dramatically. Therefore, the criticism to the neoclassical theory of migration is linked mainly 
to its problems in dealing with reality. Indeed, it does not justify some facts that commonly 
occur as part of migration phenomena; in particular, first of all, it fails to explain why so few 
people actually move, despite the huge differences in income, wages, and levels of welfare 
among countries should represent an incentive to migrate17; second, it is not able to justify 
differentials in migration rates among countries with similar structural economic conditions 
(Arango, 2000, p. 286); and third, it does not provide an explanation for quite some migratory 
phenomena, like for example return migration or population flows in the absence of economic 
disparities18 (Bijak, 2006, p. 9). 
Anyway, most shortcomings of the neoclassical economic model of migration can be 
partly lead back to the neglect of the role of the State in patterning migration flows; political 
                                                          
16 As cited in Massey et al. (1993, p. 434), see Todaro (1969, 1976). 
17 “In fact, economic disparities [among countries] are important, no doubt, but by no means sufficient for 
migration flows to take place” (Arango, 2000, p. 286). 
18 Moreover, “there exists an alternative Keynesian view on migration-induced labour market adjustments towards 
the economic equilibrium, through the elimination of differences in unemployment, not in wages” (Bijak, 2006, 
p. 9). In this perspective, net migration rates of a particular region follow – although with a time lag – the business 
cycle, disclosing a pro-cyclical nature of migration. 
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barriers, like restrictive admission policies, severely curtail the circulation of labor force and 
deter the movement of would-be migrants19. Clearly, mobility or immobility are nowadays 
much more affected by political factors, rather than differential economic conditions, and the 
selectivity of migration can be defined mainly in term of legal entitlements or personal 
characteristics in the event of undocumented migrants (Arango, 2000, p. 286). 
Intervening opportunities theory 
The neoclassical theory of migration has been also criticized because it disregards non-
economic factors, mechanically limiting the determinants of migration. The intervening 
opportunity theory of Stouffer, being part of the sociological theories of migration, considers 
also non-economic elements affecting population movements. According to it, the amount of 
migratory events over a given distance is directly proportional to the availability of attracting 
opportunities at destination and inversely proportional to the availability of such opportunities 
closer to the region of origin, i.e. to the emergence of intervening opportunities on the route to 
destination (Stouffer, 1940 and 1960, as cited in Bijak, 2006, p.6). These intervening 
opportunities may induce a migrant to settle in a place different from the destination initially 
scheduled.  
Therefore, under this theory, migration is related to the mutual interaction between 
geographic distance and opportunities available for prospective migrant in each different 
location. 
Push and pull factors theory 
Another criticism to the neoclassical theory concerns the treatment of individuals and 
societies as if they were alike and the disregard of types of migration different from labor 
migration. The unified push and pull factors approach of Lee (1966, as cited in Bijak, 2006, p. 
6 and King, 2012, p. 13) somewhat overcomes such criticism by combining the concept of 
opportunities with the elements characterizing the neoclassical approach. This theory describes 
migration as determined by the existence of attracting (pull) factors at destination, and repelling 
(push) factors at origin20. For international migration, these factors can be further classified in 
                                                          
19 On the contrary, the inclusion of the role of the State in the theorizing process about migration is the essence of 
the political economy approach. It merges the economic function of labor demand with state – or even supra-state 
– political mechanisms, which may spur or restrict international population movements. Indeed, “the political 
economy approach sees the immigration policies of receiving states (or supra-national bodies such as the EU) […] 
as directly shaping the volume, dynamics and geographical patterns of international migration flows” (King, 2012, 
p. 19). 
20 Pull factors include better income and job opportunities, better education and welfare systems, good 
environmental and living conditions, political freedom, land availability, etc., while push factors comprise 
unemployment, poverty, rapid population growth, political repression, religious intolerance, low social status, 
landlessness, poor marriage prospects, etc. 
24 
hard and soft ones: the former comprise dramatic events – such as environmental catastrophes, 
armed conflicts, or humanitarian crises – while the latter refers to less critical problems – like 
unemployment, poverty, or social exclusion. In addition, there exist also a set of “intervening 
obstacles” which may show up along the way and have to be overcome by the migrants – for 
instance, physical distance, cost of making the journey, cultural and language barriers, and 
political obstacles such as immigration restrictions. 
Personal factors also play a role in this model; different people will have different 
perception of the push and pull factors, and therefore they will react dissimilarly to various 
combinations of pushes and pulls – according to their status, age, preferences, and personality. 
Hence it becomes clear that the characteristics of the migrating population are determined by 
the prevalence of some factors over others; the favorable pull factors at destination tend to 
attract migrants who are positively selected in terms of motivation or human capital. But this is 
not what happens when the unfavorable push factors at origin are crucial in initiating the 
migration flow. 
Push and pull models influenced much of the migration thinking during the mid-
twentieth century, until the 1960s and later on. They clearly echoed the neoclassical economic 
theory, being they also based on principles like utility maximization, rational choice, factor-
price differentials between regions and countries, and labor mobility. Like the neoclassical 
economic framework, therefore, push and pull theories have been appreciated because of their 
logical simplicity but also criticized because of their determinism, functionalism, and 
disconnection from historical migration background and from the reality of migration. 
New economics of labor migration theory 
The deep changes undergone by international migration in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century21 had a crucial effect on the theorizing about migration. This led to the 
emergence of new theories that developed outside the neoclassical economic tradition. The new 
economics of labor migration theory – introduced by Stark and Bloom in 1985 and perfected 
by Stark in 1991 – is one of them, probably the most influential since the 1980s. According to 
Arango, “it can be seen either as an inside criticism of the micro version of neo-classical theory, 
or as a variant of it that refines and enriches it with a number of amendments and additions” 
(2000, pp. 287-288). 
                                                          
21 This period, for instance, is characterized by: i) migration flows becoming more global and heterogeneous in 
composition, ii) restrictive admission policies being adopted by most destination countries, iii) undocumented 
flows and clandestine traffics assuming an increasing relevance, iv) social integration of immigrants in the 
receiving societies becoming more problematic, v) transnational spaces and communities emerging more and more 
decisively.  
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The new economics of labor migration presents two main innovative features (King, 
2012, pp. 22-23). First, it suggests that migration-related decisions are not individual decisions 
but joint decisions taken within the sphere of the household. Sometimes the scope of the 
decision-making process moves to the meso level of more extended families or even wider 
community groups (Massey et al., 1998, p. 21, as cited in King, 2012, pp. 22-23). This first 
finding is in line with the fact that many migratory processes exhibit clear family patterns. 
Second, this model recognizes that the decision-making process is driven not only by wage and 
expected income maximization but also by income diversification and risk management 
strategies (Arango, 2000, p. 288 and Bijak, 2006, p. 12). In this perspective, wage differentials 
between origin and destination countries are no more the drivers of migration. 
Combining these two perspectives, it emerges that households and families control the 
various risks to their economic well-being by diversifying their capital resources in different 
activities and spreading their labor resources over space and time, in order to minimize 
uncertainty about family income or to overcome capital constraints (King, 2012, p. 23). 
Therefore, migration can be defined as a family strategy to risk management. 
The new economics of labor migration model stresses also the importance of individual 
preferences towards mobility, as well as of the difference – between countries of origin and 
destination – in the purchasing power of savings generated by migrants, which explains the 
phenomenon of return migration. 
Another crucial element is the community context, which pertains to the relative 
deprivation concept (Stark and Taylor, 1989, as cited in Bijak, 2006, p. 12). According to this 
approach, migration is driven by income maximization not in absolute terms but rather relative 
to other potential migrants in the reference group. Thus, the more uneven is the distribution of 
income in a given community, the more strongly relative deprivation will be perceived, and the 
more inducements will there be for further migration to take place (Arango, 2000, p. 288). 
It is interesting to notice that the neoclassical and new economic theories “lead to 
divergent conclusions about the origins and nature of international migration” (Massey et al., 
1993, p. 440). For instance, the two models present different return migration outcomes; in the 
neoclassical approach, return migration is seen as a failure because it occurs when migrants 
have miscalculated the balance of costs and benefits of moving, while in the new economic 
framework, return migration represents a success since people that come back to their home 
countries have achieved their target in migrating and accumulated the wanted savings. 
Nevertheless, also the new economics of labor migration theory has been abundantly 
criticized. First of all, it is totally focused only on the causes of migration at the sending side 
and shows limited applicability; the migratory contexts it portrays seem to be rather specific 
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ones, defined by long migration patterns and characterized by poor, rural settings. Moreover, it 
presumes that intra-household relationships are harmonious and that decisions are unanimously 
and collectively taken; in realty, tensions and conflicts are common inside a family or 
household, and this can often lead to distorted decision making. Finally, the new economics of 
migration do not consider those situations in which the whole family or household migrates. 
Dual labor market theory 
A theory that instead focuses only on the receiving side of migration is the dual labor 
market theory of Piore. According to this model – which was firstly introduced in 1979 in an 
attempt to explain migration at the macro level – international migration is driven by labor 
demand characteristics at destination (Bijak, 2006, p. 10); the dominant force in determining 
workers’ movements is the structural demand for certain types of cheap and flexible labor 
factors in advanced societies. This is based on the existence in industrialized countries of a dual 
labor market: a primary labor market of high-skill, well-paid, secured, and capital-intensive 
jobs for native workers, and a secondary labor market of low-skill, low-wage, dangerous, 
deteriorating, and labor-intensive jobs22, filled mainly by migrant workers (King, 2012, p. 16).  
This theory is founded on the fact that wages do not only represent the price of labor but 
also a proxy measure of a worker’s position. Indeed, Bijak wrote: 
If there are labour shortages at the bottom of the [occupational] hierarchy, the 
entrepreneurs would prefer to hire immigrant workers without aspirations to 
a higher social status, than to raise wages in order to attract local labour force. 
The latter option would require proportional wage increases in the whole 
sector to preserve the whole job ladder, and would ultimately lead to a 
structural inflation (2006, p. 10).  
In this perspective, immigrant labor is crucial for the economies of developed countries to be 
sustainable. 
The dual labor market theory justifies why advanced and newly industrialized countries 
present labor markets’ segmentation. Indeed, this segmentation occurs at two levels: at a more 
general level, the labor market is segmented between attractive jobs carried on by native 
workers and less attractive ones borne by immigrants; at a lower level, the secondary labor 
market, in turn, is divided in employment subsections according to gender, nationality, or race 
of the foreign workers. 
                                                          
22 While native workers refuse this type of jobs, foreign workers tend to accept them because they have no 
bargaining power, and because such wages and jobs are still preferable to the poverty and unemployment they 
should face at home. This falls under the so-called “status paradox of migration” – the transnational status 
disparity between a migrant worker’s status in the home country and in the host country. This status paradox is 
mainly observed in the case in which migrants are neither perceived to be skilled in the country of destination nor 
unskilled in the country of origin. 
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Therefore, the dual labor market theory furnishes interesting explanations for many 
aspects of migratory phenomena. In particular, it illustrates: i) why in advanced economies there 
exist low-productivity and instable occupations; ii) why national workers avoid such jobs; iii) 
why a countermeasure to this reluctance cannot be found in standard markets mechanisms; and 
iv) why immigrant workers from poor countries are willing to accept such jobs (Arango, 2000, 
pp. 288-289). Another merit of this model is that it highlights that immigrant workers do not 
necessary compete with native workers, affecting the latter’s wages and employment 
opportunities.  
Nevertheless, also this theory has its shortcomings. First of all, it hypothesizes that 
international migration is only demand-driven and ignores all the supply-side factors. Second, 
it appears difficult to operationalize to fit macro-level migration predictions, because it 
disregards all migrations flows that are not generated by recruitment practices23. Finally, it is 
not able to justify why different advanced industrial economies with analogous economic 
structures may exhibit different immigration rates. 
World system theory 
Keeping the focus on macrosocial processes, the world system theory of Wallerstein  – 
developed in 1974 on the wave of the dependency approach24 – presents a more sophisticated 
analysis of the development of the global capitalist system from the sixteenth century onwards 
(King, 2012, p. 18).  Wallerstein conceived the notion of a “modern world system” based on 
European hegemony, which comprises three coexisting realities.  Indeed, countries cover 
different positions within the global market economy; the dominant capitalist countries 
represent the “core-states”, poor countries constitute the “periphery” – which totally depends 
on the core through asymmetric connections in terms of trade, capital penetration, and migration 
–, while intermediate countries with regard to their wealth and interdependent status form the 
                                                          
23 Nowadays, most migrants move to advanced industrial countries on their own initiative, and in many case they 
even create their own demand for labor, rather than occupy pre-existing working positions. 
24 The dependency theory is the direct precursor of the world system theory. It took hold during the 1960s as a 
neo-Marxist approach which gave an explanation of migration diametrically opposed to the neoclassical one. 
While the neoclassical framework depicts migratory phenomena as self-correcting, leading to a new equilibrium 
in which migration no longer takes place, the dependency theory asserts that migration is self-perpetuating, 
replicating existing inequalities between regions. Therefore, this approach sees “social processes in terms of 
conflict rather than of equilibrium” (Arango, 2000, p. 285). Moreover, as opposed to the school of thought 
according to which migration is positively connected to development, dependency theory considers international 
migration linked to the global geographic division of labor and to the historical evolution of capitalism. According 
to the dependency approach, the world can be seen as a binary system in which the core of advanced, industrialized, 
and rich countries is opposed to the periphery of underdeveloped, agrarian, and poor ones. In this view, core and 
periphery are linked by uneven and asymmetrical relations; the enrichment and advancement of the former rest on 
the exploitation of the latter through colonization or other policies. Therefore, the dependency theory sees 
underdevelopment as a by-product of development and international immigration as a mechanism through which 
inequalities between countries are perpetuated and reinforced. 
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“semi-periphery”. These roles can be mutual beneficial and the role of a specific state can also 
change over time. 
According to this model, the flow of capital and goods from the core to the periphery is 
offset by the flow of labor in the opposite direction. This process is driven by two main forces: 
on the one hand, the raising demand for low-skilled labor in the core countries, caused by the 
increasing loss of attractiveness of manufacturing jobs for local workers; on the other hand, the 
intensification of productivity in the peripheries, brought about by the commercialization of 
agricultural production fostered by capital inflows, and the resulting reduced demand for local 
labor. These two combining factors determine the movement of the surplus of agricultural 
workforce from the peripheries in search for job opportunities in the low-paid segments of the 
manufacturing sector in the core. 
Therefore, the world system theory sees international migration as driven by the 
displacement generated by capital penetration in less developed countries – as a consequence 
of the domination exerted by core countries over peripheral areas –, and by the subsequent 
extension of the capitalist production method to further regions into a progressively unified 
world economy25. 
The main merit of the world system theory is that it recognizes that migratory flows are 
affected by the existence of many links – material, economic, historical, linguistic, cultural, and 
so on – between the origin and destination countries (Bijak, 2006, pp. 10-11), even if they 
present different stages of development. All these connections are the reason why, rather than 
a macroeconomic theory of migration, this model represents a cross-cutting historical 
generalization; it combines economic and sociological aspects to give a reasonable 
interpretation of history, in which all countries experience similar processes. As pointed out by 
Massey et al., in the world system approach “international migration ultimately […] follows 
from the dynamics of market creation and the structure of the global economy” (1993, p. 448), 
in particular from the asymmetrical relationships between the old colonialist countries and their 
former colonies. This is in line with the common-sense empirical observation that migration 
often occurs between countries that were connected in the past by colonial ties. 
However, the main problem with this theory is that it can be only applicable at a global 
level and that “migrants are little more than passive pawns in the play of big powers and world 
processes presided over by the logic of capital accumulation” (Arango, 2000, p. 291). 
Moreover, it seems that it can hardly be reconciled with the increasing trend toward the 
diversification of migratory paths; in reality, migration flows do not always follow the channels 
                                                          
25 “Therefore, migration also stems from inequality – in this case an unbalanced international order – but, contrary 
to equilibrium models, it reinforces the inequality instead of leading to its reduction” (Arango, 2000, p. 290). 
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of capital penetration, and spontaneous streams between either weakly connected or even 
unconnected countries frequently occur. 
Mobility transition theory 
The hypothesis of mobility transition of Zelinsky (1971) represents another attempt to 
theorize migration by historical generalizations on a large scale; it links changes in migratory 
behaviors to different moments in the process of social modernization. According to Zelinsky, 
this process provoked an increasing spatial mobility and a continuous diversification of 
migratory patterns. More precisely, this model is based on the fact that “there are definite 
patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent 
history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process” 
(Zelinsky, 1971, pp. 221-222, as cited in King, 2012, p. 15). 
These migration and mobility patterns manifested themselves differently through the 
five stages in which the historical experience of Europe can be split up (pre-modern traditional 
society, early transitional society, late transitional society, advanced society, and future super-
advanced society). Indeed, before the eighteenth century, migration was very limited and 
related mainly to local movements; during the transition from a pre-modern to a modern society, 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, migratory flows were directed both towards national 
borders and to other countries; in conjunction with the advancement of the industrialization 
processes, rural-urban migration increased until it began to diminish only in the second half of 
the twentieth century; in the advanced societies, either inter- or intra-urban migration is 
predominant, together with short-term circulatory movements; as technology improves and 
societies become super-advanced, some forms of human circulation are progressively 
substituted by better communication and delivery systems. 
Zelinsky’s model was quite visionary at his time since it combines various types of 
migration and mobility into a unique framework, and it even envisages the role of advanced 
communication technology in replacing some forms of mobility. However, in other aspects it 
was more limited and backward-looking; it totally ignores the phenomena of suburbanization 
and counter-urbanization, which are also typical of advanced societies, and it presents a limited 
applicability given that it embraces an obsolete approach to development, which can be related 
only to the historical experience of advanced economies. 
Gravity theory 
While Zelinsky’s theory was based on the concept of “demographic transition”, the 
gravity theory of Stewart was founded on that of “demographic gravitation”. This theory, firstly 
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introduced in 1941, represented an attempt to adapt equations of classical physics, in particular 
the Newton’s law of gravity, to the demographic behavior of large numbers of human beings 
(Bijak, 2006, p. 13).  
This theory conceives that migration between two regions is directly proportional to the 
product of the population sizes in the origin and destination regions – corresponding to the 
masses in the Newtonian model – and inversely proportional to the squared distance26 between 
the two regions. Hence, large numbers of people residing in a geographical region actually act 
as an attractive force for other people from other regions to migrate there, while the distance 
between the two regions behaves as a discouraging force. 
Interesting developments of this simple gravity theory observed that it can be adapted 
to the analysis of other aspects of the two regions by specifying the notions of mass and distance 
in different manners. For instance, instead of population sizes, economic dimensions like 
income or employment levels can be adopted as masses, while distance can be determined as a 
crow-fly measure or even considering the transport network structure, the costs of movement, 
or time. Moreover, different mass factors can be also investigated jointly, to cover more aspects 
that simultaneously influence migratory patterns. 
Therefore, according to the gravity theory distance represents a (discounting) factor 
which reduces the spatial interactions between regions, including population flows.  
1.2.3. Theories explaining the persistence of international migration flows 
At this point, it is clear that human international migration may start for several reasons 
– the hope for individual income gain exploiting wage differentials, or other attracting 
opportunities trade-offs, between countries; the presence of more general push factors at origin 
and pull ones at destination; the attempt to manage and diversify risk to household income; the 
recruitment strategy to satisfy the request for low-wage workers in advanced societies; the 
international displacement generated by market penetration in less-developed countries; the 
stage of the modernization process in which societies find themselves; the spatial interactions 
between origin and destination countries; or some sort of combination thereof. 
However, the situations that trigger international mobility may be quite different from 
those that sustain it across space and time. Although the aforementioned causes may continue 
to generate population movements, other forces that intervene in the course of migration come 
to operate as independent conditions that make additional movement more likely or easy. A 
                                                          
26 In the subsequent versions of the gravity model, theorists preferred not to square the distance measure and to 
apply the logarithmic transformation to the right-end side of the equation describing the magnitude of migration 
(Bijak, 2006, p. 13). 
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series of theories have been formulated to explicitly deal with this latter kind of causes 
determining the persistence of international migration flows over space and time. Some of them 
will be presented hereinafter. 
Network theory 
Migration networks are sets of interpersonal relations “that connect migrants, former 
migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, 
and shared community origin” (Massey et al., 1993, p. 448). They facilitate the circulation of 
information, grant financial relief, help new migrants to find accommodation and employment, 
and give them further assistance in many other aspects of everyday life. In this sense, networks 
reduce the costs – not only monetary costs but also psychological costs, time costs, search costs, 
and so on – and the risks associated with migratory movements and increase the expected net 
returns to migration. Therefore, they facilitate the flow of individuals from origin to destination 
countries, thereby increasing the likelihood of international movement. 
According to Massey et al., migration networks represent a form of social capital “that 
people can draw upon to gain access to foreign employment” (1993, p. 448); they are 
established on social connections that allow to achieve other benefits, such as employment or 
higher income. Notably, this “capital role that networks have usually played in migration flows 
is greatly enhanced nowadays in a world in which circulation is widely restricted” (Arango, 
2000, p. 292).   
Boyd and Nowak (2012, as cited in King, 2012, p. 22) classified migrant networks in 
three main categories: i) family and personal networks, ii) labor networks, and iii) illegal 
migrant networks27. They also emphasize the gendered nature of networks and the fundamental 
role that women usually play in the subsistence and improvement of networks. 
However, Taylor (1986, as cited in Bijak, 2006, p. 6) can be considered the first who 
identified the presence of interpersonal migrant networks in the receiving country as a 
fundamental factor explaining the self-perpetuation of migratory phenomena. Many migrants 
decide to move because others, with whom they are somehow connected, migrated before, and 
subsequently they usually join the network in turn. Indeed, migration networks continuously 
become denser and larger, as every movement widens the original network and increases the 
probability of its further expansion. Given their cumulative nature, migration networks act as a 
                                                          
27 Networks do not necessary have a positive significance, they also present a darker side. Just think of the 
phenomenon of trafficking and smuggling, which unfortunately is quite widespread nowadays. This common 
practice – which can be said to be in between social networks and criminal business networks – consists in the 
forcibly or trickery transportation of migrants across borders, and in their subsequent exploitation by keeping them 
in a restrained and indebted state (Samers, 2010, pp. 87-93, as cited in King, 2012, p. 22).  
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multiplier factor and thereby explain the perpetuation of migratory flows irrespective of the 
reasons that generate the initial displacement. 
According to Fussel (2012, as cited in King, 2012, p. 21), migration networks provide 
three important intuitions to the theorization of migration dynamics and foster their deeper 
understanding: first of all, the network theory marks a clear logical separation between the 
initial causes of migration and those that determine its diffusion and perpetuation over time and 
space; second, it contributes to the explanation of the phenomenon of differential migration; 
and third, it facilitates the prediction of future migration patterns. Moreover, Faist (1997, as 
cited in King, 2012, pp. 10 and 21) pointed out that another upside of networks is that they can 
be seen as the “crucial meso level” between the micro and macro perspectives of migration 
thinking, helping to connect individual decision-making to socio-structural determinants of 
migration, and therefore bridging a gap that represents one of the main drawback of previous 
theorizing efforts. 
All this notwithstanding, networks are not necessary inclusive, they can also be 
exclusionary. Furthermore, they must reach, sooner or later, a saturation point, which triggers 
a progressive decline in their scope and effectiveness. So far, however, little inquiry has been 
carried out on networks’ stagnation and dissolution; “theorising about migration networks has 
not gone beyond the stage of a conceptual framework” (Arango, 2000, p. 292). 
Institutional theory 
The institutional theory outlined by Massey et al. (1993) formally recognizes the 
importance of private institutions and voluntary organizations in facilitating the migratory 
process. Nowadays, a considerable amount of people try to enter into highly-industrialized and 
capitalized countries, but these countries generally offer a limited number of immigrant visas – 
which is not sufficient to satisfy all the requests – and built up strict barriers to entry. This 
unbalanced situation fosters the appearance of an increasing number of lucrative enterprises 
and other institutions that support international movements or somehow exploit them to gain 
whatever profits, yielding an underground market in migration. In fact, in developed countries, 
alongside voluntary humanitarian associations that assert the rights of documented and 
undocumented migrants and try to better their living conditions, there are also for-profit 
organizations, unlikely licit, that provide to migrants in trouble a series of services in exchange 
for expensive fees28. 
                                                          
28 “Humanitarian groups help migrants by providing counseling, social services, shelter, legal advice about how 
to obtain legitimate papers, and even insulation from immigration law enforcement authorities”, while the services 
provided by lucrative entities include “surreptitious smuggling across borders; clandestine transport to internal 
destinations; labor contracting between employers and migrants; counterfeit documents and visas; arranged 
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As pointed out by Bijak (2006), this institutional theory can be seen as an extended 
version of the network theory, in which the set of subjects facilitating the migration flows are 
broadened to a wide range of institutions, entities and organizations – either for-profit or 
nonprofit, either legal or illegal. As observed for the process of networks generation, also the 
process of institutions development appears to be self-perpetuating; over time, international 
migratory flows become more and more institutionalized and independent from the causes that 
initially generated them. Moreover, this progressive institutionalization of international 
movements turns out to be increasingly difficult to regulate, therefore authorities progressively 
lose control over migration flows once they have begun (Massey et al., 1993, p. 451). 
Cumulative causation theory 
The fundamental idea that migration is a self-sustaining and self-perpetuating 
phenomenon was firstly suggested by Myrdal in the late 1950s, under the label of cumulative 
causation. In more recent times, this concept was resumed and discussed further by Massey 
(1990, as cited in Bijak, 2006, p. 8), who highlighted how the evolutionary process of migration 
stimulates institutional and socio-economic change, both in the origin and in the destination 
countries, through various factors and feedback mechanisms. In this perspective, “causation is 
cumulative in that each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent 
migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely” 
(Massey et al., 1993, p. 451). 
The socio-economic factors and processes that may be subject to the influence of 
migration in this cumulative pattern include: i) the redistribution of income – both in absolute 
and relative terms – and the consequent relative deprivation, ii) the redistribution of land, iii) 
the organization of agricultural production, iv) the development of a culture of migration, v) 
the perverse regional distribution of human capital, and vi) the social meaning of work and the 
stigmatization of “immigrant jobs”. “Feedbacks through other variables are also possible, but 
have not been systematically treated” (Massey et al., 1993, p. 451). 
Therefore, according to the cumulative causation theory, immigration influences the 
socio-economic reality both in origin and destination countries by triggering a series of self-
reinforcing processes, which in turn stimulate more migration to occur. 
  
                                                          
marriages between migrants and legal residents or citizens of destination country; and lodging, credit, and other 
assistance in countries of destination” (Massey et al., 1993, p. 450). 
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Migration systems theory 
Deriving from the pioneering work of Mabogunje, the migration system theory has been 
widely acclaimed as an effective and comprehensive model for the study of migratory 
phenomena, mainly because of its multidisciplinary, analytical focus on the various structures, 
links, and processes.  
Seeing as how migration flows acquire a sort of stability and defined framework over 
time and space, stable international migration systems can be identified. Migration systems are 
comprised of a core receiving region – which may be a single country or a group of countries – 
and a set of specific sending countries, characterized by somewhat intense exchanges of goods, 
capital, and people. The relatively stable association of sending and receiving countries results 
not only from large migration flows; it is also bolstered by a continuous interplay of historical, 
economic, cultural, and political connections between the countries – both on the macro and 
micro levels – that give rise to a dynamic system. In this perspective, the presence of feedback 
effects makes population flows both a cause and an outcome of the other various interactions. 
In the very first draft of the migration systems theory, Mabogunje (1970, as cited in 
King, 2012, p. 20) described a model made up of five elements: i) the environmental setting, ii) 
the migrant, iii) control subsystems, iv) adjustment mechanisms, and v) feedback loops29. 
Massey and his co-authors then added a number of “interesting hypotheses and propositions” 
concerning the concept of migration systems. In particular, he highlighted that: i) although 
proximity facilitates exchange relationships, countries belonging to the same system do not 
need to be geographically close since flows rather reflect political and economic relationships; 
ii) systems may be multipolar, and this occurs when a set of dispersed core countries receive 
immigrants from a group of overlapping sending countries; iii) some countries – especially 
sending ones – may belong to more than one migration system; iv) stability does not imply a 
fixed structure, in fact systems evolve as social, economic, and political conditions change 
(Massey et al., 1993, p. 454). 
Even if Mabogunje firstly applied the migration systems model to rural-urban migration 
in West Africa, as subsequently noted by Kritz et al. (1992, as cited in King, 2012, p. 21), his 
theory may also fit to international migration features. This is because of the capability of the 
systems approach to combine the contributions of previous theoretical explanations with 
different levels of analysis, also incorporating the more relevant factors influencing the 
                                                          
29 Feedback loops were conceived as mechanisms calibrating the system either to maintain and expand it (positive 
feedback), or to reduce and cease it (negative feedback).  
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migration process – including networks, intermediary institutions, and even usually neglected 
dimensions like the State30 (Arango, 2000, p. 292). 
Therefore, the migration systems theory is regarded by many as a potentially scientific 
model but flexible in its extent and outlook. Its attractiveness is due to the fact that it moves the 
migration perspective from a linear, unidirectional, push-pull movement to a circular, multi-
causal, and interdependent framework, with the effects of change in one part of the system 
being traceable through the rest of the system (Faist, 1997, p. 193, as cited in King, 2012, p. 
20). In this sense, systems are self-sustaining, self-regulating (e.g. after a shock to the system) 
and self-adjusting. 
Nevertheless, despite the clear advantages of such a synthetizing and multi-perspective 
approach, the migration systems theory is at the moment too complex and mechanistic to find 
a practical application. Moreover, it has so far failed to go beyond the descriptive identification 
of various international, national, and regional systems, by the way concentrating on the most 
stable side of the system, i.e. the receiving countries.  
Transnational social spaces 
On the wave of both network theory and migration systems theory, international 
migration has been recently framed as a transnational process. The theory of transnational 
social spaces recognizes the existence of various cross-border links between individuals and 
groups that influence or are related to migration. As specified by Faist, “transnational social 
spaces consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties, their contents, positions in networks 
and organizations, and networks of organizations that can be found in multiple states” (2000, 
p. 199, as cited in Bijak, 2006, p. 7). Moreover, Portes clarified that: 
[…] transnational activities [are] defined as those that take place on a recurrent basis 
across national borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time 
by participants. Such activities may be conducted by relatively powerful actors, such 
as representatives of national governments and multinational corporations or may be 
initiated by more modest individuals, such as immigrants and their home country kin 
and relations. These activities are not limited to economic enterprises, but include 
political, cultural and religious initiatives as well (1999, p. 464). 
This transnational social spaces approach lies on the notion of social capital, viewed as 
the “resources that help people or groups to achieve their goals in ties and the assets inherent in 
patterned social and symbolic ties that allow actors to cooperate in networks and organizations” 
(Faist, 2000, p. 102, as cited in Bijak, 2006, p. 7). Therefore, the social capital – represented by 
the series of norms of solidarity, reciprocity, and mutual obligations between individuals and 
                                                          
30 According to Massey et al., the migration systems framework is “not a separate theory” but rather “a 
generalization following from the foregoing theories” (1993, p. 454). 
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groups – constitutes a set of local assets. Once migration begins, this social capital speeds up 
the adaptation process to the host society and also facilitates the preservation and sustainment 
of linkages with the country of origin. However, the social capital may not always be easily 
movable across borders, and this explains why certain social groups present a substantial 
relative immobility. In this perspective, transnational social spaces can be seen as a sort of 
bridges that facilitate migration flows between source and destination countries. 
The transnational social spaces theory has the advantage of presenting a sufficiently 
broad and interdisciplinary perspective to explain a wide series of migratory phenomena, like 
for instance chain migration, return migration, perpetuation of migration, and saturation of 
population flows once reached a certain level. Nevertheless, as pointed out also by Faist (2000, 
as cited in King, 2012, p. 25), there is the risk of overstating the significance of transnationalism 
by assuming that all international migration is related to transnational social spaces; in practice, 
this transnational approach can be applied only to a minority of migrants (Portes, 2003, p. 876). 
Moreover, despite its attractiveness, it is still far from a practical application and a concrete 
operationalization in migration forecasting. 
1.2.4. Future challenges in building migration theory 
After this brief overview of the most significant theories about migration developed so 
far, it should be clear that none of them is able to capture the full complexity of migratory 
phenomena, and probably no single theory will ever be. The main obstacle in migration 
studying and theorizing stands in its intrinsic diversity of types, forms, processes, triggering 
causes, actors involved, socio-economic and cultural contexts entailed, and so on. Therefore, it 
definitely seems quite far from reality the chance of succeeding in constructing a unique, 
comprehensive model capable of combining the two micro levels of decision making – both 
individual and household – with the macro dimension of the social and political context. 
As King stressed more than once, migration displays a “double embeddedness”: on the 
one hand the individual dynamics of migration – which are linked to human agency and directly 
influence migrants’ lives –, and on the other hand the macro dimension of migration – which is 
part and parcel of the current world’s social changing process and is related to the State and 
other structures. Indeed, migration is the result of an individual choice, but no doubt it is also, 
and especially nowadays, induced and shaped by government, military, or corporate decisions. 
Therefore, it emerges the issue of developing a “multi-level, multi-criteria micro-model of 
migration” (Bijak, 2006, p. 13) that is able to connect these micro and macro levels analytically 
and to explain the mutual interdependence between human agency and social structure, rather 
than their antinomy. An attempt in this perspective is represented by the structuration 
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approach, firstly theorized by Giddens in 1984 and then resumed and expanded by a number 
of migration scholars (King, 2012, p. 28). This model defines the social context and structure 
in terms of a time-space scale; as explained by Morawska (2007, as cited in King, 2012, p. 28), 
long-term and macro processes and powers form the “upper-structural layers” defining the 
“dynamic limits” which restrict the range of individuals’ action, while more proximate social 
environment – in terms of both time and space – determines the ground upon which people base 
their decisions and define their goals. In turn, actions undertaken by individuals may, or may 
not, have an influence on these local structures in the short-term and, over time, conceivably on 
the larger-scale ones too. 
This structuration model may be particularly suitable for studying population 
movements that occur between different settings, hence compelling migrants to face new 
structures and situations which they have to acknowledge and conform to, or maybe reshape to 
their own advantage. In this approach, migrants’ actions are neither the passive product of social 
structures nor simply the outcome of individual freedom of choice; rather they are the result of 
the evolving time- and space-specific contexts, and of the interplay between structural 
limitations and human agency. Nevertheless, despite its positive aspects, some critics argued 
that the structuration model has failed to provide any substantial improvement in migration 
theory, mainly given the problems in implementing the theoretical dualism intrinsic in 
structuration. 
However, notwithstanding the attempt represented by the structuration model, migration 
theorization is still far from being comprehensive and exhaustive. Existing theories “tend to be 
partial and limited” given that “they are useful to explain a facet, or a dimension, or shed light 
on a particular feature, or are applicable to certain types of migration in certain contexts and 
not to others” (Arango, 2000, p. 294). Indeed, there are still many aspects of migratory 
phenomena that existing theories have not yet properly addressed or that have even completely 
neglected. Therefore, it can be traced a list of future challenges that scholars should, sooner or 
later, deal with if they aim to offer (additional) satisfactory and interesting contributions to the 
overall picture of migration theory. 
To begin with, in the attempt of explaining why people move, theorists forgot to disclose 
why so few people move, i.e. why so many people do not move31. Causes of immobility are as 
                                                          
31 The latest figures from the United Nations Population Division point out that the number of international 
migrants worldwide – that is to say, people that are living in a country other than their country of birth – reached 
258 million in 2017 (U.N., 2017a). These numbers may seem notable, and even huge considered that if all these 
migrants were put in a single country, it would be the fifth largest in the world – after China (1.4 billion), India 
(1.3 billion), United States (324 million) and Indonesia (264 million). However, the other side of the coin is that 
over a population of 7.55 billion in 2017, migrants represent only 3.4 per cent. This means that 96.6 per cent of 
the world’s population prefers not to move, despite the main economic models, founded on push and pull factors 
of wage and unemployment differentials, suggest they should go. Hence, in such a globalized world like today’s, 
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important as causes of mobility to be investigated and illustrated. Therefore, migration theories 
should focus not only on centrifugal forces but also on centripetal ones. Many critics argue for 
the introduction of the pair of retain and repel factors in addition to the classic one of push and 
pull factors. In fact, the presence of centripetal forces that compel people to stay in their place 
of origin has been generally disregarded by the various theories – even though there can be 
identified significant signs of their importance, especially in recent years. This involves 
redirecting the focus on family, cultural, and social structures of non-migration at micro, meso, 
and macro levels; scholars should concern more about family and kinship systems, as well as 
about cultural, social, and political dimensions – including, for instance, the costs of cultural 
adaptation and the limitations represented by restrictive immigration policies, both of which are 
extremely crucial issues nowadays. 
This last argument is connected with the second challenge in migration theorizing; the 
acknowledgement of the importance of the role played by politics and the States in shaping 
migration types and flows – a role that is too often missing in the main theories. To better 
understand this necessity, one need only think that some even asserted that “migration is a 
creature of policy” (Davis, 1988, p. 259 as cited in Arango, 2000, p. 293)32. Sure enough, it is 
quite straightforward that theories based mainly on economic dimensions have some difficulties 
in conforming to an international migration setting, in which political concerns and decisions 
have such a prominent influence. Therefore, migration theories should aim for the explicit 
incorporation of political determinants that impact migratory processes and patterns, in 
particular countries’ admission policies and restrictions. 
A third challenge is linked to the problem of access to mobility. This issue represents 
one of the main determinants of class segmentation, both on an international scale – between 
countries in which people can freely move and those where this cannot happen so easily – and 
within countries on the basis of people’s wealth, social status, and connections. Kaufmann et 
al. (2004, as cited in King, 2012, p. 26) even suggested the concept of “motility”, a notion of 
mobility as capital – which they define a “new form of inequality” – that describes the potential 
and actual capacity of individuals to be mobile both geographically and socially. Moreover, 
according to King, “access to mobility […] will become a more fundamental differentiating 
factor within societies in the future” (2012, p. 26). Therefore, scholars should be more cognizant 
                                                          
while goods, capital, and knowledge can flow across countries’ borders almost without restrictions, people are less 
free to migrate than they were in the past; this is what some scholars called the “immobility paradox”. Evidently, 
there may exist plenty of factors that work to inhibit the mobility of particular groups and individuals. To go further 
into that, see, for instance, Malmberg (1997) and Chatterji (2017). 
32 In addition, Arango affirms that “nothing shapes migratory flows and types more than admission policies” (2000, 
p.293). 
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of this increasing significance of social structures of mobility and not be led astray by the over-
celebration of mobility for its own sake. 
Fourth, most theories only illustrate labor migration, as if it was the dominant type of 
migration. Nevertheless, the contemporary international scene is characterized by the 
increasing relevance of other forms of migration – such as family reunion, refugee migration, 
student migration, brain drain, lifestyle migration –, and they can be no longer overlooked in 
migration theorizing. Hence, existing theories should be adapted – when possible –, or even 
new ones specifically tailored, to deal also with these other types of migration. 
This last point is connected with the fifth challenge; the need for comparative migration 
studies in a period in which most theories are such restrictive and limited to particular migration 
types or historical periods.  
A sixth challenge is the strengthening of the relevance of gender in migration theory, 
much of which has totally neglected it or, perhaps even worse, has presumed that only men 
migrate, while women do not. As firstly recognized by Ravenstein at the end of the nineteenth 
century, males and females have distinct migration attitudes and propensities. However, even 
if men and women usually migrate under different circumstances and for different reasons, 
migration phenomena are characterized by “gender relationality”, in the sense that “the mobility 
of men will be misunderstood if not seen in relation to the mobility of women” (Bjerén, 1997, 
p. 226, as cited in King 2012, p. 27), and vice versa. Therefore, migration theories cannot fail 
to consider how gender relations radically affect migration flows and the decision-making 
process underlying them. In addition to that, they should also study whether and to what extent 
migration itself changes gender relations33.  
Seventh, migration theories rarely tale into account that migration is essentially a growth 
and decline process; population movement streams can be usually described by a bell-shaped 
curve, given that they rise, reach a peak, and then fall. Therefore, scholars should delve not only 
into the factors that determine the initiation or perpetuation of migration but also into the causes 
of its subsequent decline. Moreover, they should also be constantly mindful that the causes 
driving migration – and the contingent context enclosing it – can, and usually do, change over 
time, following the evolution of the migration flow34. 
Eighth and finally, so far theories concentrated mainly on the economic and sociological 
aspects of migration, and more rarely analyzed it under an anthropological and cultural 
                                                          
33 For instance, under particular migratory environments, migration can even contribute to women empowerment. 
34 At this point, it should be clear that migration cannot be considered a one-off phenomenon that concludes with 
migrant’s settlement, but rather an evolving process that is subject to the influence of various changing 
circumstances which reveal themselves at different time-scales – for instance, over an individual’s life-span or 
even between different historical periods. 
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perspective. Actually, according to King, there can be identified “two very broad trends […] in 
the recent writings about migration”. On the one hand, he recognizes a more traditional “attempt 
to reinscribe migration within the wider phenomena of social change”, which describes 
migration as both an effect and a cause of social transformation; in this perspective, migration 
studies are embedded in broader social science disciplines. On the other hand, in more recent 
times, the study and theorization of migration “has been heavily influenced by new perspectives 
arising from qualitative sociology, anthropology, human geography and cultural studies” (King, 
2012, p. 24). Just to mention an interesting contribution in this sense, in one of the still few 
studies built with a cultural approach, the geographer Fielding (1992, as cited in King, 2012, p. 
27) investigated the existence of two main “cultures of migration”: migration experienced as a 
“stairway to heaven” (connected to freedom, new opportunities, exploring places, etc.) and 
migration experienced as “being crippled inside” (connected to exile, slavery, exploitation, 
sacrifice, misery, loneliness, etc.). Even if it will not influence so much the traditional studies 
on the causes and types of migration flows, this cultural turn in theorizing migration will be 
useful to a better awareness of the migrant experience as a whole. 
To conclude, theoretical contributions so far provided a good but not yet satisfactory 
understanding of the causes of migration and of the mechanisms that give rise to its self-
perpetuation35. Actually, they can be seen as a range of interlocking perspectives which – 
combined together in various ways – can help to have a broader but not exhaustive overview of 
the nature and complexity of migration reality. Indeed, as pointed out by Arango more than 
once, “migration is hard to define, difficult to measure, multifaceted and multiform, and 
resistant to theory-building” (2000, p. 295). Therefore, future efforts to theorize migration are 
surely needed, and – in the light of what said above – they should not only aim at a better insight 
into the reasons behind migration, but also focus on other, less examined dimensions of 
migratory phenomena, including social structures (e.g. family and kinship ties), the State and 
the political context in which migration occurs, the relationship between migration and 
development36, various types of linkages between the macro and micro dimensions of migration 
(e.g. migration networks), the process of transnationalization, the experience of migration, and 
so on. 
  
                                                          
35 Also because many of them almost exclusively concern the most widespread migration phenomenon of the last 
period – migration from poor countries to richer ones – and ignores many other emerging mechanisms. 
36 As a proof of the importance of the relation between international migration and development, this issue 
continues to rise steadily on the agenda of the international community to the point that the 2030 Agenda for 
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At this point, it should be clear that international migration is, as some scholars have 
said, very straightforward and complex at the same time. On the one hand, it is a behavior so 
entrenched in human nature that there are a multitude of – rational and irrational – reasons to 
move, and some of them can even be given for granted. On the other hand, as Arango clarified, 
“providing general answers apt to account for an endless variety of situations is exceedingly 
difficult [and] general answers are bound to be reductionistic” (2000, p. 293). 
The previous chapter attempted to briefly illustrate the main migration theories 
developed so far. However, all these efforts in theorizing have not evidently led to significant 
cumulative progress in the knowledge of the migratory phenomenon. On the contrary, the whole 
contribution of theories to insights into migration is very limited – much more than one could 
reasonably expect from theories defined as such. The main issue with migration is that the 
wealth of forms and processes that characterize it, as well as the dynamism of the ever-changing 
reality in which it manifests, inevitably clash with the limitations of theory building. When 
scholars try to explain a human behavior that, like migration, is so affected by a large number 
of interrelated variables, they necessarily experience great general difficulties due to these 
limitations. As a result, “rather than fulfilling the function of guiding empirical research and 
providing testable hypotheses that can be contrasted with facts, existing migration theories are 
mainly useful for providing explanations ex-post” (Arango, 2000, p. 294).  
What is important to stress out is that migration is so complex and difficult to delineate, 
not only because it displays a multitude of causes and mechanisms, but also because its various 
consequences are not all so clear and well known. During the last three decades, along with the 
exponential growth of the immigrant population in developed countries, a huge proliferation of 
empirical case studies and academic papers on the consequences of immigration took place. 
These empirical works extensively analyze the effects of this or that migrant group on this or 
that country outcome: population growth and skill composition, internal migration, crime, 
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health and well-being37, wages and employment opportunities, ethnic and income composition 
of the neighborhoods38, school performance39, innovation and entrepreneurship, firm 
productivity, trade creation and prices – just to mention a few.  
Most of these studies estimating the impact of migration phenomena are based on U.S. 
data, while the empirical literature on European migration is by far more recent. This is due to 
two main factors. The first factor is historical; the Americas – and the Unites States in particular 
– have been the leading destination of huge immigrant flows for a very long time40, while 
Europe begun to turn from an emigration to an immigration area only after World War II, and 
more markedly at the end of the 70s41. The second factor is more “technical”; migration in the 
United States is strictly monitored and data on immigrants are largely available, while for the 
European Union there is still a lack of data on migration, which is notably illegal migration42.  
In the light of the above, the aim of this second chapter is to present an overview of the 
main papers intended to study the possible effects of immigration on the national dynamics of 
the destination countries. For clarity of exposition, given the multitude of studies on the subject, 
it was decided to sort the most significant ones into two broad groups, identified according to 
the topic under consideration and the different outcomes resulting from the immigration effects.  
  
                                                          
37 About this topic, see, for instance, Longhi (2014) for England, Giuntella and Mazzonna (2015) for Germany, 
and Ortmeyer and Quinn (2015) for the United States. 
38 For a cross-country analysis of the relationship between immigration in neighbor states and state redistributive 
expenditures, see, for instance, Hempstead (2001). 
39 About this topic, see, for instance, Neymotin (2009) for the United States and Brunello and Rocco (2013) for a 
broader cross-country analysis. 
40 Consider that only “in the century following 1820, an estimated 60 million Europeans set sail for labor-scarce 
New World destinations [and] about three fifths of these went to the United States” (Hatton and Williamson, 1992, 
p. 2). But to fully understand the historical role of the Americas as main immigrant destination, the mass 
(voluntary) migration of Europeans which occurred over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has to be taken 
into account along with another intercontinental migration of comparable size, i.e. the preceding (coerced) 
migration of black slaves from Africa to the Americas and the Caribbean.  
41 For more details on historical migration trends in Europe see, for instance, Fassmann and Münz (1992), Stalker 
(2002) or Bettin and Cela (2014). To go into the most recent development of the so-called “New Migration” in 
Europe see, instead, Koser and Lutz (1998). 
42 For the European Union as a whole, the stock of illegal immigrants in 2008 has been estimated to be between 3 
and 8 million – which would constitute between 6 and 15 per cent of the total foreign-born population (IOM, 
2017). 
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2.1. The impact of immigration on domestic economies and native population 
First of all, it is necessarily to clarify that the immigration phenomenon can be analyzed 
along three dimensions: not only the quantity and quality dimensions but also the diversity 
dimension, which is linked to population heterogeneity in the destination country43. Vicious 
and virtuous circles may emerge between quantity, quality and diversity of immigration. On the 
one hand, more skilled and more diverse immigration is expected to be not only economically 
more profitable but also better accepted and even supported by public opinion. On the other 
hand, in a scenario with weak, unskilled and poorly diversified immigration each aspect 
negatively reinforces the other. Australia, Canada and the Unites States are countries that 
illustrate the virtuous regime quite well. Unfortunately, most European countries, including 
Italy, are currently stuck in a low-quantity, low-quality and low-diversity immigration trap. 
In the last decades, the question of whether increased immigration flows – and the 
resulting cultural and ethnic diversity – affect the macroeconomic performance in the host 
country has become a very prolific research area in a number of disciplines, including 
economics, development studies, management, and political science. 
As mentioned before, theory suggests that immigration and diversity have both positive 
and negative effects, and, for this reason, some referred to them as a “double-edged sword”. 
When migrants move from one country to another, they may contribute to generate 
complementarities in production and carry diverse skills, experiences, perspectives and ideas44, 
which nurture technological innovation and stimulate economic growth. At the same time, 
increased heterogeneity may give rise to coordination and communication barriers, 
disagreements about public policies, animosity between different ethnic groups and conflict, 
which may undermine social cohesion and adversely affect economic development.  
A large body of literature has analyzed whether the net effect of immigration on 
domestic economies and labor markets is predominantly beneficial or harmful. However, this 
net positive or negative effect may depend on many factors, including the level of development 
of the destination country and/or the skill composition and experience of the immigrant 
population.  
                                                          
43 Nevertheless, immigration policies tend to focus on the quantity and quality dimensions of immigration, 
generally neglecting the diversity dimension. The only exception is the so-called “Green Card Lottery” in the 
United States, for which the official name is “Diversity Visa Lottery” and which distributes annually around 
100.000 visas with the explicit objective of increasing the diversity of the American population. 
44 As Alesina et al. said, “people born in different countries are likely to have different productive skills because 
they have been exposed to different life experiences, different school and value systems, and thus have developed 
different perspectives that allow them to interpret and solve problems differently” (2016, p. 104). 
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2.1.1. What is the influence of immigration on the economic prosperity of the host 
country?  
Ortega and Peri (2014) explore the relationship between openness to immigration and 
income per capita across 188 different countries45. To do so, they construct a gravity-based 
model on the basis of proxies for bilateral geographical and cultural distance across countries. 
Since many factors can be responsible for cross-country disparities in income per capita, they 
explicitly account for other channels of influence – such as climate, natural resources, disease 
environment, colonization history, early development, and, more importantly, the quality of 
institutions. Using an instrumental-variable strategy to address endogeneity issues, Ortega and 
Peri get evidence of a robust, positive, and statistically significant effect of the share of 
immigrants in the population on long-run real GDP per capita of the host country. They also 
investigate the mechanisms behind this main finding and show that the effect of immigration 
on income operates primarily through an increase in total factor productivity (TFP). This result 
reflects a positive diversity effect, implying that the degree of diversity by country of origin 
within the immigrant population additionally enhances income per person. 
In another study, Alesina et al. (2016) also focus on analyzing the impact of birthplace 
diversity46 on income and productivity of 195 countries worldwide. Using data on immigration 
for the years 1990 and 2000, they construct a diversity index that reflects the probability that 
two individuals drawn at random in a given country would be born in the same country. The 
main robust finding of their analyses is that of a positive, statistically and economically 
significant effect of the birthplace diversity due to immigration on the GDP per capita and TFP 
per capita of the host country. Moreover, they uncover that this positive relationship is stronger 
when considering skilled immigrants in the richest and most productive countries of the sample. 
These positive effects of immigration on domestic income and productivity can be interpreted 
as due to the complementarities between individuals coming from diverse backgrounds in their 
                                                          
45 The authors also conduct a cross-sectional analysis on the effects of openness to trade on income per capita, but 
they are unable to disclose a significant role in this perspective. This finding is likely to be particularly relevant 
for policies, since international migration remains highly regulated when compared to trade flows, implying large 
unrealized efficiency gains if their estimations are correct. In this respect, international migration has been defined 
the great absentee in the era of globalization; while the barriers to international trade and capital mobility have 
already been largely removed, cross-border worker flows are tightly restricted in most countries.  
46 Previous studies, focusing on ethnic, linguistic, and sometimes even genetic, fractionalization, show negative 
effects of diversity on economic growth in cross-country comparisons – with the possible exception of very rich 
countries. Diversity in terms of birthplace, however, is very different from ethno-linguistic diversity, given that 
cultural identity of individuals is mainly determined by their country of birth. Alesina and his co-authors show that 
birthplace diversity is largely uncorrelated with ethnic, linguistic or genetic diversity. Moreover, they expect that 
potential productive complementarities arise rather from diversity linked to the birthplace than from that of other 
type. 
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productive interactions47. Diversity brought about by foreigners’ inflows appears to increase 
the range of skills and ideas in the host country, thereby expanding the set of differentiated 
productive skills and enhancing the innovation activity.  
Taking advantage of the same index of birthplace diversity introduced by Alesina et al. 
(2016), Docquier et al. (2018) obtain comparable results employing panel data on U.S. states 
over a large period, from 1960 to 2010. In particular, they produce separate results for the total 
immigrant population and for the two main skill groups, i.e. college-educated and less-educated 
immigrants. Their results suggest that diversity among high-skilled immigrants is positively and 
monotonically associated with the level of GDP per capita, while low-skilled diversity has 
insignificant – or weakly significant and much smaller – effects on macroeconomic 
performance48.  
On the same page are also Bove and Elia (2017) who investigate the extent to which 
birthplace diversity brought about by immigration affects economic growth, this time focusing 
on whether this relation depends on the level of development of a country. They aim attention 
at 135 countries – of which 27 are defined as “high-income economies” – and consider a global 
sample as well as two subsamples, made up of developed and developing economies, to 
investigate whether there are systematic differences between them. Using country-level data on 
bilateral migration stocks over the period 1960-2010 to compute time-varying measures of 
fractionalization and polarization49, they conduct cross-country regressions and observe that 
both indices have a distinct positive impact on the growth rate of real GDP per capita over large 
time periods, and that this effect seems to be more consistent in developing countries.  
                                                          
47 Alesina et al. (2016) show in their research that the productive effects of birthplace diversity appear to be largest 
for immigrants originating from richer countries and from countries at intermediate levels of cultural proximity. 
These results may entail the probable presence of trade-offs between communication and social costs of diversity 
and benefits in terms of production function effects that arise from skill complementarities. 
48 Moreover, the authors also conduct other interesting exploratory regressions using alternative dependent 
variables, including alternative outcomes of interest or intermediate variables influencing the level and/or growth 
rate of their main dependent variable, GDP per capita. They first test whether diversity influences the average 
employment rate in the receiving country and find that high-skilled diversity does not significantly affect 
employment rate at state level. Secondly, they investigate the effect of high-skilled diversity on the performance 
of the R&D sector and observe that high-skilled diversity increases the number of patents per capita. Thirdly, the 
authors assess whether birthplace diversity increases the level of labor market complementarities between 
immigrants and natives. Using natives’ earnings as dependent variable, they find a positive and significant effect, 
which appears to be larger and more significant for low-skilled natives than for the high skilled. This result 
provides evidence that skill complementarities exist between workers trained in different countries. 
49 Most empirical economic studies on the effects of diversity use the fractionalization index, which measures the 
likelihood that two individuals randomly selected from the population belong to different ethnic groups. However, 
some scholars have argued that the polarization index is better suited to capture the concept of social tensions – 
related mainly to ethnolinguistic and religious diversity – and is therefore a more appropriate index of diversity. 
Bove and Elia (2017) prefer to include both indices in their analysis, so they construct also a polarization index, 
which captures how far the distribution of the immigrant groups is from a bipolar distribution where there are only 
two groups of equal size. 
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Another study on the subject that deserves to be mentioned is that of Edwards and 
Ortega (2016) who provide an interesting quantitative assessment of the economic contribution 
of unauthorized immigrant workers to the U.S. economy and of the potential gains from their 
legalization. Using data for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013, they conduct a calibration and 
simulation analysis at the industry and state level. Their results appear to show that illegal 
workers have a positive impact on the annual private-sector GDP50. It must be specified that 
the aggregate estimates conceal large differences across industries, largely reflecting the shares 
of unauthorized workers in industry employment. Overall, their economic contribution appears 
to be substantial, even if these effects on production are smaller than the share of unauthorized 
workers in employment. The authors explain this evidence by the fact that illegal workers are 
less skilled and appear to be substantially less productive, on average, than natives and legal 
immigrants with the same observable skills51. Moreover, the authors find that legalization of 
unauthorized workers would further increase their contribution to the private-sector GDP. 
These gains would be due to the productivity increase arising from the expanded labor market 
opportunities for these workers. 
As is evident, the academic studies mentioned so far focus mainly on the United States 
or present cross-country evidence; empirical research for European countries is much more 
recent and sparse. Nevertheless, Campo et al. (2018) analyze the impact of immigration on 
productivity in the United Kingdom. Their results suggest that immigration has a positive, 
substantial and significant impact (in both the statistical and economic senses) on productivity, 
measured as the gross value added (GVA) at geographical level52. They point out that this 
appears to be driven by higher-skilled workers, since the results prove to be consistently more 
positive for immigrants with higher skill levels, as measured either by their level of education 
or by occupation. Moreover, the authors tried, but have been unable, to go into further detail 
and to construct reliable estimates of impacts at a sectorial level, or to disaggregate between 
EU and non-EU migration. 
Another interesting study for Europe is that of De Arcangelis et al. (2015), who 
investigate the effect of migrants’ stock on the Italian production structure – intended in terms 
of sectorial recomposition – at the provincial level. Indeed, the change in factor endowments – 
implied by a higher presence of immigrant workers – may have different effects on the 
production structure in the host country. First, migration may induce firms to switch to 
                                                          
50 Obviously, the authors assume that there are no undocumented workers in public administration or the military, 
so they omit the public sector (i.e. the Government sector in the NAICS) from consideration. 
51 The authors report that documented foreign-born workers prove to be 25 per cent more productive than 
undocumented ones with the same levels of education and experience. 
52 These results are not apparent in the initial OLS estimates, but they emerge when the authors use an instrumental 
variable approach to identify causality. 
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techniques that are more complementary to the characteristics of the new labor force, increasing 
or decreasing their capital-to-labor ratio; second, immigration may cause an effect in the 
production structure but at a highly disaggregated level, due to the fact that some sectors employ 
immigrant workers more than others. Since immigrants are assumed to be relatively more 
productive when performing simple and manual tasks, this implies a production-composition change 
in favor of manufacturing plus construction (i.e. the relative simple-task intensive aggregate 
sector) with respect to a subset of services (i.e. the relative complex-task intensive sector). 
Using data on foreign-born residence and work permits of the 103 Italian provinces in 1995-
2006, De Arcangelis and his co-authors investigate these effects and find a small but statistically 
significant impact on the Italian production structure. Evidence suggests that an increase in the 
ratio of foreign-born residents to the province population significantly enhances manufacturers’ 
and constructors’ value added with respect to services’ value added. This means that the 
production-composition changes induced by immigration are in favor of the simple-task relative 
intensive sector rather than of the relative complex-task intensive sector. Moreover, the authors 
notice that these effects are magnified when considering an increase in foreign-born populations 
drawn from countries more different to Italy in terms of GDP per capita and educational 
attainment. This confirms that diversity boosts the effects of immigration on the economy of 
the destination country. 
2.1.2. What is the influence of immigration on the population growth in the host 
country? 
Beyond the effects of immigration on a country's economic prosperity, another topic of 
interest is whether migratory flows have an impact on a country's population. In this respect, 
the so-called displacement theory of native migration adjustments foresees that offsetting 
changes will occur in the destination country after an immigrant inflow. As immigrants increase 
the labor supply in a local market, they should lower wages in that market relative to other 
markets. Obviously, this creates an incentive for natives to move from the affected market to 
higher wage markets, and, as a consequence, wages in the original market should rise again. 
Evidently, this displacement and wage re-adjustment process is intrinsically of limited duration; 
therefore, native population changes in an area following immigrant inflows should be observed 
within a relatively short period of time. 
Nevertheless, Card (2001) ends up disproving this theory with his empirical analysis 
aimed at investigating the effects of immigrant inflows on occupation-specific labor market 
outcomes. Using 1990 census data for U.S. metropolitan areas, Card observes that intercity 
mobility rates of natives and earlier immigrants are insensitive to immigrant inflows, implying 
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that any native out-migration response is at most very modest. In fact, the impact of recent 
immigration on net native population growth proves to be positive, denoting no offsetting flows 
by natives after immigrants’ arrival. Despite these findings, Card observes that shifts in the 
relative supply of different occupations due to immigration are anyway associated with 
systematic, even if small, changes in occupation-specific wages and employment rates. This 
means that immigrant inflows over the 1980s in the United States had a modest negative effect 
on wages and employment rates – according to Card, mainly on those of younger and less-
skilled natives in high-immigration cities. 
Wozniak and Murray (2012) bring Card’s analysis on the displacement effect of 
immigration a step further, distinguishing between its impact on low-skilled and high-skilled 
native population. Their estimates show that immigration increases the low-skilled native 
population in the short run because of a decline in outflows of low-skilled natives from affected 
areas. This effect proves to be more marked in areas from which relocation is more expensive 
since low-skilled natives are, in a sense, “temporally trapped” by immigrant inflows. On the 
contrary, given that high-skilled natives are more geographically mobile than low-skilled ones, 
the short-run response among high-skilled population is definitely in line with the displacement 
theory. However, overall, also Wozniak and Murray find that the effect of immigrant inflows 
for the whole native population is insignificant. 
2.1.3. What is the influence of immigration on the labor market opportunities in the 
host country?  
In the economic field, the labor market impact in the destination countries – or more 
specifically the question whether immigration negatively affects wages and employment of 
native workers – has been one of the most extensively researched topics. 
Theoretical models of a competitive labor market predict that an immigrant influx 
should lower the wage of competing factors. Despite the intuitive appeal of these theoretical 
models and despite the large number of careful studies in the literature, the existing evidence 
provides a mixed and confusing set of results. The measured impact of immigration on the wage 
of native workers fluctuates widely from study to study, but it seems to cluster around zero. 
Speaking about this issue, it is worth specifying that the effects of immigration on the 
wages paid to native-born workers depend upon two critical factors: i) whether immigrants take 
jobs similar to those of natives or instead take different jobs due to inherent comparative 
advantages between native and foreign-born workers in performing particular tasks (i.e. 
substitutability); ii) whether native workers respond to immigration and adjust their occupation 
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choices in order to shield themselves from competition with immigrant labor (i.e. task 
specialization). 
Clearly, if workers’ skills are assumed to be differentiated solely by their level of 
educational attainment, and the production technology and productivity of each type of labor 
are given, then a large inflow of immigrants with limited schooling should alter the relative 
scarcity of education groups, increasing wages paid to highly educated natives and reducing 
wages paid to less-educated ones. However, immigrants have a comparative advantage in 
occupations requiring manual labor tasks, while less-educated native-born workers have an 
advantage in jobs demanding communication skills. Therefore, immigration may encourage 
workers to specialize; in fact, less-educated natives may respond to immigrant inflows by 
leaving physically-demanding occupations for language-intensive ones. These language-
intensive tasks tend to earn comparatively higher returns, and those returns are further enhanced 
by the increased aggregate supply of complementary manual-intensive tasks. As a consequence, 
foreign-born workers may not create large adverse effects on wages paid to less-educated 
natives. 
In the light of the above, it appears straightforward why many studies focus on the extent 
to which native and migrant workers with similar characteristics (e.g. education and experience) 
can substitute for each other in production. For instance, assuming that similarly educated 
workers with different levels of experience are imperfect substitutes, Borjas (2003) studies 
whether immigrants harm or improve the employment opportunities of native workers. His 
results suggest that immigration reduces the average wage and labor supply – intended as the 
fraction of time worked – of competing native workers. Even after accounting for the beneficial 
cross effects of low-skill (high-skill) immigration on the earnings of high-skilled (low-skilled) 
workers, Borjas’s analysis reveals that immigration has substantially worsened the labor market 
opportunities faced by many U.S. native workers. 
Anyway, Borjas deserves credit for introducing a new approach of thinking about and 
estimating the labor market impact of immigration53. He pays closer attention to the 
characteristics that define a skill group – introducing for the first time the intuition that both 
schooling and experience are significant in this sense – and resorts to a production model that 
                                                          
53 Most previous studies, indeed, exploit the geographic clustering of immigrants and use differences across local 
labor markets to estimate the impact of immigration. However, according to Borjas (2003), this framework has 
been troublesome since it presents three conceptual problems: i) because of the native out-migration phenomenon, 
the effects of new immigration may be quickly diffused across the national labor market; ii) the cross-sectional 
correlation between immigrant inflows and native wages may be upward-biased by local demand shocks that raise 
wages and attract in-migrants; iii) in the long run, an immigration-induced increase in the supply of labor to a 
particular city can be diffused across the economy by other strong currents that tend to equalize economic 
conditions across cities and regions.  
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emphasizes the role of complementarities in production, which allows for a clear discussion of 
both within and between skill group effects.  
Peri and Sparber (2008) confirm the assumption of imperfect substitutability between 
less-educated immigrants and natives, proving that foreign-born workers specialize in 
occupations that require manual and physical labor skills, while U.S. natives pursue jobs more 
intensive in communication and language tasks. Therefore, given that immigration induces 
natives to reallocate their task supply – thereby reducing downward wage pressure –, task 
complementarities and increasing specialization might explain why economic analyses 
commonly find only modest wage and employment consequences of immigration, even for less-
educated native-born workers54. 
Few years later, this time focusing their attention on science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (STEM) occupations, Peri et al. (2015) analyze the impact on native 
employment and average weekly wages of a variation in foreign-born workers across 219 U.S. 
cities. They find out that increases in immigrant STEM workers between 1990 and 2010 – made 
possible by the H-1B visa program – are associated with large, significant wage gains for native 
STEM and college-educated workers; gains for non-college-educated natives appear to be 
smaller but still significant. These findings imply that foreign STEM workers increase total 
factor productivity growth in U.S. cities, but this productivity effect is skill biased. Since they 
are closer substitutes for college-educated natives rather than for non-college-educated ones, 
they generate a much larger increase in the wage paid to college-educated native workers. While 
the effect found on natives’ wages is sizable, the impact of the inflow of STEM workers on the 
employment of any native group turns out to be insignificant. As noticed by the authors, this 
weak employment response may suggest the potential existence of additional adjustment 
mechanisms for college-educated workers at the metropolitan area level. 
Manacorda et al. (2012) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) extended the theoretical set up 
presented by Borjas in 2003 to allow for imperfect substitutability in production between 
natives and immigrants with the same education and potential experience. In particular, 
Ottaviano and Peri investigate the effect of immigration on the wages of native U.S. workers 
of various skill levels and find a small but significant degree of imperfect substitutability 
between natives and immigrants within education and experience groups. Their estimates 
imply, in the long run, an overall small positive effect on average native wages and a substantial 
negative effect on wages of previous immigrants55. 
                                                          
54 See, for instance, Altonji and Card (1991) and Peri (2012). 
55 Imperfect substitutability entails that, on average, immigrants already in the United States tend to suffer much 
larger wage losses than natives consequently to inflows of new immigrants in the country. 
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In conclusion, once imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants is 
allowed for, immigration to the United States had at most a modest negative long-run effect on 
the real wages of the least educated natives. These results at the national level are in line with 
the findings typically identified at the city level. As a matter of fact, the empirical analysis of 
cross-city – and cross-state – evidence in the United States has consistently found small, and 
often insignificant, effects of immigration on the wages of native workers. However, estimating 
the effects of immigration using national level data, some scholars have found a more 
significant negative effect of immigration on the wages of natives with no high school diploma. 
These scholars argued that wages across local labor markets are subject to the equalizing 
pressure that arises from the special arbitrage of mobile workers. As a result, the wage effects 
of immigration are better detected at the national level since one can exploit variation in wages 
and immigrants across groups of workers with different skills (as captured by education and 
experience) over time. 
So far, there have been discussed only studies focused on the United States, since, for 
the reasons mentioned above, few researches have been carried out at European level. Among 
them, it is worth mentioning the analysis of Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1996) on the impact 
of immigrants on the wages paid to young native blue-collar workers in Austria. Even if this 
group is the one that should compete most heavily with migrant workers, they find no negative 
wage effects at regional, industry, or firm level. That is, in regions, industries, or firms with a 
larger foreign share, natives appear to earn higher wages.  
With regard to Italy, Barone and Mocetti (2011) concentrate on studying whether the 
inflow of female immigrants who specialize in household production has an impact on the labor 
supply of Italian women. They observe that when the number of immigrants who provide 
household services is higher, native women spend more time at work (intensive margin) without 
affecting their labor force participation (extensive margin). Moreover, they disclose that this 
impact works through substitution in household work rather than complementarities in the 
production sector56.  
Further to the above, it is worth adding that some scholars went even beyond the analysis 
of the consequences of immigration on the labor market opportunities, investigating whether 
and how the quality of institutions57 in the destination country may alter the influence of 
immigrant flows on natives’ wages and employment. Among them, Angrist and Kugler (2003) 
carry out an interesting cross-country analysis of immigration effects interacted with 
                                                          
56 These results are concentrated on high-skilled women, whose time has a higher opportunity cost compared to 
low-skilled ones. 
57 For an interesting study that, instead, examines the direct impact of immigration on a nation’s policies and 
institutions see Clark et al. (2015). 
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institutions. Focusing on Western Europe countries and constructing measures of labor and 
product market rigidity58 (i.e. firing costs, high replacement rates, rigid wages and business 
entry costs), they obtain empirical result that are consistent with the hypothesis that reduced 
flexibility worsens immigration effects on native equilibrium employment59. 
In the subsequent years, Kemeny (2012) and Kemeny and Cooke (2017) test whether 
the impact of immigrant diversity on the average economic welfare of natives depends on the 
quality of institutions in U.S. countries. The results suggest that generalized trust and inclusive 
institutions60 catalyze the positive correlation between diversity and average native wages. 
These findings confirm the economic significance of immigrant diversity, while suggesting the 
importance of local policies that succeed in fostering trust, community spirit, and other informal 
institutions, as well as promoting inclusive social and economic institutions.  
To summarize what have been said so far, research on immigration’s impact on local 
labor markets generally focuses on how native workers’ opportunities are affected. However, 
the majority of empirical studies for the United States and Europe fail to find any significant 
effect of immigration on both wages and employment rates. There are basically two possible 
lines of explanation for these results. The first one – which has already been mentioned above 
– is labor segmentation; foreign-born workers specialize in occupations that require manual 
and physical labor skills, while natives pursue jobs more intensive in communication and 
language tasks. The second one is related to immigration-compensating changes at the sector- 
or firm-level productive or organizational structure; in fact, an exogenous immigration-induced 
increase in the availability of low-skilled workers could cause a shift toward more low-skill 
intensive productions. This kind of adjustments will be dealt with in more detail in the 
subsequent paragraph. 
2.2. The impact of immigration on entrepreneurship, innovation and domestic firms 
As pointed out in the previous paragraph, immigration seems to have a positive impact 
on the destination country’s economic prosperity. However, there may be different mechanisms 
behind this aggregate beneficial effect. First of all, when arriving in a country, foreign-born 
                                                          
58 The main rationale for institutions that reduce flexibility is to protect natives – and especially incumbent workers 
– from competition in the labor and product markets. However, the equilibrium consequences of protective 
regulations and institutions are unclear; although employment protection and entry barriers may reduce job losses 
in the short run, reduced flexibility may be counter-productive, possibly amplifying any negative employment 
consequences of immigration for natives. This ambiguous effect of market rigidity is the main reason behind this 
type of academic studies. 
59 Part of this interaction is due to scale effects; institutions that reduce employment levels, higher entry barriers, 
and reduced wage flexibility will tend to make the effect of a given number of immigrants worse. 
60 Inclusive institutions means that they lower the costs of interaction in a society consisting of different groups. 
Kemeny and Cooke (2017) build two distinctive indicators for inclusive institutions: a composite measure of social 
capital and a variable that captures locality-specific ordinances aimed at immigrants. 
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workers alter the skill mix of local labor supply and therefore may have an influence on the 
country’s labor market, particularly on wages and employment. This channel has already been 
discussed above and can thus be set aside at this point, even more because the effect of 
immigrants on average native wages and employment rate is negligible – at least in the long 
run. This means that other mechanisms come into play; immigration, indeed, can exert its 
influence on the welfare of the host country through its aggregate impact on entrepreneurship 
and innovation or through its direct consequences on domestic firms, particularly on their 
production structure and performance. 
Compared to the literature examined so far, the impact of immigration on innovation, 
entrepreneurship and domestic firms has received some attention only recently. Over the last 
decade, academic studies provided evidence in support of a “diversity dividend” in terms of 
creativity, innovation, and productivity. This literature argues that cultural heterogeneity within 
a labor force expands the collective variety of skills, knowledge, and ideas that are contained 
within it, becoming a determinant factor for a region’s economic development and prosperity. 
2.2.1. What is the influence of immigration on entrepreneurship and innovation in the 
host country? 
In theory, immigrants may facilitate innovation and entrepreneurship by providing a 
responsive labor supply that is both willing and able to invest in new skills. Because immigrants 
face a lower opportunity cost of investing in new capabilities or methods and exhibit a higher 
risk propensity, they tend to be more flexible in their human capital investments than 
observationally equivalent natives are. Hence, areas with large numbers of immigrants – even 
if they are not self-employed – may prove to be areas in which entrepreneurship and innovation 
are generally easier to accomplish. 
In this regard, Rodríguez-Pose and Hardy (2015) analyze the impact of cultural diversity 
on the entrepreneurial performance of U.K. regions. Their findings suggest that culturally 
diverse regions tend to be more entrepreneurial and, more specifically, that diversity amongst 
highly skilled workers – i.e. those employed in knowledge-intensive occupations – exerts the 
strongest influence upon start-up intensities61.  
Regarding the United States, Duleep et al. (2012) carry out an empirical study aimed at 
analyzing the impact of immigration on the aggregate entrepreneurial activity. Results 
                                                          
61 The authors clarify that the type of cultural diversity taken into account is a decisive factor; they show that 
birthplace and ethnic diversity measures are clearly linked, but, in the case of knowledge-intensive 
entrepreneurship, birthplace diversity proves to be prevalent. Therefore, new migrants born outside the United 
Kingdom turn out to be of greater benefit to a region’s knowledge stock and provide for more business 
opportunities to be identified and realized. 
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consistently suggest that college-educated immigrants lead to increased innovation and 
business development in a variety of dimensions – which include entrepreneurship, 
establishment creation, and job formation. Moreover, the authors observe that greater shares of 
college-educated natives also contribute to increased entrepreneurial activity. However, the per 
capita effect on entrepreneurial activity of immigrants far exceeds that of natives. Finally, the 
authors notice that higher shares of college-educated immigrants also lead to increased 
entrepreneurial activity of natives, and this finding suggests that benefits of immigrants are 
greater than just their direct innovative activity.  
Therefore, Duleep and her colleagues point out an important issue; in addition to the 
direct contributions of immigrants to creativity and research, high-skilled immigration can 
boost innovation indirectly through positive knowledge spillovers on fellow researchers, the 
achievement of critical mass in specialized research areas, and the provision of complementary 
skills – such as management and entrepreneurship.  
Anyway, despite few studies on the effect of immigration on general entrepreneurship, 
the vast majority of empirical research concentrates on the influence of foreign-born workers 
on patent applications. Gaining insight into the consequences of immigration on technological 
progress, which is a driver of productivity growth, allows to ultimately get a greater 
understanding of economic growth; if immigrants increase patents per capita, they may increase 
output per capita and make natives better off.  
For instance, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) investigate the impact of skilled 
immigration on U.S. patents per capita. Their data show that immigrants account for 24 percent 
of patents – twice their share in the population – and that a college-graduate immigrant 
contributes at least twice as much to patenting as his or her native counterpart. However, the 
authors emphasize that this immigrant patenting advantage over natives in the United States is 
entirely accounted for the disproportionately greater share of immigrants holding degrees in 
science and engineering fields, implying immigrants are not innately more able than natives. 
Combining individual and aggregate data, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle find that college-
graduate immigrants increase patents per capita substantially; this shows evidence of positive 
spillovers of immigrants. Moreover, the authors find that immigrants who are scientists and 
engineers, or who have post-college education, boost patents per capita more than simple 
immigrant college graduates do. 
On the contrary, exploiting fluctuations in H-1B admissions in the United States, Kerr 
and Lincoln (2010) find no evidence of positive spillovers. They observe that increases in the 
size of the H-B1 program substantially expand Indian and Chinese patenting activity in H-1B 
dependent cities relative to their peers. However, they identify limited effects for native science 
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and engineering patenting. This means that total science and engineering invention increases 
with higher H-1B admissions mainly through direct contributions of immigrants. 
Blit et al. (2017) concentrate their analysis on 98 Canadian cities and obtain similar 
results for Canadian STEM-educated immigrants; those who, among them, are successful in 
obtaining jobs in STEM areas do appear to raise patenting rates in a significant way. However, 
with little more than one-third of STEM-educated immigrants finding employment in STEM 
jobs, the aggregate beneficial impact of Canadian skilled immigration on patent rates appears 
to be relatively modest in comparison to the United States. Given the modest magnitude of the 
estimated effects, it emerges that, for Canada, any spillover effects of immigrants on native 
patenting are likely minimal. 
As can be noticed, the extant research on the effects of immigration on innovation is 
generally limited to the role played by highly educated immigrants – individuals with tertiary 
or post-tertiary education or in research occupations – and is predominantly focused on the 
United States. However, in most European countries only the minority of immigrants are high 
skilled. According to common sense, there should be a negative correlation between the migrant 
share and the innovation variable when the migrant population is dominated by unskilled 
workers, while this might not be the case when immigrants are culturally diverse and high 
skilled. 
Despite this generally held belief, empirical evidence for Europe tells a different story. 
Jahn and Steinhardt (2016) investigate the impact of immigration on innovation in Germany. 
By exploiting a placement policy for immigrants, they do not find any evidence of a negative 
impact on innovations – as measured by patent applications –, although the majority of inflows 
was unskilled. Instead, their panel estimates suggest that the investigated inflows had no or 
even a positive impact on innovations. 
Similar results are also obtained by Bratti and Conti (2017), who analyze the effect of 
overall and low-skilled immigration on both Italian provinces’ patent applications and firms’ 
self-reported innovation outcomes. Their study is quite interesting because it provides evidence 
not only for R&D-based but also for non-R&D-based innovation using a very small 
geographical scale of analysis. The estimates demonstrate that the share of immigrants in the 
province population has neither positive nor negative effect on Italian provinces’ patent 
applications. These main findings do not change when the authors use firm-level data and self-
reported measures on firm product, process, and organizational innovations62.  
                                                          
62 According to Bratti and Conti (2017), this lack of influence of increasing waves of low-skilled workers on firms’ 
creation and adoption of innovation in Italy may be due to their similarity to the natives’ skill structure, which 
prevented a dramatic rise in the relative abundance of low-skilled workers. 
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The findings achieved by Ozgen et al. (2014) are even more unexpected. Basing their 
analysis on two unique and harmonized linked employer-employee datasets for Germany and 
the Netherlands, they conduct a consistent cross-country study on the impact of cultural 
diversity among migrant employees on the product innovation of firms. Surprisingly, they 
observe that innovation in both countries is predominantly determined by other factors – such 
as establishment size and industry but also obstacles and organizational changes faced by firms. 
Cultural diversity of employees, instead, can make a positive but definitely modest and context 
dependent contribution to product innovation63.  
To sum up what said so far, there is abundant anecdotal belief that the contribution of 
immigrants to innovation and entrepreneurship is quite substantial, particularly in the United 
States. In addition, despite few studies that buck the trend, several empirical researches have 
established a clear connection between skilled immigration and patenting activity. What is still 
less clear and unexplored is whether this increase in patenting activity in broad terms has 
translated into innovation with direct effects on firms’ outcomes, and this is precisely the issue 
addressed hereinafter. 
2.2.2. What is the influence of immigration on firms’ structure and performance in the 
host country? 
The increasing international labor migration of the last decades inevitably had important 
effects on the workforce composition of firms in all migrant receiving countries. However, the 
consequences of these changes for firms’ structure and performance have attracted growing 
attention only in recent years. 
A first type of studies on the subject focus on the effect of immigrant flows on the 
offshoring decisions made by firms64. Labor supply shocks due to immigration may basically 
affect a firm’s choice to relocate its production activities in two ways. On the one hand, by 
reducing the relative cost of having some tasks performed domestically rather than being 
sourced abroad, immigrants may reduce the need for offshore production; according to this 
view – usually referred to as the “labor supply effect” or “import substitution effect” – 
immigration and offshoring will be substitutes. On the other hand, by reducing the costs of 
                                                          
63 Moreover, the authors affirm that, with respect to the composition of employment, the presence of high-skilled 
staff appears to be most crucial for the innovativeness of firms; simply considering the presence of foreign workers 
among employees does not affect the likelihood of introducing a product innovation. 
64 The relocation of domestic jobs abroad is often motivated by the firm’s desire to reduce its labor costs, to move 
production closer to foreign consumers, or to utilize a foreign workforce with a different skill set. The firm has to 
weigh these benefits against the inherent trials associated with offshoring, which include the difficulty of 
monitoring production activities abroad, the need to transport intermediate goods between countries, and the 
foreign connections and familiarity with foreign business environments required to offshore. 
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exporting thanks to the information and connections that they often have with their home 
country, immigrants favor bilateral exports and offshore production to the immigrants’ country 
of origin; according to this view – usually referred to as the “bilateral network effect” or “export 
promotion effect” – immigration and offshoring will be complements. 
Since both immigration and relocation of production offshore can be thought of as 
international movements of factors, there should be a possible general equilibrium link between 
the two. Skiba (2006) observes that, theoretically, this link crucially depends on the sector 
specificity of immigrant labor. What matters is whether immigrants’ cross-sectoral employment 
pattern is different from that of native workers, and usually immigrant labor is less mobile 
across industries than the domestic labor is. In his empirical analysis, Skiba then documents a 
positive relation between immigration and firms outflows across U.S. states and presents 
evidence that this relation is likely to be driven, precisely, by the specificity of immigrant labor. 
First, a comparison of immigrant labor specificity across states reveals that states with the most 
specific – relative to total – immigrant labor experience the highest firm outflow rates. Second, 
a comparison of industries shows that industries where immigrants tend to work experience 
statistically significantly lower firm relocation rates. 
Olney (2009) takes this issue a step further; he specifies that the relocation of production 
activities can be captured both at the extensive margin by the net birth rate of establishments in 
a city and at the intensive margin by their net expansion rate. His empirical results indicate that, 
in the Unites States, low-skilled immigration decreases and high-skilled immigration increases 
the relocation of production activities at both the extensive and intensive margins. An additional 
industry level analysis reveals that there is no relationship between immigration and the 
establishments’ net birth and expansion rates in non-mobile industries65, but there is a strong, 
significant relationship in the remaining mobile industries. 
More recently, Olney and Pozzoli (2018) obtained similar results using data for 
Denmark; they observe that an exogenous influx of non-EU immigrants into a municipality 
reduces firm-level offshoring at both the extensive and intensive margins. The general reduction 
in offshoring could explain why immigration is found to have no negative impact on wages; it 
may cause an increase in local labor demand that ends up compensating the direct immigrant-
induced increase in labor supply, without any consequence on wages and employment. 
Moreover, by analyzing the effect of immigration on international trade, the authors find no 
impact on both imports into and exports from a municipality. However, an interesting 
                                                          
65 Clearly, not all industries can respond to immigration in a similar manner; certain industries that are reliant on 
natural resources or that need to be close to consumers have less ability to adjust the location of their production 
activities in response to immigration. 
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subsequent bilateral analysis shows that immigrants have connections in their country of origin 
that increase the likelihood that firms import from, export to and offshore to that particular 
foreign country. Therefore, the network effect that encourages offshoring to the immigrants’ 
country of origin is also useful in facilitating trade with that country66. Thus, Olney and Pozzoli, 
with this revealing study, demonstrate that both the effects mentioned before prove to be valid; 
overall, immigration and offshoring are complements at the bilateral level but substitutes at the 
multilateral level. 
In this respect, it is worth specifying that the information advantage brought about by 
immigrants is not the unique factor that affects a firm’s decision about whether and where to 
offshore. Countries’ policies and institutional characteristics may also have an impact in this 
regard. For example, Moriconi et al. (2018) observe that countries endowed with institutions 
that enhance investor protection and reduce corruption register a higher probability of been 
chosen by firms, while those with institutions that increase regulation in the labor market 
decrease such probability. 
As well as on offshoring and relocation decisions, immigration may have an impact on 
firms’ expenditure in automation; theoretically, firms endogenously respond to the skill level 
of their workforce by changing their investment decisions. In principle, automation machinery 
may be thought as substitutes for low-skilled labor and complements for medium-skilled labor. 
Therefore, certain academic studies focused their attention on the so-called technology-skilled 
complementarity. For instance, Lewis (2011) investigates how U.S. firms respond to increases 
in the relative supply of low-skill labor by comparing technology adoption rates across 
metropolitan areas with different shocks to the relative supply of high school dropouts induced 
by low-skilled immigration. The author finds that plants added technology more slowly when 
immigration induced the ratio of high school dropouts to graduates to grow more quickly. These 
results are consistent with automation machinery being a relative substitute for low-skill labor. 
However, investigating the impact of low-skilled immigration on the investment 
decisions by Italian manufacturing firms, Accetturo et al. (2009) come to different conclusions. 
Their econometric evidence indicates that, on average, an increase in the share of low-skilled 
immigrants, computed at provincial level, raises firms’ investment rate in machineries. 
Therefore, it appears that a more intense inflow of unskilled immigrants in Italy increases the 
probability for firms to make large investments67.  
                                                          
66 In addition to Denmark, similar effects of immigration on international trade have also been observed for other 
European and non-European countries. See, for instance, Gould (1994) for the United States and Combes et al. 
(2005) for France. 
67 Investigating further, the authors observe that this evidence is larger for small firms and firms in more 
competitive and less technologically intensive industries, which are likely to produce less differentiated goods and 
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Conducting a firm-level analysis on French data, Mitaritonna et al. (2014) also observe 
that firms in districts receiving a remarkable influx of immigrants display faster growth of 
capital investments. Moreover, they find that immigration is associated with productivity gains 
and, consequently, with natives’ wage increases. This effect is particularly strong for firms with 
initially zero, or very low, level of foreign employment – provided that they start hiring some 
immigrants. 
Other quite recent papers have also investigated whether local availability of immigrants 
benefits productivity or increases the surplus of local firms. Immigrants may complement native 
workers, stimulate investments and technological adoption, allow specialization by skill in the 
firm, and lower costs per unit of output. These effects could be beneficial for the firm and 
increase its productivity and profits. However, on the other hand, cultural diversity may affect 
firm performance negatively due to worse communication, lower social ties and trust, and worse 
cooperation among workers. 
In this regard, Teruel-Carrizosa and Segarra-Blasco (2008) analyze the effect of 
increasing immigration flows on firms’ performance in Spain. Their findings reveal that the 
share of immigrants in a municipality has a positive impact on both labor productivity and 
wages of manufacturing firms. In particular, they point out that the increased employment 
supply brought to bear by immigrants displaces native workers to more skilled occupations and 
has a positive indirect impact on skill composition and productivity of firms – since it allows a 
better distribution of labor qualifications. 
In contrast to the aforementioned study, again for Spain, Nicodemo (2013) discloses 
that immigration has instead a negative effect on labor productivity, as measured by gross value 
added (GVA) per employee. Moreover, she notices that the type of immigration – European 15 
versus non-European – is not relevant in explaining this negative effect on productivity; in this 
respect, she points out that what really matters is the way in which firms employ the immigrant 
workers, and firms prove to be somewhat heterogeneous in the use of workers.  
Another remarkable study on this topic is that of Paserman (2008), carried out using 
unique micro-level data for Israeli. He observes a negative correlation between the change in 
the high-skilled immigrant share and the change in firms’ output per worker. In particular, a 
more in-depth analysis exhibits that immigration is strongly negatively correlated with 
productivity in low-tech industries, whereas in high-tech industries it seems to prevail a positive 
relationship – suggesting the presence of complementarities between high-skilled immigration 
and technology. 
                                                          
react to the availability of foreign workers by accumulating relatively more capital. Whereas, the positive effect 
of immigration partially vanishes as long as firm employment increases. 
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Other scholars focused their attention on the effects of the workforce heterogeneity – 
rather than of the immigrant share – on firm productivity and performance. In fact, diversity 
can affect productivity by, among other things, stimulating innovative thinking and introducing 
new ideas to solve problems. For example, René et al. (2012) find a positive effect of workforce 
heterogeneity by birthplace on workers’ productivity in Austrian firms and conclude that teams 
of mixed backgrounds present complementarities in production that, in turn, lead to higher 
wages. 
Also Trax et al. (2015), analyzing data for Germany, detect positive spillovers 
associated with the degree of cultural diversity in the workforce, which induce notable 
productivity gains. These benefits appear to be especially strong within larger manufacturing 
firms and weaker in service companies68.  
Partially in contrast with the previous studies, Parrotta et al. (2010) notice that, while 
labor diversity in terms of skill significantly boosts Danish firms’ performance, ethnic diversity 
has either no or even negative effects on firm total factor productivity (TFP). According to these 
findings, it seems that the negative effects, if any, due to communication and integration costs 
linked to a more culturally heterogeneous workforce, outweigh the benefits deriving from 
creativity and knowledge spillovers. However, the authors observe that ethnic diversity can be 
valuable for firms operating in industries characterized by above-average trade openness, 
confirming the idea that workers coming from different countries provide product and market 
information useful for firms in order to compete in global markets. 
At this point of our vast literature review, it should be clear that very little has been done 
so far to understand whether immigration has an impact on firm profitability and, if so, to which 
extent. Nevertheless, two interesting researches on U.S. data seem to find positive effects on 
firm profits. Using the increase in the number of H-1B visas as a proxy for increased 
immigration, Ghosh et al. (2014) detect a positive effect not only for labor productivity but also 
for firm profits. Two years later, Doran et al. (2016) analyze the impact of additional H-1B 
visas on different firm outcomes and, among others, notice an increase in median profits and a 
related decrease in median payroll costs per employee. 
The very latest study worth mentioning in this regard is a very recent and appealing 
research conducted on Italian data. Brunello et al. (2019) investigate the effects of low-skilled 
immigration on the performance of Italian manufacturing firms. Their results exhibit a positive 
                                                          
68 In addition to the firm level analysis, the authors conduct also a regional investigation and observe that a more 
diversified regional environment – i.e. with foreigners from many different cultural backgrounds and not with 
more foreigners per se – brings about substantial benefits for firms’ productivity, both in manufacturing and in 
services. In conclusion, it turns out that regional diversity is at least as important for productivity as micro-level 
diversity. 
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but small average effect of immigration on profits, a negative impact on labor costs, and no 
influence on total factor productivity (TFP). Entering into more detail, the positive effects on 
profitability prove to be larger for small firms operating in low-tech sectors and for firms 
located in low-skilled production areas, while these firms report negative effects on TFP. 
Moreover, the authors observe that also firms with easier access to credit supply seem to 
experience a stronger positive impact on profits, consistently with the fact that firms with no 
restriction on capital adjustments can move to the efficient combination of inputs more quickly. 
Obviously, this second chapter simply aimed at presenting just a little part of the myriad 
of existing studies on the effects of immigration on economies and firms. What is clear is that 
scholars found a substantial heterogeneity in outcomes depending on the various scenarios 
considered in their analysis. The impact of immigration on the different economies, in fact, 
substantially varies according to host countries’ labor market characteristics, policies and 
institutions, while the effects on firm performance largely depend on firm size, age, level of 
technology and sector. Moreover, the consequences of immigration significantly change 
depending on the skill characteristic of the foreigner population – high-skilled versus low-
skilled – and the time horizon under consideration – long run versus short run69. 
To conclude with an emblematic remark, as Borjas said, “the most important lesson is 
that the economic impact of immigration will vary by time and by place, and can be either 
beneficial or harmful” (1994, p. 1668). 
  
                                                          
69 Longer-run analysis, in fact, may conceal important short-run dynamics in the adjustment process to incoming 
migration. A series of short-run responses (e.g. outmigration) often restores equilibrium over the longer period, 
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The academic literature exposed in the previous chapter shows that much has been done 
in investigating the effects of immigration on the economic dynamics of the host country, but 
many aspects have not yet received proper attention. Two main issues must be clarified in this 
respect. First of all, so many studies focus their analysis on the United States, or in any case on 
countries characterized by high-skilled immigration phenomena. However, highly-qualified 
and low-qualified immigrants may have completely different – or even opposite – consequences 
on domestic economies and firms. Second, although there exists a vast literature that analyzes 
the impact of immigration on macroeconomic aspects, still few researches investigate its effects 
on firm-level dimensions. Nevertheless, aggregated dynamics may disguise highly 
differentiated microeconomic mechanisms, which instead would be interesting to consider.  
Therefore, since the extant research gives mainly a partial picture of the overall 
influence of immigration on domestic trends – and particularly on firm-level ones –, this third 
and last chapter is intended to give a little contribution in order to enrich this fragmented picture. 
The main purpose of the empirical work presented hereinafter is to investigate whether 
low-skilled immigration has a causal effect on manufacturing firms’ performance indicators. 
The focus of the analysis is the Italian context, characterized by quite high levels of 
immigration, mainly from developing or less developed countries. The chapter will be 
organized in three paragraphs. The first one represents a sort of contextualization since it offers 
a brief excursus on the characteristics of the Italian immigration phenomenon in the past 
decades. The two subsequent paragraphs are similarly structured if compared to each other since 
they both illustrate the dataset construction, the empirical methodologies and the results 
obtained from a number of regression estimations. In particular, the second paragraph presents 
the main econometric analyses, which are based on micro-level data and are aimed at looking 
for a causal effect of low-skilled immigrant share on selected indicators reflecting 
manufacturing firms’ profitability and efficiency. The third and last paragraph, instead, is 
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devoted to the search for a causal link between the share of less-educated immigrants and patent 
applications at provincial level as a proxy for firms’ innovation capability. 
Before proceeding, it is worth specifying that in this chapter – as in most literature – the 
terms “low-skilled”, “less-educated”, and “low-qualified” are used as perfect synonyms. 
Likewise, the adjectives “high-skilled”, “highly educated”, and “highly qualified” can be 
intended as interchangeable. 
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3.1. A brief contextualization: the Italian immigration peculiarities 
Compared to the United States, which boast an immigration history of almost two 
centuries, European states began to transform from emigration to immigration countries after 
1945 – only 75 years ago. At the beginning, the inflows were mainly due to the return migration 
of European colonists and colonials officers who came back to their home country during 
decolonization; Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were the countries most 
affected by this phenomenon. Subsequently, by the end of the 1950s, Western European 
economies “began to meet part of their growing demand for labor by recruitment, often on the 
basis of bilateral agreements, in several Mediterranean countries: at first in Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, and Yugoslavia, and later in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey” (Fassmann and 
Münz, 1992, p. 461).  In addition to the aforementioned states, West Germany, Switzerland, 
Sweden, and Austria also experienced a sharp increase in their foreign resident population 
because of these labor migration flows.  
But it was only in the mid-1970s and during the 1980s that most Southern European 
counties have finally become destination countries as well.  This is particularly the case for 
Italy, and “to a lesser extent the same holds true for Spain, Portugal, and Greece” (Fassmann 
and Münz, 1992, p. 462). Actually, the economic boom of the 1950s-60s had already fostered 
the very first arrivals of foreigners in Italy; these inflows mainly involved people characterized 
by a high level of mobility who came from developing countries attracted by better living 
conditions. However, the Italian emigration rate70 continued to exceed the immigration rate 
until the beginning of the 1970s, when net migration became positive for the very first time in 
1973. 
Table 3.1 illustrates the evolution of the foreign resident population in Italy, both in 
absolute terms and as a percentage share on total resident population. As can be seen, the 
number of foreign residents increased from about 47,000 in 1950 to 144,000 in 1970, and then 
started to rise until the mid-1990s, when it reached about 729,000 (1.28 per cent of the total 
population). 
  
                                                          
70 Italian emigration can be considered one of the most massive in history. The emigration phenomenon started 
immediately after the Italian unification and lasted for over a century. “During the period 1861-1976 over 26 
million people emigrated, half of them towards other European countries, the rest towards North and South 
America. Two fifths of all these emigrations originated from the regions of the South of Italy” (Del Boca and 
Venturini, 2003, p. 1). 
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Table 3.1: Foreign Resident Population (FRP, in thousands) in Italy 






1950 47 0.10 
1970 144 0.27 
1975 186 0.34 
1980 299 0.53 
1985 423 0.75 
1990 781 1.38 
1995 729 1.28 
2000 1,271 2.23 
2005 2,210 3.82 
2010 2,648 6.16 
2015 5,014 8.25 
Source: own elaboration, based on data reported on I.Stat warehouse, supplemented with  
information found in Fassmann and Münz (1992), Del Boca and Venturini (2003). 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 better highlight this trend in Italian immigration. Foreign population 
stock and share steadily increased until the beginning of the 2000s, when the immigrant 
phenomenon definitely took hold. In just over 15 years, non-native presence in Italy has almost 
quadrupled; indeed, the number of foreigners rose from 1,271,000 (2.23 per cent of the total 
population) in 2000 to about 5,047,000 (8.33 per cent of all Italian residents) in 2017. 
Figure 3.1: Evolution of Foreign Resident Population stock in Italy from 1950 to 2017. 
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of Foreign Resident Population share in Italy from 1950 to 2017. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on an extended version of Table 3.1. 
Generally, it should be noted that immigration to Italy has displayed quite peculiar 
characteristics. First of all, it has been a very rapid phenomenon, the scope of which grew quite 
exponentially. Second, due both to the absence of strong colonial links and to the lack of official 
recruitment channels, the foreign population turned out to be highly diversified in terms of 
countries of origin, more than in any other European state71. Moreover, the different 
communities show very heterogeneous migratory models, with reference to the distribution in 
the territory72, the composition by gender, the size of the families and often the work carried 
out by foreigners (ISTAT, 2018). 
Another fundamental peculiarity of Italian immigration is that foreigners have proved 
to be an essential resource for the Italian economy. Just think that in 2016 immigrants accounted 
for 8.9 per cent of total Italian GDP and represented 9.4 per cent of total entrepreneurs73 
(Fondazione Leone Moressa, 2017). Moreover, in contrast to the rest of Europe, in Italy the 
employment rate of foreign population is higher than that of natives (59.5 per cent for foreigners 
compared with 57 per cent for nationals in 2016). However, the great majority of immigrants 
work in manual-intensive and low-qualified occupations (e.g. in construction, agriculture, 
                                                          
71 Currently, in Italy there are people of little less than 200 nationalities. In 2017, the first ten citizenships alone 
accounted for 63.7 per cent of the total foreign residents. The most widely represented community is Romanian, 
which on January 1st, 2017 represented 23.1 per cent of the total amount of foreigners, followed by Albanian (8.6 
per cent), Moroccan (8.1 per cent), Chinese (5.7 per cent), and Ukrainian (4.6 per cent) (ISTAT, 2018). 
72 Foreigners in Italy have mainly settled in the North and Center of the country, where they account for more than 
10 per cent of total residents, and in large metropolitan cities. In the South, the foreigners’ presence remains more 
contained even if it is gradually increasing in the last years (ISTAT, 2018). 
73 This percentage was 6.5 in 2008 and 7.4 in 2011. Furthermore, the net balance of businesses lead by foreigners 
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manufacturing, and personal-service sectors)74. As pointed out by Del Boca and Venturini 
(2003), this is essentially due to two main factors. First, most of foreign residents in Italy are 
characterized by relatively low levels of education. As shown by Figure 3.3, among developed 
countries, Italy is one of those with the lowest share of highly educated immigrants75. In 2015-
16, low-medium skilled foreigners accounted for 89.4 per cent of total immigrants, compared 
to 79.9 per cent in France, 77.9 per cent in Spain, 67.6 per cent in Switzerland, and 56.5 per 
cent in the United Kingdom – just to mention a few. 
Figure 3.3: Share of immigrants by educational level in Italy 
and in selected OECD countries, 2015-2016. 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data available on the Database 
on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries (DIOC). 
The second reason why immigrants in Italy are greatly employed as manual workers is 
that even highly qualified foreigners are willing to accept low-skilled and low-paid occupations, 
highlighting a substantial difficulty in finding a job on par with their education and training. 
Therefore, in summary, Italy appears to be particularly attractive for immigrants coming 
from developing countries, which end up working in manual-intensive jobs. This is partly due 
to its favorable geographical position, which makes it a perfect destination for immigrants 
coming from North Africa and South-Eastern Europe, generally areas with a low level of 
                                                          
74 In 2016, 37 per cent of foreigners were employed in low-skilled jobs compared to the 8 per cent of Italian 
workers, while these percentages were totally reversed when looking at technical, highly qualified occupations 
(Fondazione Leone Moressa, 2017). 
75 Strictly speaking, according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), highly educated 
means a person with a tertiary or post-tertiary education, medium educated stands for a person with an upper 
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educational attainment. But this mostly happens because of the characteristics of the Italian 
productive structure; domestic firms are mainly specialized in traditional industries that are 
intensive in low-skilled labor. Moreover, the steady ageing process of Italian population76 
results in an increasing demand for personal care and household services that are predominantly 
accomplished by less-educated people (Brunello et al., 2019, p.8). 
After this brief, necessary contextualization, we can finally go deeper into understanding 
the effects of low-skilled immigrants on Italian manufacturing firms’ performance and on 
general innovative activity. 
3.2. Focus on profitability and efficiency of manufacturing firms 
This paragraph illustrates the empirical analyses carried out in order to investigate the 
presence of an impact of low-skilled immigration on profitability and efficiency of Italian 
manufacturing firms over the period 2008-2017.  
3.2.1. Data description and dataset construction 
Data used to construct the final dataset, on which the empirical analyses have been 
performed, were collected from different free-access databases. 
First of all, information on manufacturing firms were drawn from AIDA - Bureau Van 
Dijk, a firm-level database that allows for the search, consultation, analysis, and processing of 
economic, financial, and commercial information of Italian incorporated enterprises. This 
database contains not only companies’ financial statements but also a variety of other 
information – including the juridical situation, the management and ownership composition, 
the group structure, M&A deals, company rating, and so on. 
Data have been collected for manufacturing companies77 that were active for the whole 
ten-year period considered and had a turnover of more than 500 thousand euros in at least one 
of the years under investigation. The resulting sample consists of 92,521 firms, which implies, 
in principle, a panel with 925,210 observations. However, the real dimension of the samples 
analyzed in this section is quite lesser than the theoretical one. This is due to two main issues: 
i) data contained some gaps, i.e. not all information required was available for each company 
for the entire period under analysis, and ii) some anomalies were discovered in the data – e.g. 
negatives values of sale – and so the correspondent observations were dropped. For each firm 
                                                          
76 According to ISTAT (2017), Italian residents aged 65 or more grew from 11.7 million in 2007 to 13.5 million 
in 2017, 20.1 percent and 22.3 percent of total population respectively. 
77 Manufacturing companies were identified according to the ATECO 2007 classification of economic activities, 
which is the Italian version of the European NACE Rev.2. In particular, the focus was on firms that fall within 
section C (manufacturing activities), which corresponds to divisions from 10 to 33. 
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in the sample, the following information was extracted from AIDA: i) company name, ii) 
business address78, iii) year of incorporation, iv) legal form (i.e. type of business entity), v) 
number of companies belonging to the same corporate group, vi) ATECO code (i.e. industry 
identification), and vii) a set of financial statement figures79.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the percentage frequency distribution by region of companies in 
the sample. As can be noted, more than a quarter of firms are located in Lombardia (24,804 out 
of 92,521 companies), while the first five most represented regions – i.e. Lombardia, Veneto, 
Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, and Piemonte – account for almost 70 per cent of all firms. This is 
in line with the well-known difference in the level of industrialization of Southern Italy, when 
compared to the North and Center of the country.  
Figure 3.4: Percentage frequency distribution of firms in the sample by region. 
Source: own elaboration, based on AIDA data. 
Figure 3.5, instead, shows the percentage frequency distribution by legal form of the 
92,521 firms selected. The majority of them, almost 80 per cent, is a SRL (Società a 
Responsabilità Limitata). The remaining part is represented by SpAs (Società per Azioni) – 
                                                          
78 The business address, also known as operating office, is the place where the real activities of the company, i.e. 
its day-to-day operations, are carried out. For the purpose of the analyses performed hereinafter, it has been deemed 
to be more relevant than the broadly used legal address. This is because the macroeconomic dimensions measured 
at local level, on which the empirical investigations are based, are presumed to have a direct influence on firms 
that really operate in that particular territory. 
79 These selected financial statement accounts will be detailed later on, when the computation of the variables of 
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which account for 18 per cent of total companies – and other types of legal forms, including 
partnerships (Società di Persone), consortia, and cooperatives. In fact, according to the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), beyond all different types of self-employment, the SRL 
is the most commonly chosen legal form among Italian firms. Moreover, this is coherent with 
the fact that in Italy there are many small-medium sized companies, which require a certain 
degree of flexibility in their structure. 
Figure 3.5: Percentage frequency distribution of firms in the sample by legal form. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on AIDA data. 
Finally, Figure 3.6 depicts the percentage frequency distribution by industry of firms in 
the sample. It can be noted that more than one fifth of them (22.12 per cent) manufacture metal 
products. Following there are companies devoted to production of machineries and other 
equipment (12.41 per cent), food (8.16 per cent), rubber and plastic items (5.08 per cent), and 
non-metallic mineral products (8.01 per cent). These five industries alone gather more than half 














Figure 3.6: Percentage frequency distribution of firms in the sample by industry. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on AIDA data. 
Before going on with the explanation of the dataset construction, it is worth pointing out 
why any kind of information linked to company’s employment has been totally neglected in the 
analysis. The reason for this choice is that, in the last years, Italian firms – and particularly those 
belonging to the manufacturing sector – have made an extensive, if not massive, use of services 
offered by temporary employment agencies. Because of this behavior, reported values of 
employment underestimate the real number of people working for the firm, since those hired 
through temporary employment agencies do not figure among firm’s employees. This implies 
also an underestimation of labor costs reported in the financial statements, since fees paid to 
temporary employment agencies fall within cost of services. Therefore, even though it would 
have been interesting to estimate the effect of immigration on firm’s productivity (e.g. in terms 
of Value Added per employee), it was decided to disregard this aspect because productivity 
would have been overestimated in the available data. 
The firm-level dataset obtained from AIDA database was subsequently combined with 
macroeconomic data pertaining to some dimensions that may affect a company’s performance. 
These data has been aggregated at the local labor market (LLM) level. LLMs (also referred to 
as labor market areas, LMAs, or travel to work areas, TTWAs,) are clusters of municipalities 
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to-work movements. Therefore, LLMs can be understood as areas where people both reside and 
work and where establishments can find the most of their required labor force. What is 
interesting is that LLMs are totally independent by the configuration of larger administrative 
divisions (e.g. provinces or regions). For this reason, LLMs are deemed the most appropriate 
territorial unit on the basis of which to aggregate local measures of interest. 
In order to create a unique dataset made of both firm-level and local-level dimensions, 
the business address was used to assign to each company in the sample its pertaining LLM80. 
Unfortunately, this assignment procedure is inevitably liable to errors; the main issue is linked 
to the fact that medium-large firms are likely to be multi-plant companies – i.e. may have more 
than just one plant –, and establishments belonging to the same enterprise may be located in 
different LLMs. However, this error is assumed to be mitigated by the fact that, as shown in 
Figure 3.7, the vast majority of firms in the sample are micro and small enterprises (89 per cent 
of the total), while only 2 per cent of them can be classified as large ones81. 
Figure 3.7: Percentage frequency distribution of firms in the sample by size. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on AIDA data. 
  
                                                          
80 According to the 2001 definition provided by ISTAT, local labor markets considered in this paper are 686.  
81 The criteria used to classify companies by size are those suggested by the European Community in the 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC. In particular, companies with an annual turnover i) not exceeding 2 million euros 
are defined as microenterprises; ii) higher than 2 million but not exceeding 10 million euros are classified as small 
enterprises, iii) higher than 10 million but not exceeding 50 million euros are considered as medium enterprises, 











In the empirical specifications illustrated in the following subparagraph, all 
macroeconomic dimensions, aggregated at the LLM level, will represent the explanatory 
variables, while firm-level indicators, based on companies’ financial statement figures,  will be 
treated as responding variables. Hereinafter, it will be detailed extensively how each of these 
variables, both input and output ones, have been computed for the purpose of the subsequent 
analyses. 
EBITA Margin 
Companies’ EBITA margin was used as outcome variable in the analysis of the impact 
of immigration on firms’ operating profitability. EBITA margin has been chosen instead of the 
absolute value of EBITA, since it allows for a comparison of one company's profitability to 
others in the same industry, irrespective of their sizes. Data to compute this measure can be 
easily found on a company’s financial statement and were all collected from AIDA database. 
This operating ratio has been calculated by the following expression: 
 EBITAmargin
𝑖𝑡
 =  
EBITDA𝑖𝑡  −  Depreciation𝑖𝑡
Revenues𝑖𝑡
 ×  100 (1) 
where companies are indexed by i and years by t. EBITDA𝑖𝑡 are earnings before 
interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) of company i at the end of year t, 
Depreciation
𝑖𝑡
 is the annual depreciation of company i at the end of year t, and Revenues𝑖𝑡 are 
sales revenue of company i at the end of year t. The EBITA margin reveals how many operating 
profits a company is able of generate in proportion to its sales. The higher the margin, the higher 
the firm’s operating profitability. Moreover, this margin can also be interpreted as a measure of 
a company’s cost-cutting efforts effectiveness. The higher a company's EBITA margin is, the 
lower its operating expenses are in relation to total revenues. 
 It is worth explaining why, in this context, earnings before interests, taxes, and 
amortization (EBITA) has been preferred to the more widely used EBITDA measure. 
Companies that operate in the manufacturing sector, like those included in the sample, generally 
require significant investments in fixed assets. Therefore, using EBITDA to evaluate these 
companies may distort the real firm’s profitability by ignoring the considerable depreciation of 
those assets. This is the reason why the EBITA dimension has been deemed a more appropriate 
measure of operating profitability. 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the evolution of the average EBITA margin, among all firms in the 
sample, between 2008 and 2017. As can be seen, companies’ profitability exhibited a sharp 
decrease in 2009, from 5.29 to 2.63 per cent. This is allegedly linked to the fact that, precisely 
in 2009, the world economy was definitely affected by the consequences of the financial crisis, 
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which previously arose in the United States and intensified at the end of 2008. After a partial 
recovery, there was a second, minor decrease in 2012 – another very negative year for the Italian 
economy. After 2013, the average EBITA margin started to increase quite constantly until 2016, 
and then more rapidly in 2017 when it reached a value of 5.74 per cent.  
Figure 3.8: Evolution of average EBITA margin from 2008 to 2017. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on AIDA data. 
Asset Turnover Ratio 
Companies’ asset turnover ratio was instead exploited as outcome variable in the 
analysis of the impact of immigration on firms’ efficiency. Also this ratio was obtained using 
companies’ financial statement data drawn from AIDA database. In particular, it has been 
computed as follows: 
 




where companies are indexed by i and years by t. Revenues𝑖𝑡 are sales revenue of 
company i at the end of year t and TotAssets𝑖𝑡 are total assets of company i at the end of year 
t82. The asset turnover ratio represents how many revenues the company is generating from each 
euro invested in its assets. The higher the ratio, the better the firm is performing in terms of 
efficiency.  
                                                          
82 To be exact, since this ratio compares a flow measure (sales revenue) with a stock one (total assets), it would be 
more precise to use at the denominator the average between total assets at the beginning and at the end of the year. 
However, computing the average values would have provoked the loss of an entire year of observations, and, since 
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Figure 3.9 shows the evolution of the companies’ average asset turnover ratio between 
2008 and 2017. As can be noted, the displayed pattern is quite similar to that of EBITA margin. 
The major decrease in the ratio occurred in 2009, when it dropped from 1.26 to 1.12. However, 
unlike EBITA margin, which reached in 2017 a higher value than in 2008, the average asset 
turnover ratio in 2017 (1.20) remained lower than in 2008 (1.26). 
Figure 3.9: Evolution of average Asset Turnover ratio from 2008 to 2017. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on AIDA data. 
Low-skilled immigrant percentage share 
Theoretically, to conduct a precise analysis on the effects of low-skilled immigration on 
firms’ performance, it would be necessary to have information about the proportion of less-
educated foreigners employed by companies. However, since this detailed information was not 
available, another dimension, which could have been significant for the purpose of the analysis, 
had to be identified. Taking advantage of the fact that immigrants are more geographically 
concentrated than natives are, and hence that firms have a different degree of exposure to 
immigrants depending on where they are located, foreigners’ presence in the territory has been 
considered a good proxy in this context. 
Therefore, in both the empirical specifications used to investigate the effects of 
immigration on firms’ profitability and efficiency, the low-skilled immigrant percentage share 
has been used as key explanatory variable. It has been defined as follows: 
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where local labor markets are indexed by j and years by t. LSImmigrants
𝑗𝑡
 is the number 
of low-skilled immigrant residents in LLM j at the beginning of year t, while Residents𝑗𝑡 is the 
number of total residents in LLM j at the beginning of year t. These two dimensions are both 
drawn from I.Stat, the warehouse that collects the statistics produced by ISTAT. 
In particular, the stock of national residents by LLM – the denominator in Eq. (3) – has 
been computed on the basis of two main statistics: i) Resident population by municipality on 
January 1st for the years from 2012 to 2017, and ii) Inter censuses estimated resident population 
by municipality on January 1st for the years from 200483 to 2011. Data has been collected both 
for total population and for males and females separately, in the event of a prospective robustness 
analysis. 
With regard to the administrative subdivision on the Italian territory, it is important to 
specify that in the period considered – i.e. between 2004 and 2017 – both the municipality and 
the province configuration has changed. The variations occurred over time, in particular at the 
municipal level, concerned mainly merges, spin-offs, or name changes of existing territorial 
units84. Only in order to simplify the process of aggregation of data at the LLM level, the 
administrative subdivision in 110 provinces and 7,998 municipalities85 was considered. 
Due to the aforementioned changes, before being manipulated, the data extracted from 
I.Stat have been made uniform across the different time periods. LLMs have been subsequently 
assigned to each municipality according to the 2001 definition available on ISTAT website, and 
figures have been finally aggregated at the LLM level in order to compute, for all LLMs in each 
period, the number of total residents on January 1st. 
The stock of low-skilled immigrant residents by LLM – the numerator in Eq. (3) – has 
been also derived from I.Stat, using the statistic Resident foreigners by Citizenship86 and 
municipality on January 1st for the whole period from 2004 to 2017. Data has been collected 
both for total foreigners and for males and females separately, in the perspective of a subsequent 
robustness analysis. 
Unfortunately, data provided by ISTAT do not include any information about 
foreigners’ educational attainment. To overcome this issue, in order to take into consideration 
                                                          
83 Data were collected also for years from 2004 to 2007 since they were needed for the analysis of the impact of 
immigration on innovation propensity, which will be presented in the third paragraph of this chapter. 
84 In general, there has been a diminishing trend in the number of municipalities – which varied from 8,100 in 
2004 to 7,978 in 2017 –, while the number of provinces first increased – from 103 in 2004 to 110 in 2009 – and 
then decreased again in 2016 – reaching the current number of 107.  
85 This corresponds to the administrative municipal subdivision in force in 2016. 
86 For ISTAT, citizenship is the decisive criterion for distinguishing residents between “locals” and immigrants. 
However, other national statistical institutes and organizations often adopt different criteria, like for instance 
country of birth. 
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only low-skilled immigrants, foreigners coming from developed countries87 are assumed to be 
high skilled and are therefore excluded from the collected data to compute the number of low-
skilled foreign residents by municipality. 
Subsequently, these data have undergone the same manipulation and aggregation 
process carried out on the stock of total residents, in order to obtain, for all LLMs in each period, 
the number of low-skilled foreign residents on January 1st. 
Figure 3.10 shows the evolution of the average low-skilled immigrant percentage share 
among local labor markets, as computed by Eq. (3), between 2004 and 2017. The graph details 
also the average shares by gender. First of all, it should be noted the strong average increase in 
the share of low-skilled foreigners, in particular from 2004 to 2011. The average share grew 
from 2.45 per cent in 2004 to 5.59 per cent in 2011 and then to 6.07 per cent in 2017. Moreover, 
it is interesting to point out that the average share computed for males lied above the average 
total share, while the average share of females lied below the average, until 2011, when things 
reversed. However, the gap between the share of males and that of females has narrowed 
significantly – from 0.49 per cent in 2004 to 0.18 per cent in 2017. 
Figure 3.10: Evolution of average low-skilled immigrant percentage share 
from 2004 to 2017. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on I.Stat data. 
  
                                                          
87 Developed countries refer to member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 2017, except for Mexico, Turkey, and Chile, which were still considered emerging 
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Table 3.2 shows some summary statistics for the low-skilled immigrant share by local 
labor market, both globally and separately by gender88. The average value of overall low-skilled 
immigrant share is 5.43 per cent, ranging from a minimum of 0.09 to a maximum of 16.61 per 
cent. Average low-skilled immigrant share for males (5.39 per cent) is below the overall mean, 
whereas the average for females (5.47 per cent) is above. For the purpose of the analyses on 
manufacturing firms, data on the explanatory variable, i.e. the low-skilled immigrant share, 
consists of panel information about each LLM for the whole 10-year period. Therefore, the 
overall variation can be split in the between variation, which stands for variation among LLMs 
regardless of the time dimension, and the within variation, which refers to variation for a single 
LLM across time. By looking at these variations, it can be observed that, in general, the low-
skilled immigrant share exhibits a much higher variation among LLMs than across time. This 
is in line with the fact that, immigrants are not equally distributed in the Italian territory, but 
prefer to locate in the Northern and Center of the country. 














5.43 5.39 5.47 
Minimum 0.09 0.04 0.04 
Maximum 
 
16.61 18.10 16.51 




1.00 0.80 1.12 
95th percentile 11.86 12.38   11.60 
Overall Standard Deviation 
 
3.60 3.76 3.49 
Between Standard Deviation 3.52 3.68 3.39 
Within Standard Deviation   0.76 0.77 0.83 
Source: own elaboration, based on I.Stat data. 
  
                                                          
88 Summary statistics are computed for the years from 2008 to 2017, the 10-year time period considered in the 
analyses on manufacturing firms’ performance. 
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Gross Domestic Product 
In addition to the explanatory variable of interest, some local confounders has been 
added to the empirical models specified in the subsequent subparagraph. It is important to 
control for these additional variables because, beyond the low-skilled immigrant share, there 
exist many other LLM-level factors that may have an impact on a company’s performance. 
The first local confounder taken into account is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Data on this measure for the years from 2004 to 2017 have been drawn from the online database 
provided by the European Statistical Office (EUROSTAT), in particular from the statistic Gross 
domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions. Since data were only 
available at the provincial level, they had to be reorganized in order to identify the GDP by 
LLM. The adopted two-step rearrangement procedure can be illustrated by the following 
equation: 
 









 where municipalities are indexed by m, provinces by p, local labor markets by j, and 
years by t. The first step consists in the calculation in brackets, where GDP𝑝(𝑚)𝑡 is GDP of 
province p – to which municipality m belongs – in year t, Residents𝑗(𝑚)𝑡 is the number of total 
residents in LLM j – to which municipality m belongs – at the beginning of year t, and 
Residents𝑝(𝑚)𝑡 is the number of total residents in province p – to which municipality m belongs 
– at the beginning of year t89. The second step consist in the summation, for each municipality 
m – belonging to LLM j – and year t, of previously computed values weighted by the share of  
residents in municipality m – belonging to LLM j – at the beginning of year t, Residents𝑚(𝑗)𝑡, 
out of total residents in LLM j at the beginning of year t, Residents𝑗𝑡. After performing all the 
steps for each period from 2008 to 2017, the outcome of Eq. (4) is the GDP in LLM j in year t, 
GDP𝑗𝑡, the first control variable that was needed. 
Adding local GDP in the empirical model specifications allows controlling for local 
productivity, and it is expected to show a positive correlation with the firms’ performance 
indicators under consideration. 
Table 3.3 displays some summary statistics for GDP by local labor market. The average 
value is 2,392 million euros, ranging from a minimum of 65 to a maximum of 164,767. Since 
also data on control variables is shaped like a panel dataset, the overall variation can be better 
                                                          
89 The stock of total residents by province has been computed from data at the municipal level, assigning to each 
municipality the province it belongs to and then aggregating the number of residents by province. 
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understood by looking at the between and within variations. As can be noted, GDP varies much 
more among LLMs than for a single local labor market over time. Hence, it can be said that 
gross domestic product strictly depends on the peculiarities of each LLM. 
















95th percentile 7,371 
Overall Standard Deviation 
 
8,728 
Between Standard Deviation 8,726 
Within Standard Deviation 367 
Source: own elaboration, based on EUROSTAT data. 
Unemployment rate 
The second local confounder, which has been added to the empirical specifications, is 
unemployment rate. Data on this measure for the years from 2004 to 2017 have been collected 
from I.Stat, using the statistic Unemployment rate at provincial level90. Also these data were 
only available by province and had therefore to be adjusted in order to ascribe them to LLMs. 
The imputation procedure can be summarized by the following equation: 
 




 where municipalities are indexed by m, provinces by p, local labor markets by j, and 
years by t. The unemployment rate of LLM j in year t, UR𝑗𝑡, is computed by summing up, for 
each municipality m – belonging to LLM j – and year t, the unemployment rate of province p – 
to which municipality m belongs – in year t, UR𝑝(𝑚)𝑡, multiplied by the share of residents in 
                                                          
90 Data were kept also for males and females separately in the event of a prospective robustness analysis. 
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municipality m – belonging to LLM j – at the beginning of year t, Residents𝑚(𝑗)𝑡, out of total 
residents in LLM j at the beginning of year t, Residents𝑗𝑡.  
This second control variable, local unemployment rate, has been computed to all years 
from 2008 to 2017 in order to be included in the regressions to control for local employment 
opportunities. Naturally, it is expected to exert a negative impact on firms’ performance. 
Table 3.4 shows some summary statistics for unemployment rate by local labor market, 
both globally and separately by gender. The average value of global unemployment rate is 11.62 
per cent, ranging from a minimum of 1.87 to a maximum of 31.46 per cent. Average male 
unemployment rate (10.43 per cent) is below the overall mean, whereas average female 
unemployment rate (13.42 per cent) is above. Moreover, it can be highlighted that, in general, 
unemployment rate displays a higher variation among LLMs than across time. This is in line 
with the fact that, as is well known, its value differs a lot between the North and South of Italy. 











11.62 10.43 13.42 
Minimum 1.87 1.47 1.87 
Maximum 
 
31.46 32.64 38.17 




3.99 3.08 4.82 
95th percentile 22.82 21.55 25.44 
Overall Standard Deviation 
 
5.94 5.85 6.54 
Between Standard Deviation 5.18 4.99 5.80 
Within Standard Deviation 2.91 3.06 3.03 
Source: own elaboration, based on I.Stat data. 
Industrial intensity ratio 
The third and last control variable is what has been called industrial intensity ratio. It 
has been defined as follows: 
 
IndInt𝑗𝑡  =  
MLocUnits𝑗𝑡
Residents𝑗𝑡
 ×  1000 (6) 
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where local labor markets are indexed by j and years by t. MLocUnits𝑗𝑡 is the number 
of manufacturing local units in LLM j in year t, while Residents𝑗𝑡 is, as usual, the number of 
total residents in LLM j at the beginning of year t. 
To compute this measure, data on the number of manufacturing local units91 – the 
numerator in Eq. (6) – were gathered from: i) the statistic Local units and persons employed by 
municipalities, available on I.Stat, for the years from 2012 to 2017, and ii) the tables produced 
by the Statistical register of Local Units (ASIA - LU) and published on ISTAT website, for the 
years from 2004 to 2011. Data from this second source were already provided by LLM, while 
data from I.Stat, which was at the municipal level, have been manipulated to deal with changes 
in municipalities and then aggregated at the LLM level. 
This last control, IndInt𝑗𝑡, can be intended as the number of manufacturing local units 
per 1,000 inhabitants in LLM j at time t, and represents a measure of the intensity of 
competitiveness among manufacturing firms in that particular local labor market. Therefore, it 
is expected to have a negative influence on company performance measures. 
















95th percentile 14.68 
Overall Standard Deviation 
 
3.79 
Between Standard Deviation 3.74 
Within Standard Deviation 0.65 
Source: own elaboration, based on I.Stat data. 
  
                                                          
91 Manufacturing local units are intended as local units of firms that fall within section C in the ATECO 2007 
classification of economic activities. 
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Table 3.5 illustrates some summary statistics for this industrial intensity ratio by local 
labor market. The average value of this ratio is 7.80 per 1,000 inhabitants, ranging from a 
minimum of 2.22 to a maximum of 37.89. Moreover, it can be seen that almost all variation in 
industrial intensity is between variation, implying that this ratio varies very little over the time 
period considered. 
All variables presented so far have been combined to obtain a unique panel dataset on 
the basis of which the empirical analyses has been carried out. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 display the 
summary statistics for all the variables in the panel dataset.  
In particular, Table 3.6 shows the summary statistics of both the outcome variables, 
before and after discarding extreme values. By looking at their minimum and maximum values 
– as well as at the 5th and 95th percentiles – before discarding, it is very clear that some 
observations were totally out of scale. Since this might have been due to some anomalies in the 
collected data, the very extreme values – i.e. below the 1st and above the 99th percentile – have 
been discarded before running the empirical regressions92.  
By examining the statistics computed on the outcome variables after discarding extreme 
values, it can be noted that both of them present mean and median values that are quite close to 
each other, implying that their distributions are rather symmetrical. The EBITA margin variable 
has an average of 5.31 per cent and displays both negative and positive values – in particular, 
approximately 12 per cent of observations are below zero93. The asset turnover ratio exhibits 
an average of 1.14, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 3.42. With regard to their 
variation, both variables exhibit a higher between than within variation; this is consistent with 
the fact that these financial ratios are strictly related to companies’ features – like, for instance, 
the industry they belong to.  
  
                                                          
92 Considering that AIDA database proved to be not free from reporting errors, it was preferred to potentially lose 
some information about few companies performing extremely good or bad than to include flawed observations in 
the analysis. 
93 This means that firm’s operating profit (EBITA) was not always positive along the period considered; this might 
have happened because either sales revenues were not enough to cover the operating expenses or the company was 
not sufficiently cost-effective. 
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Table 3.6: Outcome Variables in the sample from 2008 to 2017, summary statistics 














 Before discarding After discarding 
Overall Mean 
 
4.10 1.17 5.31 1.14 
Minimum -997.63 0 -48.21 0 
Maximum 
 
100.00 1,345.73 37.34 3.42 






-8.25 0.27 -6.32 0.31 
95th percentile 20.67 2.28 19.22 2.19 
Overall Std. Dev. 
 
25.85 2.35 8.37 0.58 
Between Std. Dev. 17.86 2.28 6.56 0.53 
Within Std. Dev. 21.22 1.83 5.94 0.29 
Observations 715,698 724,136 701,384 709,652 
Firms in the sample 92,421 92,435 92,139 92,061 
Variable type  Outcome1 Outcome2  Outcome1 Outcome2 
Source: own elaboration. 
Table 3.7 illustrates the summary statistics of the explanatory variables. What can be 
pointed out, among other things, is that all variables but one display a quite symmetrical 
distribution. Only gross domestic product exhibits average and median values that are definitely 
different from each other; in particular, its distribution appears to be right-skewed since the 
mean is above the median. This is mainly due to the influence of some outliers that present very 
large values. In order to scale down the variance and reduce the effect of these observations, 
the natural-logged GDP, instead of GDP expressed in millions, has been entered into the 
regression models. This will also make the observations values more comparable to each other. 
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 Overall Mean 
 
8.55 24,007 8.47 9.95 
Minimum 0.09 83 1.87 2.22 
Maximum 
 
16.61 164,767 31.46 37.89 




2.01 761 3.71 4.26 
95th percentile 13.49 146,939 18.53 17.02 
Overall Std. Dev. 
 
3.40 42,892 4.44 4.41 
Between Std. Dev. 3.27 42,835 3.88 4.34 
Within Std. Dev. 0.93 2,222 2.15 0.77 
Observations 925,210 925,210 925,210 925,210 
LLMs in the sample 671 671 671 671 
Variable type Key Regressor Control Control Control 
Source: own elaboration. 
Speaking of the panel dimensions, it can be observed that only 671 LLMs out of 686 are 
represented in the sample; this means that there were no companies, which met the 
requirements, located in the 15 missing LLMs. Moreover, considering that some data were 
missing and that, for the reasons previously explained, some observations have been canceled 
out, the EBITA margin has been computed (at least for one time period) for 92,139 firms out 
of the 92,521 that were at first identified from AIDA database, while the asset turnover ratio 
has been calculated only for 92,061 firms. Therefore, the analysis of immigration effects on 
firms’ profitability has been carried out over 701,384 observations and the analysis on firms’ 
efficiency has been executed over 709,652 observations. 
3.2.2. Estimation strategy: econometric model specifications 
The sample illustrated so far is therefore structured as a panel dataset, where 
manufacturing firms represent the cross-sectional dimension and years from 2008 to 2017 
denote the time series dimension. Unfortunately, since not all firm-level information was 
available for each company in every period, this panel is quite unbalanced. Nevertheless, this 
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was not a big problem, as omitted observations could be assumed to be missing at random94; in 
this case, most statistical software automatically makes the appropriate adjustments for 
unbalanced panel data without causing inconsistency of the estimators used. 
The general empirical model used in the analyses of immigration effects on firms’ 
performance is represented by the following equation: 
 𝑦𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 = 𝜷𝑿𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛼𝑖(𝑗) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 
with i = 1,…,N, j = 1,…,n, and t = 1,…,T 
(7) 
where firms are indexed by i, local labor markets where i is located by j, and years by t. 
𝑦𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 is the dependent variable referred to firm i – located in LLM j – at time t, 𝜷 is the K × 1 
vector of parameters for the K explanatory variables, 𝑿𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 is the 1 × K vector of local-level 
explanatory variables computed for LLM j – where firm i is located – at time t, 𝛼𝑖(𝑗) are 
individual-specific effects, 𝛿𝑡 are time-specific effects, 𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 are the idiosyncratic errors. 
That in Eq. (7) is a so-called unobserved effects model (UEM). Its basic assumption is 
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity across firms in the sample, i.e. omitted firm-specific 
variables that do not change over time and that affect the outcome variable95. 𝛼𝑖(𝑗) in Eq. (7) 
identifies these peculiar time-invariant characteristics of each firm, which can be interpreted as 
the leftover variation in the dependent variable that cannot be explained by the explanatory 
variables.  
In addition, time-specific effects are added to the model since it is presumed that 
unexpected variation, or year-by-year shocks, may also have an influence on the outcome 
variable96. 𝛿𝑡 in Eq. (7) captures these unobservable variables that change over time but are 
common to all firms, e.g. disregarded changes in macroeconomic conditions. In practice, time 
fixed effects are taken into account trough 𝑇 − 1 time dummy variables and an intercept, so Eq. 
(7) becomes: 
 𝑦𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜷𝑿𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛿2𝑇2  + … +  𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑇  +  𝛼𝑖(𝑗) + 𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 
with i = 1,…,N, j = 1,…,n, and t = 1,…,T 
(8) 
where 𝛼 is the intercept which reflects the effects of year 1, the base year, 𝛿2, … , 𝛿𝑇 are 
the coefficients of the 𝑇 − 1 time binary regressors, and 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝑇 are the 𝑇 − 1 time dummies. 
                                                          
94 Observations are randomly missing when the reason for the information loss is not correlated with the 
idiosyncratic errors. 
95 This assumption has been confirmed by running the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test on the panel 
dataset. The null hypothesis of zero variance across firms has been rejected, and therefore the use of an unobserved 
effects model can be claimed to be the most appropriate in this context. 
96 The need to add time fixed effects has been confirmed by running a Wald test on time dummies coefficients.   
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By combining both firm and time fixed effects, the empirical model illustrated by Eqs. 
(7) and (8) allows to eliminate bias from factors that differ across entities but are constant over 
time and simultaneously control for unobservables that change over time but are constant over 
entities.  
In order to choose the best estimation strategy for model in Eqs. (7) and (8), it was 
fundamental to identify a consistent and efficient estimator97. In this respect, it was firstly 
necessary to clarify whether the individual-specific effects 𝛼𝑖(𝑗) were correlated with the 
regressors or not. In this context, the unobserved effect 𝛼𝑖(𝑗) has been allowed to be correlated 
with the explanatory variables and this means that the fixed-effects assumption has been deemed 
to hold. The assumption of uncorrelation between the individual effects and the explanatory 
variables, instead, is referred to as random-effects assumption. To confirm that the fixed-effects 
assumption was valid, that is for each regressor (regressors are indexed by k): 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑗(𝑖)𝑡𝑘, 𝛼𝑖(𝑗))  ≠ 0 
with i = 1,…,N, j = 1,…,n, t = 1,…,T, and k = 1,…,K 
 
a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, also known as Hausman specification test, has been run. 
This test assesses whether there is a systematic difference between the fixed effects (FE) and 
random effects (RE) estimators. The null hypothesis is that the two estimators lead to the same 
estimates, and therefore the RE estimator should be preferred because it is both consistent and 
efficient – the FE one is also consistent but less efficient. The alternative hypothesis points out 
at significant differences between the two estimators, so the FE estimator should be used 
because it is consistent, whereas the RE one is not. By running the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test 
on the available dataset, the null hypothesis has been rejected, hinting at the validity of the 
fixed-effects assumption.  
Therefore, nor the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator – which would have 
been bias and inconsistent – nor the random effects (RE) estimator – which would have been 
inconsistent as well – were appropriate to estimate the empirical model of Eqs. (7) and (8). 
Thus, the adopted estimation strategy was based on the fixed effects (FE) estimator, also called 
within estimator, because it exploits the within variation (i.e. over time) to obtain time-
                                                          
97 A consistent estimator is one for which, as number N of observations in the dataset increases, the estimates 
converge in probability to the parameter to be estimated. That is 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝛽?̂?  =  𝛽. Consistency is based on the law 
of large numbers and implies more precise and accurate estimates as the dimension of the sample increases. An 
efficient estimator is one that estimates the coefficients of the regression displaying the minimum variance relative 
to specific classes of estimators. Having both a consistent and efficient estimator is preferred, but when it is not 
possible, consistency is deemed to be more important. 
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demeaned variables. The procedure consists in averaging, for each firm i (located in LLM j), 
Eq. (7) over time, obtaining: 
 ?̅?𝑖(𝑗) = 𝜷?̅?𝑗(𝑖)  +  𝛼𝑖(𝑗) + 𝛿̅ + ?̅?𝑖(𝑗) 
with i = 1,…,N, and j = 1,…,n 
(9) 





𝑡=1 , and the same goes for ?̅?𝑗(𝑖), 𝛿̅, and ?̅?𝑖(𝑗). Obviously, 𝛼𝑖(𝑗) 
does not vary over time, so it remains the same as in Eq. (7). By subtracting Eq. (9) from Eq. 
(7), the model with time-demeaned variables is obtained: 
 (𝑦𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖(𝑗))  = 𝜷(𝑿𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  −  ?̅?𝑗(𝑖))  + (𝛿𝑡  −  𝛿̅) + (𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡  −  ?̅?𝑖(𝑗)) 
with i = 1,…,N, j = 1,…,n, and t = 1,…,T 
(10) 
The important thing about this demeaning procedure is that the unobserved individual 
effects 𝛼𝑖(𝑗) cancel out
98. Therefore, the heterogeneity bias is no longer an issue and an OLS 
estimation of the time-demeaned dependent variable on the time-demeaned regressors can be 
now run to Eq. (10)99. Hence, the fixed effects – or within – estimator, is nothing but a pooled 
OLS estimator that is based on the time-demeaned variables. 
After discussing about the general features of the econometric methodology applied in 
this paper, the models to be estimated on the panel dataset can be examined in more detail. The 
first one, used to analyze the effects of low-skilled immigration on manufacturing firms’ 




= 𝛽1LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛽2lnGDP𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛽3UR𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 
            + 𝛽4IndInt𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛼𝑖(𝑗) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 
with i = 1,…,92,139, j = 1,…,671, and t = 2008,…,2017 
(11) 
where the dependent variable, EBITAmargin
𝑖(𝑗)𝑡
, is the operating profit margin of 
company i – located in LLM j – at the end of year t. The explanatory variable of interest, 
LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖)𝑡, is the low-skilled immigrant percentage share in LLM j – where firm i is 
located – at the beginning of year t. The other variables are the local controls; lnGDP𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 is the 
natural logarithm of total GDP in LLM j – where firm i is located – in year t, UR𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 is the 
                                                          
98 However, even if it allows to control for heterogeneity, the within transformation wipes out all time-invariant 
variables that do not vary within an entity (e.g. size, legal form, industry). Since deviations of time-invariant 
variables from their average are all zero, their impact on the dependent variable cannot be analyzed. 
99 Actually, the statistical software employed – namely Stata 14 – uses the modified within deviation – i.e. it adds 
back the overall mean to each variable – and then runs the OLS estimation on the following model: 
(𝑦𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖(𝑗)  +  ?̅?) = 𝜷(𝑿𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  −  ?̅?𝑗(𝑖)  +  ?̅?)  + (𝛿𝑡  −  𝛿̅  +  𝛿̅) + (𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡  −  ?̅?𝑖(𝑗)  +  ?̅?) 
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unemployment rate of LLM j – where firm i is located – in year t, and IndInt𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 is the industrial 
intensity ratio of LLM j – where firm i is located – in year t. All these dimensions have already 
been defined in detail in the previous subparagraph 3.2.1.  
The coefficient of interest in Eq. (11) is, therefore, 𝛽1, which captures the correlation 
between the low-skilled immigrant share at the LLM level and the firms’ EBITA margin. This 
correlation is conditional to the firm-specific effects, 𝛼𝑖(𝑗), the time fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡, and the 
other LLM-level controls. 
The second empirical model is aimed at investigating the impact of low-skilled 
immigration on manufacturing firms’ efficiency and it is based on the following equation: 
 
AssetTurnover𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 = 𝛽1LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛽2lnGDP𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛽3UR𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 
            + 𝛽4IndInt𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛼𝑖(𝑗) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 
with i = 1,…,92,061, j = 1,…,671, and t = 2008,…,2017 
(12) 
where the dependent variable, AssetTurnover𝑖(𝑗)𝑡, is the asset turnover ratio of company 
i – located in LLM j – at the end of year t, as previously defined in subparagraph 3.2.1. In all 
other respects, Eq. (12) is perfectly analogous to Eq. (11). 
Clearly, this time the coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, detects the correlation, ceteris paribus, 
between the low-skilled immigrant share at the LLM level and the firms’ asset turnover ratio. 
3.2.3. Assumptions violation: heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and endogeneity 
issues  
Dealing with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation: the clustering approach 
The fixed effects estimator works well under a set of assumptions on data behavior100. 
Among them, it is worth mentioning the assumptions of homoskedasticity and no 
autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic errors.  Homoskedasticity refers to a situation in which the 
variance of the regression residuals is constant, namely: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡|𝑿𝑖(𝑗), 𝛼𝑖(𝑗))  =  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡)  =  𝜎𝜇
2 for all t 
with i = 1,…,N, j = 1,…,n, an d t = 1,…,T 
 
If data do not meet this assumption, that is when the error terms are not identically 
distributed, there is rather evidence of heteroskedasticity. 
                                                          
100 For more details on these assumptions see Wooldridge (2013, pp. 509-511). 
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Instead, the assumption of absence of autocorrelation implies that the idiosyncratic 
errors are independent from each other, specifically: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑠|𝑿𝑖(𝑗), 𝛼𝑖(𝑗))  =  0 for all t ≠ s 
with i = 1,…,N, j = 1,…,n, an d t,s = 1,…,T 
 
If this assumption is violated, the error terms display autocorrelation, also referred to as 
serial correlation. This happens when the errors associated with a given time period carry over 
into subsequent time periods101. 
When (one or both of) these two key assumptions are violated, performing inference 
using the FE approach induces inefficient estimates. Moreover, although the estimated 
coefficients are still consistent and unbiased102, the same cannot be said for their estimated 
standard errors; this means that they are too high or too low, and that the reported t-statistics, 
p-values, and confidence intervals cannot be relied on. However, heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation represent a big issue in long panels, i.e. panels with small N and large T; when the 
opposite holds, i.e. when N is substantially larger than T, the assumptions violation is a minor 
concern. In fact, in short panels, like the one employed in this paper, the clustering approach 
is enough to deal with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and to obtain fully robust standard 
errors and test statistics. 
In order to investigate whether the collected data entailed homoskedasticity or 
heteroskedasticity, a modified Wald test for (groupwise) heteroskedasticity in the residuals of 
the fixed effects regressions has been run on the panel dataset. The null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity has been rejected, and therefore heteroskedasticity appeared to be present in 
the data. 
Subsequently, also a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel dataset has been 
executed. In this test, the null hypothesis is the absence of first-order serial correlation, and 
again the alternative hypothesis has been preferred, implying that the data displayed also 
autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic errors. 
Given these results, the clustering methodology has been adopted in order to fix both 
the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation issues. Since observations of firms located in the 
same LLM are likely to be related to each other, clustering at the LLM level produces standard 
                                                          
101 There might occur different types of serial correlation. The most common is first-order autocorrelation, which 
means that the error in one period is correlated with the error in the following period; it can be either positive or 
negative. Second-order autocorrelation, instead, requires that the error in one period affects the error two periods 
later; this often happens when data have seasonal features. Orders higher than second-order do happen, but very 
rarely. 
102 An estimator is said to be unbiased when it does not show systemic bias away from the real value, on average, 
for any sample size N. That is 𝐸(𝛽?̂?)  =  𝛽𝑘 with k = 1,…,K, irrespectively of sample size. 
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errors that are robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-panel (serial) 
correlation103. In particular, these robust standard errors involve the computation of the Huber-
White variance estimator, also known as sandwich variance estimator, for all the coefficients 
in the regression. 
The last issue in this respect is that the Hausman specification test – previously run to 
assess whether the empirical model into consideration was a FE or RE model – could not be 
used. This is because it is based on the assumption of efficiency of the RE estimator under the 
null hypothesis. However, in the presence of heteroskedasticity and/or serial correlation, the 
RE is not fully efficient. Therefore, a cluster-robust version of the Hausman specification test 
as well as a Sargan-Hansen test have been executed on the panel dataset104. Both tests 
confirmed the validity of the fixed effect model. 
Dealing with endogeneity: the instrumental variable approach 
Besides the loss of efficiency linked to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the 
presence of endogeneity105 is a far more relevant issue. Indeed, in order to produce accurate and 
reliable estimates, the FE estimator needs all the explanatory variables in the model to be 
exogenous. In other words, under a strict exogeneity assumption on the explanatory variables, 
the FE estimator is unbiased. A variable is referred to as exogenous when it is uncorrelated with 
the idiosyncratic error across all time periods. This means that, in the general regression model 
presented above, the following condition must hold: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑗(𝑖)𝑡𝑘 , 𝑢𝑖(𝑗))  =  0 for all k, t 
with i = 1,…,N, j = 1,…,n, t = 1,…,T, and k = 1,…,K 
 
However, the low-skilled immigrant share in Eqs. (11) and (12) cannot at all be assumed 
to behave as an exogenous variable106. This is due to three main reasons. First of all, immigrants 
are not randomly distributed across local labor markets; on the contrary, they tend to move to 
areas that offer favorable economic, geographical, or institutional conditions. Because of this, 
there are likely to be local omitted variables that affect both the number of immigrants and the 
                                                          
103 Since data, in fact, displayed three dimensions – the firm, the LLM, and the time dimensions –, clustering at 
the LLM level has been preferred to the usual clustering at the firm level. Another reason for this choice was that 
all regressors – both the explanatory variable and the control variables – were actually computed at the LLM level. 
104 These two tests do not require one of the two estimators in question to be fully efficient under the null 
hypothesis, and therefore can be used when the data display heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation in the error 
terms. 
105 Endogeneity can be brought on by different causes; the most common include: i) measurement errors, ii) omitted 
variables, and iii) reverse causality, or simultaneity. 
106 Endogeneity of the key regressor has been confirmed running specific Davidson-MacKinnon tests of exogeneity. 
The null hypothesis that the supposed endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous has been rejected 
for both model specifications. The rejection of the null indicates that the endogenous regressor’s effect on the 
estimates is meaningful, and instrumental variables techniques are thus required. 
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firms’ performance in a particular LLM. Second, simultaneity may occur in the event that the 
firms’ performance in turn influences the location decision of immigrants looking for a job. 
Third, there might also be some concerns about the measurement of the key explanatory 
variable due to the presence of undocumented immigrants107. According to the estimates 
released by the ISMU Foundation, the amount of foreigners without a regular residence permit 
in Italy were about 491 thousand on January 1st, 2017. Unfortunately, these undocumented 
immigrants are not included in the official statistics, and therefore the low-skilled immigrant 
share computed for the analyses is inevitably lower that it should actually be. 
Because of the above-mentioned reasons, it would not have been possible to identify a 
causal effect of low-skilled immigration on manufacturing firms’ performance. Hence, an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach has been adopted in order to address the endogeneity of 
the share of low-skilled immigrants in the population. As in most of the relevant literature on 
this subject108, the IV strategy has been built on the basis of ethnic enclaves, i.e. taking 
advantage of the fact that immigrants of a given nationality prefer to locate in areas where 
previous immigrants of the same nationality already live109. 
The procedure used to construct the instrument subsequently employed in the empirical 
analyses can be divided into three steps. First of all, data on foreign residents by citizenship on 
January 1st, 1991 have been collected for each LLM. This information has been used to 
construct the LLM-level share of immigrants by citizenship in 1991, as follows:  
 





  (13) 
where LLMs are indexed by j and citizenships by c. Immigrants
𝑗𝑐1991
 is the number of 
immigrants with citizenship c in LLM j at the beginning of year 1991, Immigrants
𝑐1991
 is the 
number of total immigrants with citizenship c at the beginning of year 1991, and therefore 
𝜃𝑗𝑐1991 is the share of immigrants with citizenship c in LLM j at the beginning of year 1991. 
Thus, the historical LLM-level share of foreign residents has been exploited to predict 
the current number of immigrants by LLM. In detail: 
                                                          
107 Illegal immigration, indeed, is an issue that affects almost all European immigration countries. 
108 Another methodology frequently used in the empirical research is the natural experiment approach. It consists 
in taking advantage of rapid and unexpected refugees’ waves, often due to events such as civil wars and natural 
catastrophes, in order to avoid endogeneity concerns when analyzing immigration impacts. 
109 This is confirmed by the fact that in Italy there exist very large communities of foreigners coming from the 
same countries. For instance, 19.6 per cent of Romanians live in Lazio, while 8.3 per cent of Ukrainians in 
Campania. Moreover, there are large Chinese communities around Milan, Rome, Florence-Prato, and in the 





 ̂ =  ∑  
𝑐
( 𝜃𝑗𝑐1991  ×  Immigrants𝑐t) (14) 
where LLMs are indexed by j, citizenships by c, and time by t.  𝜃𝑗𝑐1991 is defined by Eq. 
(13), Immigrants
𝑐t
 is the number of total immigrants with citizenship c at the beginning of year 
t, and Immigrants
𝑗𝑡
 ̂ is the predicted number of total immigrants in LLM j at the beginning of 
year t. 
Finally, the predicted number of foreigners has been used to compute the instrument for 
the low-skilled immigrant share, as follows:  
 








 ̂ is defined by Eq. (14), Residents𝑗1991 is the number of total residents 
in LLM j at the beginning of year 1991, and therefore 𝑍𝑗𝑡 is the instrument for the low-skilled 
immigrant share in LLM j at the beginning of year t. It is worth specifying that – differently 
from other studies – in the denominator of Eq. (15), the population in year 1991 has been 
preferred to the population in year t in order to avoid all possible sources of endogeneity110. In 
particular, the total population in a given year is likely to depend on the number of immigrants 
in that year, at least for two reasons: i) obviously foreign residents are included in the total 
amount of residents, and ii) immigrants may cause natives to move to other areas (i.e. 
outmigration), again influencing the total population in the LLM. 
Thus, by interacting foreign presence by citizenship with immigrants’ past geographical 
distribution, the instrument in Eq. (15) allows to capture the immigrant share that is exogenous 
to local characteristics and, therefore, can be used to identify the causal impact of immigration 
on the firm’s performance. The exogeneity of the instrument relies on the fact that the historical 
distribution across LLMs more than 15 years before the beginning of the sample period is likely 
to be unrelated to the current local conditions and economic shocks, which also affect the firms’ 
performance111. 
                                                          
110 In this respect, the choice of 1991 as base year was not random, since it is the year before the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty, officially known as the Treaty of European Union. In fact, it was a fundamental treaty for the 
EU because it i) laid the foundations for economic and monetary union, ii) established a common foreign and 
security policy, iii) enacted closer cooperation between EU governments, the police and the judiciary on justice 
and home affairs, and iv) introduced the concept of European citizenship, allowing citizens to reside in and move 
freely between Member States. Moreover, 1991 considerably foreruns the EU Eastern enlargements in 2004 and 
2007, and the Western Balkans enlargement in 2013. Both the Maastricht Treaty and the EU enlargements 
represent important historical changes, so past (i.e. in 1991) and current (i.e. from 2008 and 2017) local shocks 
can be deemed to be uncorrelated. 
111 Unfortunately, the instrument exogeneity cannot be tested since those considered in the analyses are just-
identified models, i.e. they employ exactly one instrument for one endogenous variable. However, it is believed 
that the arguments put forward to support instrument exogeneity can be deemed to be convincing. 
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Resuming the structural models of Eqs. (11) and (12), the causal effect of low-skilled 
immigration on manufacturing firms’ profitability and efficiency has been investigated using a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation method. As the name itself suggests, this procedure 
consists of two steps. In the first one, the following reduced form equation has been estimated 
with only exogenous regressors:  
 
LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 =  𝛾1𝑍𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛾2lnGDP𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  + 𝛾3UR𝑗(𝑖)𝑡   
               + 𝛾4IndInt𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  + 𝛼𝑖(𝑗)  +  𝛿𝑡  +  𝑒𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 
(16) 
This first stage removes the variability of LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖)𝑡 correlated with 𝑢𝑖(𝑗) and, 
therefore, allows to isolate its exogenous component. In the second stage, the value predicted 
through Eq. (16), LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖)𝑡̂ , has been replaced in the structural Eqs. (11) and (12) to 
determine the causal impact of low-skilled immigration on both the firms’ EBITA margin and 




 =  𝛽1LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖)𝑡
̂  +  𝛽2lnGDP𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛽3UR𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  
                            + 𝛽4IndInt𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛼𝑖(𝑗) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 




AssetTurnover𝑖(𝑗)𝑡  =  𝛽1LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖)𝑡
̂  +  𝛽2lnGDP𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛽3UR𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  
                            + 𝛽4IndInt𝑗(𝑖)𝑡  +  𝛼𝑖(𝑗) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡 
with i = 1,…,92,061, j = 1,…,671, and t = 2008,…,2017 
(18) 
Obviously, in order to produce efficient and consistent estimates, the IV (2SLS) 
estimator has to rely on a valid instrumental variable. In order to be valid, an instrument must 
be simultaneously relevant and exogenous112. Instrument relevance implies that 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(LSImmShare𝑗(𝑖), 𝑍𝑗(𝑖))  ≠  0, i.e. the instrument has to be correlated with the endogenous 
regressor – the low-skilled immigrant share. This means that, in Eq. (16), 𝛾1 has to be 
significantly different from zero. Instrument exogeneity, instead, entails that 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑗(𝑖), 𝑢𝑖(𝑗) )  =  0, i.e. the instrument has to be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error, 
and therefore with the dependent variable.  
                                                          
112 If the instrument is not relevant, the IV estimates are inefficient, while if the instrument is not exogenous, the 
IV estimates are inconsistent. 
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3.2.4. Regression findings 
This subparagraph illustrates the regression findings of the models specified above. First 
of all, the baseline results for both model specifications will be disclosed. The models have 
been implemented by adding first the key regressor – the low-skilled immigrant share – and 
then the local controls one by one, in order to gradually check the effect that each explanatory 
variable had on others already accounted for. Clearly, two different regressions have been run 
for the two dependent variables considered – the EBITA margin and the asset turnover ratio – 
and both the fixed-effects (FE) and the instrumental variables (IV) estimates will be reported. 
Subsequently, a set of robustness checks, performed in order to test the validity of the baseline 
results, will be illustrated. And finally, some heterogeneity analyses conducted on the data will 
be also presented; in this respect, the overall sample has been split in different subsamples 
according to various criteria, and then separate IV regressions have been conducted in order to 
investigate the presence of potentially different effects of low-skilled immigration. 
Baseline results 
Table 3.8 illustrates the fixed effects estimates of model in Eq. (11). Columns from (1) 
to (3) deal with the progressive model implementation mentioned above; as can be noted, the 
coefficient of interest remained always negative and significant as controls were gradually 
added to the model. Column (4) presents the FE estimates of the final model designed to 
investigate the low-skilled immigration effects on manufacturing firms’ profitability. It appears 
that a higher presence of foreigners in the population of a given LLM is correlated with lower 
operating profitability of firms located in the same area. In particular, a one-percentage point 
increase in the low-skilled immigrant share is associated, on average, with a decrease of firms’ 
EBITA margin by about 0.19 percentage points.  
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Table 3.8: FE estimates with firm and time fixed effects. 
Dependent variable: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 EBITAmargin EBITAmargin EBITAmargin EBITAmargin 
     
LSImmShare -0.1497*** -0.1913*** -0.1851*** -0.1893*** 
 (0.0453) (0.0425) (0.0424) (0.0374) 
     
lnGDP  4.9734*** 3.8930*** 3.5379*** 
  (0.8365) (0.9364) (0.8874) 
     
UnemplRate   -0.0730*** -0.0619*** 
   (0.0157) (0.0155) 
     
IndInt    -0.2598*** 
    (0.0802) 
     
Constant 7.1909*** -36.9813*** -26.9894*** -20.8589*** 
 (0.3200) (7.3626) (8.2755) (7.8780) 
     
Within R2 0.0086 0.0089 0.0091 0.0092 
LSDV R2 0.5008 0.5010 0.5010 0.5011 
     
Rho 0.5183 0.7024 0.6496 0.6447 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 701,384 701,384 701,384 701,384 
No. of firms 92,139 92,139 92,139 92,139 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses. 671 clusters based on 2001 LLMs definition (15 LLMs 
missing in the sample). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Before moving forward, it is worth making some clarifications. To begin with, the 
constant term reported in Table 3.8 stands for the average value of the firm fixed effects, and it 
can be said to be not particularly meaningful for the purpose of the analysis113. Moreover, time 
fixed effects have been estimated using nine time dummies as clarified in subparagraph 3.2.2; 
the corresponding coefficients, which are not reported in Table 3.8, are all negative and 
significant – at least at the 10 per cent level –, except for year 2017. 
The table displays two different measures of the goodness of fit of the model, the within 
R-squared and the LSDV R-squared. The first one pertains to the fixed effects (FE) estimation 
                                                          
113 This is linked to the fact that, in a fixed effects model, the “standard constant term” and the “individual fixed 
effects” are inherently unidentified, and their values can only be obtained by imposing some arbitrary constraint. 
A popular constraint is setting α equal to zero; however, the statistical software employed adopts a less-intuitive 
constraint and forces the sum of all panel fixed effects to be zero (with unbalanced panels the 𝛼𝑖  are effectively 
weighted by the number of observations in the panel). This choice is motivate by a set of advantages that make the 
results interpretation easier and more intuitive. 
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procedure and describes the proportion of variation in the dependent variable over time that is 
explained by the model; hence, it can be seen as a measure of how well the explanatory variables 
account for changes in the output variable within firms. The second measure, instead, is related 
to the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) procedure114 and represents the overall fit of the 
model when also the cross-sectional fixed effects are taken into consideration. Therefore, it 
illustrates the proportion of the overall variation in the dependent variable that can be explained 
by all the independent variables in the model, including the fixed effects. As can be noted by 
looking at the R-squared values reported in Table 3.8, both of them are quite low and did not 
increase that much as regressors were added to the model; this shall be interpreted as a signal 
of the presence of an inherently high amount of unexplainable variability in the data. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the analyses presented in this paper is not obtaining a high level 
of fit of the models, but rather investigating whether a real causal relationship exists between 
the regressor of interests and the response variable. And statements can be made about this 
matter even with low R-squared. 
Another interesting index shown in Table 3.8 is rho, also referred to as intraclass 
correlation; it represents the fraction of variance due to differences across firms and shows the 
proportion of variation explained by the individual-specific term, 𝛼𝑖(𝑗)
115. In column (4), the 
rho of 64.5 per cent implies that firm-fixed effects account for most of the variation, the rest is 
due to the idiosyncratic error,  𝑢𝑖(𝑗)𝑡. 
Table 3.9 exhibits the fixed effects estimates of model in Eq. (12). By looking at 
columns from (1) to (3), again, it can be pointed out that the key coefficient continued to be 
negative and strongly significant as control variables were progressively taken into 
consideration. As above, column (4) displays the FE estimation results of the final model, which 
this time was aimed at examining the relationship between low-skilled immigration and 
manufacturing firms’ efficiency. The estimates point to a higher share of less-educated 
immigrants in a certain LLM to be related to lower efficiency of firms located in the same 
territory. Notably, when the low-skilled immigrant share rises by one percentage point, the 
firms’ asset turnover ratio decreases, on average, by 0.01.  
As far as time fixed effects are concerned, the unreported estimated coefficients of the 
nine time dummies proved to be all negative and significant at the one per cent level. Moreover, 
the same considerations expressed above can be made with respect to the reported R-squared 
                                                          
114 The LSDV estimator produces the same estimates of the FE one, but it is based on an empirical model that uses 
𝑁 − 1 firm dummy variables – instead of the demeaning procedure – in order to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the data. 
115 Having high values of rho is good since it means that, albeit it is not known where the variation comes from, it 
can still be ascribed to a particular firm. 
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measures, even if their values are a bit higher in this second regression. Also the intraclass 
correlation, rho, is above that in Table 3.8; in fact, this time as much as 76.8 per cent of the 
variation is due to the firm-fixed effects. 
Table 3.9: FE estimates with firm and time fixed effects. 
Dependent variable: manufacturing firms’ Asset Turnover ratio. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AssetTurnover AssetTurnover AssetTurnover AssetTurnover 
     
LSImmShare -0.0088*** -0.0105*** -0.0102*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
     
     
lnGDP  0.1918*** 0.1558*** 0.1539*** 
  (0.0484) (0.0522) (0.0503) 
     
UnemplRate   -0.0024*** -0.0024*** 
   (0.0005) (0.0009) 
     
IndInt    -0.0014 
    (0.0046) 
     
Constant 1.3470*** -0.3565 -0.0236 0.0091 
 (0.0182) (0.4212) (0.4559) (0.4297) 
     
Within R2 0.0266 0.0268 0.0269 0.0269 
LSDV R2 0.7448 0.7449 0.7449 0.7449 
     
Rho 0.7463 0.7807 0.7681 0.7682 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 709,652 709,652 709,652 709,652 
No. of firms 92,061 92,061 92,061 92,061 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses. 671 clusters based on 2001 LLMs definition (15 LLMs 
missing in the sample). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
In addition to what previously said, it can be noticed that the coefficients of the three 
local control variables appear to display the expected sign in both models implemented. 
Furthermore, they are all statistically significant, except for the industrial intensity ratio in the 
second specification. 
Table 3.10 illustrates the instrumental variable estimates of both empirical models. In 
particular, columns (1) and (3) report the first stages – as per Eq. (16) – of the 2SLS estimation 
of models in Eqs. (17) and (18), respectively; due to the fact that the observations and firms in 
the sample are different between the two models, results are slightly dissimilar but clearly 
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comparable. It can be observed that the coefficient of the instrument Z, which represents its 
marginal effect on the low-skilled immigrant share, is positive and significant at the one per 
cent level; this implies that the selected instrument is definitely relevant. In addition, instrument 
relevance has been confirmed running an underidentification Lagrangian multiplier test of 
whether the first stage equation was identified. Since standard errors were clustered, this test 
has been based on the Kleibergen-Paap LM rk statistic, which led to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the equation was underidentified. A rejection of the null implies also that the 
“excluded” instrument is relevant. 
However, instrument relevance is not enough. The correlation between the instrument 
and the endogenous regressor has to be strong, otherwise statistical inference can be misleading. 
To check whether the instrument was not weak, the cluster-robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 
statistic has been employed. As can be seen in columns (1) and (3), the value of this F statistic, 
which is associated to the exclusion of the instrument Z from the first stage equation, is 
definitely higher than the 10 per cent Stock-Yogo critical value in both models. Therefore, the 
instrument employed in this context was not weak. 
Column (2) displays the results of the fixed-effects IV estimation of Eq. (17). With 
respect to the previous FE estimation of Table 3.8, it can be noted that the coefficient of interest 
kept the negative sign and increased in magnitude; moreover, it is still significant, but only at 
the 10 per cent level. Therefore, it can be said that a higher presence of less-educated foreigners 
in a given LLM is likely to lead to a reduction in the operating profitability of manufacturing 
firms in the same area. In particular, it is found that a one-percentage point increase in the low-
skilled immigrant share causes, on average, a decrease of firms’ EBITA margin by about 0.29 
percentage points after one year. 
Similar considerations can be made for column (4), which exhibits the results of the 
fixed-effects IV estimation of Eq. (18). Comparing the reported values with those in Table 3.9, 
it can pointed out that the key coefficient continued to be negative and increased in its absolute 
value; it also remained significant at the one per cent level. Hence, it can be concluded that a 
higher share of immigrants in a particular LLM causes a reduction in the efficiency of firms 
located in that area. Specifically, estimates indicate that an increase in the low-skilled 
immigrant share by one percentage point entails a decline, on average, by about 0.03 in the 
firms’ asset turnover ratio a year later. 
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Table 3.10:  First stage and IV estimates with firm and time fixed effects. 
Dependent variables: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin and Asset Turnover ratio. 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 LSImmShare EBITAmargin LSImmShare AssetTurnover 
     
LSImmShare  -0.2914*  -0.0283*** 
  (0.1617)  (0.0096) 
     
lnGDP 3.0309** 3.9439*** 3.0298** 0.2256*** 
 (1.3831) (1.1965) (1.3827) (0.0689) 
     
UnemplRate 0.0216 -0.0601*** 0.0217 -0.0020** 
 (0.0135) (0.0166) (0.0135) (0.0009) 
     
IndInt -0.0762 -0.2641*** -0.0747 -0.0021 
 (0.0738) (0.0811) (0.0735) (0.0048) 
     
Z 0.2615***  0.2626***  
 (0.0585)  (0.0586)  
     
Constant -20.8178* -23.7361** -20.8392*** -0.4996 
 (12.4825) (9.8697) (12.4805) (0.5587) 
     
Within R2 0.7481 0.0092 0.7485 0.0261 
Rho 0.9930 0.6639 0.9930 0.7942 
     
F statistic 22.98  23.10  
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 701,384 701,384 709,652 709,652 
No. of firms 92,139 92,139 92,061 92,061 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses. 671 clusters based on 2001 LLMs definition (15 LLMs 
missing in the sample). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Robustness checks 
Regression findings displayed above are definitely different from what was expected, 
since they seem to differ from the results of the extant literature on the subject. Indeed, the (few) 
previous empirical studies that investigated the effects of immigration on firms’ performance 
generally tend to conclude that immigration exerts a positive (or slightly positive) impact. 
Therefore, in order to confirm the structural validity of the empirical models 
implemented so far, a set of robustness checks have been run on the available data. First of all, 
a vector of time-varying firm-level controls have been added to the model specification. The 
aim was to assess whether the impact of low-skilled immigration on firms’ performance 
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indicators would have changed by taking into account more regressors – namely, the firm’s age, 
the (logged) debt-to-equity ratio, and the (logged) shareholders’ equity.  
Table 3.11:  IV estimates with both local- and firm-level controls. 
Dependent variables: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin and Asset Turnover ratio. 
 (1) (2) 
 EBITAmargin AssetTurnover 
LSImmShare -0.3227*** -0.0285*** 
 (0.1197) (0.0091) 
   
Age -0.1504*** -0.0166*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0017) 
   
lnDtoE 0.0989*** -0.0121*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0012) 
   
lnShareholdersEquity 2.2968*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0017) 
   
lnGDP 3.5802*** 0.2183*** 
 (1.0307) (0.0670) 
   
UnemplRate -0.0498*** -0.0018** 
 (0.0137) (0.0009) 
   
IndInt -0.2697*** -0.0020 
 (0.0694) (0.0047) 
   
Constant -30.9912*** -0.2623 
 (8.8892) (0.5550) 
   
Within R2 0.0762 0.0291 
Rho 0.6652 0.7896 
   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 701,364 709,632 
No. of firms 92,138 92,061 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses. 671 clusters based on 2001 LLMs definition (15 LLMs 
missing in the sample). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Results of these additional regressions are shown in Table 3.11, which reports IV 
estimates only. As can be noted by looking at column (1), the estimate of the key coefficient 
did not change its sign and went back to being significant at the one per cent level; the negative 
effect on firms’ EBITA margin of a one-percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant 
share rose from 0.29 to 0.32 percentage points. In addition, the goodness of fit of the model 
improved significantly since the within R-squared jumped from 0.01 to 0.08. Instead, with 
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respect to immigration effects of firms’ efficiency, it can be said by examining column (2) that 
the results for the second model remained almost unaffected by the additional controls. 
Another potential source of bias, which could have caused the results to differ from what 
was expected, is the presence of outliers in the sample; very small firms and, especially, very 
large ones may exert a strong influence on the data, which can sometimes distort the regression 
findings. In order to check whether this was the case, it has been considered a subsample made 
of “regular” firms, i.e. those between the 1st and 99th percentile in terms of both revenues and 
total assets. Therefore, firms that were too small or too big, as far as either annual turnover or 
total assets are concerned, were excluded from these additional analyses. Table 3.12 displays 
the IV estimates of the coefficient of interest for these subsamples. It seems clear that results 
do not differ much from those obtained on the whole samples, therefore outliers are deemed not 
to influence the empirical findings to the point of altering them significantly. 
Table 3.12:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
on subsamples of “regular” firms in terms of Revenues and Total Assets. 
Dependent variables: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin and Asset Turnover ratio. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 EBITAmargin EBITAmargin AssetTurnover AssetTurnover 
     
LSImmShare -0.2977* -0.3213*** -0.0312*** -0.0314*** 
 (0.1634) (0.1199) (0.0098) (0.0093) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 689,607 689,588 697,483 697,464 
No. of firms 91,395 91,394 91,311 91,311 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses. 671 clusters based on 2001 LLMs definition (15 LLMs 
missing in the sample). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration.  
Moreover, since the baseline samples consisted of a very large number of observations, 
some further tests have been conducted in order to verify whether the same results would have 
continued to hold in a much more restricted sample. In this respect, firms have been initially 
reduced keeping only those with sales revenue higher than (or equal to) 500 thousand euros for 
the entire period under investigation. Results obtained from this subsample are exhibited in 
Table 3.13. Subsequently, another attempt has been made by keeping only firms for which 
observations were always available between 2008 and 2017, thereby considering a smaller but 
strongly balanced panel dataset. IV estimates for this second experiment are reported in Table 
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3.14. As can be noted, in both cases the estimated effect of low-skilled immigration on the 
company indicators under consideration continued to be negative and definitely significant. 
Table 3.13:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share on subsamples 
of firms with revenues always higher than (or equal to) 500 thousand euros. 
Dependent variables: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin and Asset Turnover ratio. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 EBITAmargin EBITAmargin AssetTurnover AssetTurnover 
     
LSImmShare -0.3129** -0.3207*** -0.0248*** -0.0249*** 
 (0.1279) (0.0867) (0.0082) (0.0084) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 490,364 490,350 489,939 489,926 
No. of firms 59,979 59,979 59,876 59,876 
No. of clusters 648 648 649 649 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Table 3.14:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
on subsamples of firms with observations available for the whole time period. 
Dependent variables: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin and Asset Turnover ratio. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 EBITAmargin EBITAmargin AssetTurnover AssetTurnover 
     
LSImmShare -0.3687*** -0.3590*** -0.0227*** -0.0227*** 
 (0.0964) (0.0761) (0.0066) (0.0067) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 267,720 267,708 277,990 277,983 
No. of firms 26,772 26,772 27,799 27,799 
No. of clusters 574 574 575 575 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
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So far, the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share on firms’ performance has been 
estimated by looking at total population, independently of the gender. Therefore, another test 
aimed at assessing the consistency of the results obtained so far restricts the explanatory 
variables to males and females separately. Table 3.15 illustrates the IV estimates obtained using 
as key regressor the low-skilled immigrant share computed either on the male or female 
population only116. It can be immediately noticed that, in all regressions, the estimates are 
higher when using the female rather than the male immigration share. In particular, the 
estimated coefficients of the effects on the EBITA margin obtained employing the female share 
are about 0.06 percentage points higher than those obtained when using the overall immigrant 
share, while those achieved using the male share are about 0.05 percentage points lower. The 
same can be said for the estimates of the impact on asset turnover, which are 0.005 points higher 
with the female share and 0.004 points lower with the male share. Anyway, despite this slight 
variation, all estimates remained definitely negative and statistically significant. 
Table 3.15:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
computed separately for males and females. 
Dependent variables: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin and Asset Turnover ratio. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 EBITAmargin EBITAmargin AssetTurnover AssetTurnover 
     
LSImmShare -0.2421** -0.2713*** -0.0242*** -0.0244*** 
for males (0.1313) (0.0940) (0.0077) (0.0073) 
     
LSImmShare -0.3447* -0.3813** -0.0332*** -0.0335*** 
for females (0.1958) (0.1540) (0.0109) (0.0116) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 701,384 701,364 709,652 709,632 
No. of firms 92,139 91,138 92,061 92,061 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses. 671 clusters based on 2001 LLMs definition (15 LLMs 
missing in the sample). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration.  
In the light of the robustness tests presented above, it can affirmed that the empirical 
analyses conducted so far are quite persuasive; the available evidence suggests that a higher 
presence of low-skilled immigrants worsen both profitability and efficiency of manufacturing 
                                                          
116 The same has been done for the unemployment rate. 
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firms. Anyway, it should not be forgotten that much also depends on the assumptions made in 
the data-gathering and sample-building phases117 and on the empirical methodologies adopted.  
Heterogeneous effects 
The results presented above are based on the implicit assumption that the effects of low-
skilled immigration on Italian manufacturing firms’ performance do not change across firms. 
However, the immigration impact is likely to be different according to firms’ characteristics – 
especially their geographical location and the industry in which they operate. Therefore, a set 
of analyses have been performed in order to assess the existence of possible heterogeneous 
effects. 
First of all, firms have been split in three subsamples based on the geographical area in 
which they are located, i.e. North, Center, and South, in line to the ISTAT partition. In this 
respect, it is well known that there are significant differences between the North and the South 
of the country, in terms of both level of industrialization and presence of foreigners, and 
therefore it was worth investigating whether this diversity would be reflected in the data.  
Table 3.16:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
on subsamples based on the geographical area. 
Dependent variable: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin. 
 All sample North Center South 
 EBITAmargin EBITAmargin EBITAmargin EBITAmargin 
     
LSImmShare -0.3227*** -0.1978*** -0.2880 -0.2271 
 (0.1197) (0.0627) (0.2365) (0.3481) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 701,364 476,149 124,743 100,472 
No. of firms 92,138 60,452 16,980 14,706 
No. of clusters 671 236 132 316 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration.  
By running three separate regressions on the subsamples, it appeared that the adverse 
effect of low-skilled immigration on firms’ operating profitability was lower in the North of the 
                                                          
117 The assumptions and considerations on the basis of which data were collected and adapted to build up the 
samples have been largely detailed in subparagraph 3.2.1. 
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country when compared to the whole sample, while it became no longer statistically significant 
when looking only at the Center and at the South areas (see Table 3.16). With regard to the 
impact on asset turnover, instead, it seemed that foreigners’ presence had a stronger negative 
effect on firms located in the Center of Italy when compared to those located in the North, 
whereas its effect is rather small and no more statistically significant in the South. Again, the 
negative effect on efficiency of firms in the North appeared lower when contrasted to firms 
considered altogether (see Table 3.17). 
Table 3.17:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
on subsamples based on the geographical area. 
Dependent variable: manufacturing firms’ Asset Turnover ratio. 
 All sample North Center South 
 AssetTurnover AssetTurnover AssetTurnover AssetTurnover 
     
LSImmShare -0.0285*** -0.0178*** -0.0373*** -0.0066 
 (0.0091) (0.0033) (0.0115) (0.0201) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 709,632 482,029 125,747 101,856 
No. of firms 92,061 60,474 16,961 14,626 
No. of clusters 671 236 132 316 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Subsequently, firms have been split in four subsamples according to the sector they 
operate in. Following the classification of manufacturing industries provided by EUROSTAT, 
firms have been classified as operating in low-tech (LT), medium-low-tech (MLT), medium-
high-tech (MHT), and high-tech (HT) industries. Previous academic researches generally 
pointed out that the effect of immigration is stronger when firms operating in LT and MLT 
industries are concerned; hence, an attempt has been made in order to analyze whether this was 
also the case. Concerning the impact on firms’ EBITA margin, results of the separate regression 
displayed a slightly more negative effect for LT and MLT industries, when compared to the 
whole sample, whereas the coefficients were lower but no statistically significant for MHT and 
HT industries (see Table 3.18). Also the negative impact on firms’ efficiency appeared to 
decrease as the level of technology of the industry increased, but this time the coefficient 
estimates were all significant, at least at 10% level (see Table 3.19). 
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Table 3.18:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
on subsamples based on the firms’ industry. 
Dependent variable: manufacturing firms’ EBITA margin. 
 LT MLT MHT HT 
 EBITAmargin EBITAmargin EBITAmargin EBITAmargin 
     
LSImmShare -0.3513*** -0.3543* -0.3090 0.1125 
 (0.1239) (0.2061) (0.2071) (0.2119) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 248,700 268,253 158,831 25,580 
No. of firms 33,292 35,516 20,129 3,201 
No. of clusters 641 621 522 305 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration.  
 
Table 3.19:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
on subsamples based on the firms’ industry. 
Dependent variable: manufacturing firms’ Asset Turnover ratio. 
 LT MLT MHT HT 
 AssetTurnover AssetTurnover AssetTurnover AssetTurnover 
     
LSImmShare -0.0463*** -0.0219** -0.0203*** -0.0137* 
 (0.0140) (0.0094) (0.0115) (0.0082) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 249,302 271,895 162,039 26,396 
No. of firms 33,183 35,505 20,164 3,209 
No. of clusters 641 622 522 305 
Time series length 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by LLM in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
In an unreported experiment, the sample has been also split in four subsamples, 
according to the dimension of the corporate group the companies belong to. Firms have been 
classified as being part of a small group when it involved 2 to 5 companies, medium group 
when it was made of 6 to 15 companies, and large group when it embodied 16 companies or 
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more. It has been observed that the negative effect on EBITA margin appeared to increase its 
magnitude as long as the group dimensions rose; the coefficient for firms in large groups was 
almost three times that obtained for the whole sample, whereas it was definitely lower (and not 
even statistically significant) for firms belonging to no group. The impact of low-skilled 
immigration on firms’ efficiency, instead, seems to be more homogeneous and in line with the 
results obtained for all companies; only the estimated coefficient for firms in medium groups 
was slightly more negative. 
Another, last investigation on heterogeneous effects of immigration according to firms’ 
characteristics has been carried out by looking at companies’ legal form. The negative effect of 
the low-skilled immigrant share on firm’s profitability appeared to be a little bit higher for SRLs 
and lower for SPAs, when contrasted to the all sample; the coefficient was positive for 
partnerships and strongly negative for firms with other legal forms, but in both cases it was no 
statistically significant. With respect to firms’ efficiency, instead, all coefficients remained 
negative and significant, showing stronger effects for SPAs. 
3.3. Focus on Italian propensity to innovate 
So far, the discussion was focused on manufacturing firms’ profitability and efficiency, 
two aspects that are both linked to how well a company is performing118. From previous 
analyses, it emerged a negative, significant effect of low-skilled immigration on both indicators 
taken into account. Therefore, from the available data, it can be inferred that a high presence of 
less-educated foreigners in a given area worsens, on average, the performance of firms in that 
area. 
Anyway, there is still much that can be done in order to understand what the channels 
of influence are and which specific mechanisms come into play. Hence, this last paragraph aims 
at taking the analyses a little step further. Since many scholars argued that innovation is one of 
the main drivers of firms’ performance and growth, some additional empirical investigations 
have been accomplished with the purpose of examining whether the presence of low-skilled 
immigrants exerted also an influence on the propensity to innovate of Italian firms.  
  
                                                          
118 These two measures are strictly related to each other, and combining them together is it possible to have an idea 
of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. In fact, the product of these two indicators is called 
Return on Assets, or ROA, and is a widely used measure of how efficient a firm is at using its assets to generate 
earnings. 
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3.3.1. Data description and dataset construction 
In this respect, it has been possible to build a strongly balanced panel dataset. The focus 
was on patent applications, an innovation outcome that is readily observable and commonly 
used as a tangible proxy for innovation more broadly119.  
Before going any further, it is important to make a clarification. Italian firms can claim 
patent protection either at the Italian Patent and Trademark Office (Ufficio Italiano Brevetti e 
Marchi, UIBM) or at the European Patent Office (EPO). Nothing prevents a company from 
applying both at the national and European level, so granted European patents can also be 
validated in Italy. Luckily, it was possible to collect data for both types of patent applications, 
and therefore perform a more robust investigation. 
Italian patent applications 
Data on national patent applications has been drawn from the database available on the 
UIBM website. The UIBM, which pertains directly to the Italian Ministry of Economic 
Development (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, MISE), deals with all forms of intellectual 
property protection – namely, patents and utility models120, trademarks, and designs. For the 
purpose of the analyses presented hereinafter, data have been collected on the number of patent 
(and utility model) applications by province (NUTS 3 region) for years from 2004 to 2016. 
Unfortunately, municipal-level information was not available; nevertheless, the geographical 
scale at provincial level can be deemed to be sufficiently small to control for those differences 
in institutional and socio-economic factors, which are not observable and may contribute to 
both attracting new immigrants and increasing the innovation potential of a given area. 
Figure 3.11 illustrates the distribution of the average number of national patent 
applications by region. As can be noted, on average, more than 30 per cent of requests came 
from individuals or firms resident in Lombardia, while the first five most represented regions – 
i.e. Lombardia, Piemonte, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, and Lazio – account for more than 75 per 
cent of the total.  
  
                                                          
119 As a proxy for innovation, the number of patent applications have been preferred to the already available values 
of R&D expenditures reported on firms’ financial statements. The reason for this choice is that the financial 
statement data may be not totally reliable. Since the Italian tax authority, in order to encourage investments in 
innovation, recognizes a tax credit up to 50 per cent of incremental annual R&D expenses, firms tend to report 
higher costs than those really incurred.  
120 Utility models are a form of protection dealt with at national level only. 
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Figure 3.11: Percentage frequency distribution of the average number 
of national patent applications by region, 2004-2016. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on UIBM data. 
European patent applications 
Information on European patent applications has been collected from PATSTAT, the 
EPO’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. It is a relational database that contains 
bibliographical and legal patent data from all over the world and allows to run queries directly 
in the EPO’s databases, conduct statistical analyses, visualize the data and download it for 
offline elaboration. Information made available was at the micro level; for each parent 
application, among other information, it was detailed the identification number, the filing date, 
and the name and province of residence of the applicant(s).  
Data have been extracted about patent applications presented at the EPO by Italian 
residents between 2004 and 2016. Subsequently, they have been aggregated in order to obtain 
the number of patent applications by province for each year121. 
  
                                                          
121 In order to be aggregated, patent applications that were presented by more than one individual or firm have 









































Frequency distribution of national patent applications by region
112 
Figure 3.12: Percentage frequency distribution of the average number 
of European patent applications by region, 2004-2016. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on PATSTAT data. 
Figure 3.12 depicts the distribution of the average number of European patent 
applications by region. As can be observed, on average, one third of requests came from 
individuals or firms resident in Lombardia, while the first five most represented regions – i.e. 
Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Piemonte and Toscana – account for almost 80 per cent 
of the total. 
Figure 3.13 presents the evolution of the total number of both Italian and European 
patent applications between 2004 and 2016. It appears that the trend of requests remained fairly 
stable for the whole period considered; applications at the national office only exhibited a small 










































Frequency distribution of European patent applications by region
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Figure 3.13: Evolution of the total number of Italian  
and European patent applications from 2004 to 2016. 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on UIBM and PATSTAT data. 
Low-skilled immigrant percentage share 
As in the previous analyses on firm-level data, the key regressor – used to investigate 
the impact of immigration on innovative activity – was the low-skilled immigrant percentage 
share. This time data collected from I.Stat have been aggregated at the provincial level in order 
to obtain the low-skilled immigrant share defined as follows: 
 




  ×  100 (19) 
where provinces are indexed by p and years by t.  
Other local controls 
Again, in addition to the explanatory variable of interest, some local independent 
variables are taken into account to control for their potential influence on innovation. Similarly 
to what has been done previously for the analyses on companies’ performance, these local 
confounders added to the empirical model specifications include the GDP and the 
unemployment rate at provincial level. As said before in subparagraph 3.2.1, data on these 
measures for the years from 2004 to 2016 were readily available on the online databases 
provided by the EUROSTAT and ISTAT, respectively.  
The third and last control variable is what has been called business intensity ratio. It has 
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BussInt𝑝𝑡  =  
LocUnits𝑝𝑡
Residents𝑝𝑡
 ×  100 (20) 
where provinces are indexed by p and years by t. LocUnits𝑝𝑡 is the number of total local 
units in province p in year t, while Residents𝑝𝑡 is the number of total residents in province p at 
the beginning of year t. 
To compute this measure, data on the number of total local units – the numerator in Eq. 
(20) – were collected from: i) the statistic Local units and persons employed by provinces, 
available on I.Stat, for the years from 2012 to 2016, and ii) the tables produced by the Statistical 
register of Local Units (ASIA - LU) and published on ISTAT website, for the years from 2004 
to 2011. This last control, BussInt𝑝𝑡, can be understood as the number of local units per 100 
inhabitants in province p at time t, and represents a measure of the whole intensity of 
competitiveness in that particular province. 
Data on all variables mentioned above have been put together to construct a unique 
panel dataset made up of 1,430 observations, in which the 110 provinces represent the cross-
sectional dimension and years from 2004 to 2016 denote the time series dimension. Tables 3.20 
and 3.21 present the summary statistics for all the variables in the panel dataset.  
In particular, by examining Table 3.20, it is immediately evident that both outcome 
variables present average and median values that certainly differ from each other. Notably, the 
mean is much higher than the median, which implies a right-skewed distribution. By comparing 
their maximum values with the 95th percentiles, it is clear that this is due to the presence of few, 
very large values. Therefore, in order to reduce the effect of these observations and to partially 
fix the skewness in the data, the natural logarithmic transformation has been applied to the 
number of patent applications before running the empirical regressions. 
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95th percentile 380 137 
Overall Std. Dev. 
 
329 80 
Between Std. Dev. 329 78 
Within Std. Dev. 30 19 
Observations 1,430 1,430 
Provinces 110 110 
Variable type Outcome1 Outcome2 
Source: own elaboration. 
Moreover, from Table 3.20 it can be noted that both outcome variables exhibit a much 
higher between than within variation; this confirms that the number of patent applications is 
strictly related to local characteristics that do not vary much over time. 
Table 3.21, instead, illustrates the summary statistics of the explanatory variables. As 
before, it can be pointed out that all variables display, as expected, a higher between than within 
variation, implying that they all vary more between provinces than over time. Moreover, all 
regressors except GDP appear to have a quite symmetrical distribution; hence, the log-
transformed GDP has been used as control variable in the empirical regressions. 
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 Overall Mean 
 
5.43 14,535 9.57 7.99 
Minimum 0.21 
 
870 1.87 5.01 
Maximum 
 
15.58 170,793 31.46 12.50 




0.86 2,683 3.28 5.45 
95th percentile 11.11 36,149 20.36 10.35 
Overall Std. Dev. 
 
3.34 21,281 5.33 1.53 
Between Std. Dev. 2.97 21,309 4.50 1.51 
Within Std. Dev. 1.56 1,616 2.89 0.30 
Observations 1,430 1,430 1,430 1,430 
Provinces 110 110 110 110 
Variable type Key Regressor Control Control Control 
Source: own elaboration. 
3.3.2. Estimation strategy: econometric model specifications 
Also these additional empirical analyses are based on an unobserved effects model 
(UEM), since it is likely to exists some unobserved heterogeneity across provinces that affects 
patent applications and that somehow has to be taken into account. Therefore, the general 
empirical model employed is represented by the following equation: 
 𝑦𝑝𝑡 = 𝜷𝑿𝑝𝑡  +  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑡 
with p = 1,…,P, and t = 1,…,T 
(21) 
where provinces are indexed by p and years by t. 𝑦𝑝𝑡 is the dependent variable referred 
to province p at time t, 𝜷 is the K × 1 vector of parameters for the K explanatory variables, 𝑿𝑝𝑡 
is the 1 × K vector of local-level explanatory variables computed for province p at time t, 
𝛼𝑝 are province-specific effects, 𝛿𝑡 are time-specific effects, 𝑢𝑝𝑡 are the idiosyncratic errors. 
The model of Eq. (21) includes both provincial fixed effects – i.e. time-invariant 
differences across provinces that would influence the dependent variable – and time fixed 
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effects – i.e. time-specific factors that would also affect the dependent variable, like for instance 
macroeconomic cycles or changes in the patent regulations122.  
The detailed models to be estimated on the panel dataset are presented hereinafter. The 
first one, used to analyze the effects of low-skilled immigration on national patent applications, 




= 𝛽1LSImmShare𝑝𝑡  +  𝛽2lnGDP𝑝𝑡  +  𝛽3UR𝑝𝑡 
            + 𝛽4BussInt𝑝𝑡  +  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑡 
with p = 1,…,110 and t = 2004,…,2016 
(22) 
where the dependent variable, ln(ITPatAppl)
𝑝𝑡
, is the natural logarithm of the number 
of patent applications presented at the UIBM by residents in province p in year t. 
Analogously, the second empirical model, aimed at investigating the impact of low-




= 𝛽1LSImmShare𝑝𝑡  +  𝛽2lnGDP𝑝𝑡  +  𝛽3UR𝑝𝑡 
            + 𝛽4BussInt𝑝𝑡  +  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑡 
with p = 1,…,110 and t = 2004,…,2016 
(23) 
where the dependent variable, ln(EUPatAppl)
𝑝𝑡
, is the natural logarithm of the number 
of patent applications presented at the EPO by residents in province p in year t. In Eqs. (21) and 
(22) the key explanatory variable and the local controls are exactly the same and have already 
been defined above. The coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, captures the correlation, ceteris paribus, 
between the low-skilled immigrant share at the provincial level and the number of either 
national or European patent applications. 
3.3.3. Assumptions violation: heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and endogeneity 
issues  
As has been done before for the main analyses on the immigration effects on firms’ 
performances, it was necessary to investigate whether the collected data showed 
heteroskedasticity and/or serial correlation. In this regard, a modified Wald test for 
heteroskedasticity and a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation revealed that both were present in 
                                                          
122 The presence of both types of fixed effects has been confirmed running the specific tests on the data, namely 
the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test and the Wald test on time dummies coefficients. 
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the panel dataset. Therefore, in order to account for both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation, standard errors have been adjusted for clustering at the provincial level. 
In addition, the low-skilled immigrant share – even if computed at the provincial level 
– carried along the same endogeneity problems; clearly, the reasons for the presence of 
endogeneity are identical to those described in subparagraph 3.2.3. Thus, in order to be capable 
of identifying a potential causal effect of low-skilled immigration on innovation, the IV 
methodology have been employed123. In particular, estimations have been obtained using the 
2SLS technique, in which the first stage is expressed by the following reduced form equation: 
 
LSImmShare𝑝𝑡 =  𝛾1𝑍𝑝𝑡  +  𝛾2lnGDP𝑝𝑡  +  𝛾3UR𝑝𝑡   
               + 𝛾4BussInt𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝  +  𝛿𝑡  + 𝑒𝑝𝑡 
(24) 
Hence, resuming the structural Eqs. (22) and (23), the second stage regression equations, 
used to investigate the presence of a causal impact of low-skilled immigration on both national 




 =  𝛽1LSImmShare𝑝𝑡
̂  +  𝛽2lnGDP𝑝𝑡  +  𝛽3UR𝑝𝑡  
                            + 𝛽4BussInt𝑝𝑡  +  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑡 






 =  𝛽1LSImmShare𝑝𝑡
̂  +  𝛽2lnGDP𝑝𝑡  +  𝛽3UR𝑝𝑡  
                            + 𝛽4BussInt𝑝𝑡  +  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑡 
with p = 1,…,110 and t = 2004,…,2016 
(26) 
3.3.4. Regression findings 
In this last subparagraph, these additional regression findings are finally illustrated. 
Again, the baseline results for the regressions of the two dependent variables – the number of 
Italian and European patent applications – will be presented first, using both the fixed-effects 
                                                          
123 Since the instrument used in the previous analyses was available at the local labor market level, it has been 
adjusted in order ascribe it to provinces. The imputation procedure can be summarized by the following equation: 
𝑍𝑝𝑡  =  ∑  Z𝑗(𝑚)𝑡  ×  
Residents𝑚(𝑝)𝑡
Residents𝑝𝑡
𝑚(𝑝)𝑡 , where municipalities are indexed by m, provinces by p, local labor markets 
by j, and years by t. therefore, the instrument for province p in year t, 𝑍𝑝𝑡  is computed by summing up, for each 
municipality m – belonging to province p – and year t, the instrument for LLM j – to which municipality m belongs 
– in year t, Z𝑗(𝑚)𝑡, multiplied by the share of residents in municipality m – belonging to province p – at the 
beginning of year t, Residents𝑚(𝑝)𝑡, out of total residents in province p at the beginning of year t, Residents𝑝𝑡. 
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(FE) and the instrumental variables (IV) estimation procedures. Subsequently, also some 
robustness checks and heterogeneity analyses will be briefly described. 
Baseline results  
Table 3.22 shows the fixed effects estimates of models in Eqs. (22) and (23). Column 
(1) presents the results obtained from the model designed to investigate the low-skilled 
immigration effects on Italian patent applications. By looking at the coefficient of interest, it 
emerges a small negative correlation between the outcome variable and the key regressor, but 
this effect seems to be not significantly different from zero.  
Table 3.22: FE estimates with firm and time fixed effects. 
Dependent variables: Italian and European patent applications. 
 (1) (2) 
 lnITPatAppl lnEUPatAppl 
LSImmShare -0.0044 -0.0516*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0182) 
   
lnGDP 0.0829 -0.0709 
 (0.6153) (0.4810) 
   
UnemplRate -0.0070 0.0036 
 (0.0088) (0.0075) 
   
BussInt 0.1821** -0.0885 
 (0.0858) (0.0678) 
   
Constant 1.0244 3.7008 
 (5.6622) (4.3960) 
   
Within R2 0.1032 0.1605 
LSDV R2 0.9300 0.9405 
   
Rho 0.9049 0.9515 
   
Local fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1,430 1,430 
Provinces 110 110 
Time series length 13 yrs 13 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by province in parentheses. 110 clusters based on the 2009 administrative subdivision. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Nonetheless, different assertions can be made in respect to the results obtained for the 
regression of European patent applications, which are displayed in column (2). This time, the 
estimate of the marginal effect of immigration on innovation displays a strong statistical 
significance and points to a higher share of less-educated immigrants in a given province to be 
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associated with a lower number of patent applications made by residents in the same area. 
Notably, when the low-skilled immigrant share rises by one percentage point, the number of 
European patent application decreases, on average, by 5.16 per cent. 
As an aside, it can be said that: i) both models display high intraclass correlation, i.e. 
0.90 and 0.95 respectively; ii) both local productivity and employment opportunities seem to 
be not related to the number of patent applications, since all coefficients’ estimates are not 
statistically different from zero; iii) local competition, instead, appears to be positively 
associated with national patent applications, but not with European ones. 
Table 3.23 illustrates the 2SLS instrumental variable estimates of both empirical 
models. In particular, column (1) reports the first stage results as per Eq. (24), which are exactly 
the same for both models in Eqs. (25) and (26). It can be noted that the coefficient of the 
instrument Z, which represents its marginal effect on the low-skilled immigrant share, is 
positive and significant at the one per cent level; as before, this indicates that the instrument is 
relevant124. Moreover, since the cluster-robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is higher 
than the 15 per cent Stock-Yogo critical value, the instrument can also be deemed to be not 
weak. 
Column (2) displays the results of the fixed-effects IV estimation of Eq. (25). With 
respect to the previous FE estimation of Table 3.20, it can be observed that the coefficient of 
interest is still negative although lower in its absolute value; but, more importantly, it continued 
to be statistically insignificant. Therefore, it can be said that the presence of low-skilled 
foreigners does not exert a causal effect on patent applications, at least as far as those presented 
at the Italian patent office are concerned. 
Different conclusions can be drawn by looking at column (3), which exhibits the results 
of the fixed-effects IV estimation of Eq. (26). Comparing the reported values with those in 
Table 3.20, it can pointed out that the key coefficient continued to be negative and even doubled 
in magnitude; however, it displays a lower statistical significance. Hence, it can be affirmed 
that a higher share of less-educated immigrants in a certain province is likely to cause a 
reduction in the number of European patent applications presented by residents in the same 
area. Specifically, a one-percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant share seems to 
lead to a decline, on average, by about 11 per cent in the number of patent applications presented 
at the EPO. 
  
                                                          
124 Instrument relevance has been corroborated running an underidentification Lagrangian Multiplier test, which 
proved that the first stage equation was indeed identified. 
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Table 3.23:  First stage and IV estimates with firm and time fixed effects. 
Dependent variables: Italian and European patent applications. 
 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
 LSImmShare lnITPatAppl lnEUPatAppl 
    
LSImmShare  -0.0012 -0.1087* 
  (0.1617) (0.0659) 
    
lnGDP 1.1496 0.0771 0.0322 
 (0.9204) (0.6267) (0.5027) 
    
UnemplRate 0.9203* -0.0071 0.0051 
 (0.0159) (0.0090) (0.0076) 
    
BussInt -1.6170*** 0.1880 -0.1947 
 (0.2976) (0.1347) (0.1366) 
    
Z 0.2108***   
 (0.0654)   
    
Constant 4.7052 1.0204 3.7714 
 (9.1808) (5.6619) (4.3732) 
    
Within R2 0.8833 0.1031 0.1550 
Rho 0.9854 0.9046 0.9596 
    
F statistic 11.26   
    
Local fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 1,430 1,430 1,430 
Provinces 110 110 110 
Time series length 13 yrs 13 yrs 13 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by province in parentheses. 110 clusters based on the 2009 administrative subdivision. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Robustness checks 
Regression findings displayed above can be said to be quite in line with those presented 
in the extant literature on the subject. In fact, as far as low-skilled immigration is concerned, 
most of previous studies failed to report a significant negative effect of immigration on 
innovation. 
Anyway, some (limited) robustness checks have been run on the available data. What 
has been done in this respect consists in initially restricting the explanatory variables to males 
and females separately. Indeed, Table 3.24 illustrates the IV estimates obtained using as key 
regressor the low-skilled immigrant share computed either on the male or female population 
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only125. By looking at column (1), which shows the estimates for the effect on national patent 
applications, it can be noticed that both coefficients are very low, even if that obtained 
employing the male share is slightly negative and that obtained with the female share is slightly 
positive; however, neither of them is significantly different from zero. Column (2), instead, 
reports the estimates of the impact on European patent application made by Italian firms. This 
time, the coefficients are both negative and quite similar in magnitude, but only that obtained 
using the female share is statistically different from zero – even if only at the 10 per cent level. 
Table 3.24:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
computed separately for males and females. 
Dependent variables: Italian and European patent applications. 
 (1) (2) 
 lnITPatAppl lnEUPatAppl 
   
LSImmShare -0.0033 -0.1054 
for males (0.0680) (0.0667) 
   
LSImmShare 0.0006 -0.1138* 
for females (0.0732) (0.0667) 
   
Local-level controls Yes Yes 
Local fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1,430 1,430 
Provinces 110 110 
Time series length 13 yrs 13 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by province in parentheses. 110 clusters based on the 2009 administrative subdivision. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Given that a very low statistical significance emerged only for some coefficient 
estimates, in particular when employing as dependent variable the European patent 
applications, the existence of a negative causal effect of low-skilled immigration on innovation 
cannot be deem to be confirmed for sure. Therefore, in this respect, considering that in 2016 
the number of requests for patent protection presented at the EPO by Italian residents were 
extraordinary below the average (see Figure 13.3), observations for that specific year have been 
excluded from the data and then regressions have been run again. Hence, Table 3.25 contrasts 
the IV estimates with and without observations for 2016. It is immediately clear that the 
negative effect of low-skilled immigration on European patent applications is no longer 
statistically significant, for none of the coefficients reported. And these results are eventually 
                                                          
125 The same has been done for the unemployment rate. 
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in line with those obtained from regressions carried out using the number of national patent 
applications as outcome variable. 
Table 3.25:  IV estimates with and without observations for year 2016. 
Dependent variable: European patent applications. 
 With 2016 Without 2016 
 1nEUPatAppl lnEUPatAppl 
   
LSImmShare -0.1087* -0.0708 
 (0.0659) (0.0664) 
   
LSImmShare -0.1054 -0.0684 
for males (0.0667) (0.0658) 
   
LSImmShare -0.1138* -0.0758 
for females (0.0667) (0.0682) 
   
Local-level controls Yes Yes 
Local fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1,430 1,320 
Provinces 110 110 
Time series length 13 yrs 12 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by province in parentheses. 110 clusters based on the 2009 administrative subdivision. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Obviously, like all robustness tests, also the analyses presented above may be 
questionable and considered not fully conclusive. However, given that the estimates of the core 
coefficient are systematically negative, it can be said that a negative effect of low-skilled 
immigration on innovation cannot be excluded for sure. 
 
Heterogeneous effects 
As has been done before for the analyses on the impact of low-skilled immigration on 
firms’ performance, some additional investigations have been conducted in order to disclose 
the presence of any heterogeneous effect. Hence, the Italian provinces have been divided in 
three larger geographical areas – namely North, Center, and South, in line to the ISTAT 
partition of the Italian territory – in order to investigate whether some diversity in the effect of 
low-skilled immigration would have emerged among these three areas. 
As far as national patent applications are concerned, Table 3.26 illustrates the estimates 
of the coefficient of interest obtained by running separate regressions on the three subsamples 
of provinces. It can be observed that the marginal effect of low-skilled immigration turned out 
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to be positive for the North and slightly positive for the Center, whereas it appeared to be 
strongly negative in the South. However, despite this apparent heterogeneity, the effect of low-
skilled immigration on national patent application never proved to be statistically different from 
zero.  
Table 3.26:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
on subsamples based on the geographical area. 
Dependent variable: Italian patent applications. 
 All sample North Center South 
 lnITPatAppl lnITPatAppl lnITPatAppl lnITPatAppl 
     
LSImmShare -0.0012 0.3487 0.0067 -1.4985 
 (0.1617) (0.2151) (0.1530) (1.4442) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,430 611 286 533 
Provinces 110 47 22 41 
Time series length 13 yrs 13 yrs 13 yrs 13 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by province in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Table 3.27:  IV estimates of the impact of the low-skilled immigrant share 
on subsamples based on the geographical area. 
Dependent variable: European patent applications. 
 All sample North Center South 
 lnEUPatAppl lnEUPatAppl lnEUPatAppl lnEUPatAppl 
     
LSImmShare -0.1087* -0.2116 0.0552 -1.1248 
 (0.0659) (0.1627) (0.1266) (1.1591) 
     
Local-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,430 611 286 533 
No. of firms 110 47 22 41 
Time series length 13 yrs 13 yrs 13 yrs 13 yrs 
Standard errors clustered by province in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Table 3.27, instead, shows the estimates for the effect of less-educated foreigners on 
European patent applications. Again, the coefficient estimates differ between the three areas; 
the marginal effect of the low-skilled immigrant share is negative in the North and strongly 











The work presented in this paper could be assimilated to the quite limited group of 
empirical researches that investigate the impact of immigration on innovation and firms’ 
performance. However, this study can be deemed to be quite peculiar, at least in two aspects. 
The first peculiarity is linked to the dimensions of the sample considered; in fact, the baseline 
analyses are conducted on observations belonging to more than 92,000 manufacturing 
companies, and this number, compared to other firm-level studies, can be said to be quite 
remarkable. The second peculiarity concerns the type of outcome variables selected for the 
empirical investigations; as far as is known, there are no notable studies that focus on firms 
performance indicators like those employed in this paper. Most of the academic literature that 
analyzes the effects of immigration on company dimensions, rather aims attention at absolute 
values of profits or capital stocks. Hence, the use of financial statement ratios as dependent 
variables in this type of studies can be said to be quite a novelty. Clearly, empirical findings 
based on ratios may differ from those based on absolute measures; indeed, there are a variety 
of company dynamics that contribute to determine financial ratios, and focusing also on this 
type of indicators may provide a wider picture on the effects of immigration on domestic firms. 
Specifically, the present work is primarily focused on investigating the (causal) effects 
exerted by low-skilled immigration on the operating profitability and efficiency of Italian 
manufacturing firms. In order to do so, different regression analyses have been conducted 
employing both the fixed-effects and the instrumental variables methodologies. These analyses 
have been run on a large panel dataset, which combines firm-level and local-labor-market-level 
dimensions collected for the ten-year period between 2008 and 2017. In all empirical 
specifications, the local share of low-skilled immigrants out total population has been exploited 
as key regressor, assuming it as being a good proxy for the number of foreigners employed by 
firms. In addition, a set of local controls have been added to the model to account for macro 
dimensions that may also affect firms’ performance. In order to investigate the impact of 
immigration on firms’ operating profitability and efficiency, the EBITA margin and the asset 
turnover ratio have been adopted, respectively, as outcome variables.  
Results point to a significant negative effect of low-skilled immigration on both 
profitability and efficiency of manufacturing firms. In other words, a higher share of immigrants 
in a given area causes a reduction, on average, in both EBITA margins and asset turnover ratios 
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of companies located in the same area. These findings are confirmed when adding also firm-
level controls to the model specification and prove to be robust to different types of sample 
reductions. Moreover, some heterogeneous effects analyses suggest, in general, a sharper effect 
for companies located in the Center of the country and for companies operating in low-tech and 
medium-low-tech industries. 
In the light of the above, some additional investigations have been performed in order 
to check whether low-skilled immigration might have negatively influenced firms’ profitability 
and efficiency through its impact on innovation propensity. For this purpose, the number of 
patent applications – presented both at the national and at the European offices – has been 
employed as proxies for innovation activity more broadly. Data on patent applications have 
been combined with other provincial level data to build a second panel dataset for the years 
between 2004 and 2016. Results obtained using analogous empirical strategies suggest a 
possible negative effect of the low-skilled immigrant share on both patent dimensions. Even if 
the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero in all model specifications, 
they are systematically negative; these findings point to the eventuality that a higher presence 
of low-skilled immigrants into a particular province might have slacken the innovative 
propensity of firms located in the same area. 
At first glance, the results came to light in this work may appear to clash with those 
emerged from previous empirical researches; however, a more careful analysis may reveal that 
they simply tell the story from another perspective. Obviously, a higher presence of less-
educated foreigners in a region causes a shift in the local labor supply towards cheap manual-
intensive labor. Thus, labor-intensive companies – as most of those operating in the 
manufacturing sector are – are likely to hire more immigrant workers, driven by the opportunity 
of easily reducing their payroll costs, thereby increasing their profits. This is in line with 
findings presented by Brunello et al. (2019), who observe a reduction in firms’ labor costs and 
a slightly positive increase in their profits. However, immigrants may bring along some 
communication and integration issues that may also exert an influence on firms’ performance, 
but in a more subtle way. For instance, to perform the same tasks, foreign workers are likely to 
require more on-the-job training than natives, both because they have a relatively low 
educational attainment and because face substantial linguistic barriers that hinder their 
communication and learning. Hence, companies might incur in higher costs, in broad sense, 
mainly in terms of discontent among native workers and of resulting general laxity in the 
working environment. These dynamics, altogether, may have negative effects on the overall 
firm productivity, which in turn may trigger a deterioration of efficiency and profitability 
indicators. In fact, this could be consistent with evidence provided by Parrotta et al. (2010) for 
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Denmark, Nicodemo (2013) for Spain, and Brunello et al. (2019) for Italy, who all discover a 
negative effect of immigration on firm productivity. 
Moreover, in the light of the results emerged with regard to patent applications, it can 
be said that the initial cost reduction linked to hiring more foreign workers might discourage 
firms’ investments in innovation over time. This behavior, in the long run, is likely to reduce 
companies’ competitiveness, forcing them to lower their prices, thereby decreasing their 
profitability. In addition, companies that do not innovate and renovate their capital investments 
are forced to face problems due to obsolescence that further reduce their efficiency and 
profitability over time. This possibility is also in accordance with conclusions reported by Lewis 
(2011), who observes that firms respond to increases in the relative supply of low-skill labor by 
reducing their investments in technology. 
Obviously, those presented above are just hypotheses that represent a possible 
interpretation of the results emerged in this paper and may be seen also as suggestions for 
further analyses on these topics. Essentially, these potential explanations are based on the 
assumption that Italian firms’ may prefer short-term profits to longer-term benefits. This 
behavior can be deemed reasonable if we think that the majority of manufacturing firms in Italy 
are small firms, often undercapitalized, that struggle to generate sufficient cash flows to stay 
competitive and develop innovative projects. Such companies could have easily preferred 
higher immediate profits, even if this would have meant sacrificing long-term profitability and 
efficiency, especially in the years following the economic crisis that so harshly affected Italian 
firms. 
However, it should not be forgotten that those analyzed in this work are simple 
indicators that conceal complex business dynamics and require a set of additional information 
to be interpreted at best. Furthermore, empirical results strictly depend on the assumptions made 
in order to select the sample and to construct the database, as well as on the statistical 
methodologies employed. 
To conclude with some considerations regarding the limitations of this study, it can be 
said that, as is confirmed by the low r-squared obtained in the analyses, the large sample of 
firms employed entails high unexplained variability. Perhaps, restricting the sample may allow 
reducing some of this variability, however leading to less general conclusions. Nevertheless, 
this heterogeneity can even be assumed as intrinsic of a business environment that, like the 
Italian one, is characterized by a multitude of small and medium enterprises. 
Another possible issue may be linked to the identification of the firms’ location through 
the reported operating address. Since some companies are likely to have more than one single 
establishment, the analyses may be partially influenced by this assumption. Obviously, having 
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more detailed information about the different plants’ location may lead to more accurate 
empirical analyses. Similarly, also the use of the immigrant presence in the territory as a proxy 
for the number of foreign workers employed by firms can to some extent be misleading, and 
the use of information on companies’ employment may produce more reliable results. 
Besides all these considerations, what is clear is that migration is likely to continue to 
be important in the near future, because of ongoing strong pressures towards globalization, 
capitalistic demand for cheap labor, and people’s desire to move in order to improve their life 
opportunities. Hence, given its strict relation to human development and economic prosperity, 
immigration will remain a top priority for the foreseeable future. And is beyond doubt that there 
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